Morocco’s Shifting Domestic and International Politics

 

By Henry Srebrnik, Fredericton Daily Gleaner

Last summer, some 60,000 migrants pushed their way into the Spanish town of Ceuta, a coastal enclave on the Moroccan side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Ceuta and its sister enclave Melilla have long been a source of tension between Madrid and Rabat, with Morocco claiming the territories as its own.

The Spanish-Moroccan boundary on the African side of the Mediterranean is the line on the ground with the greatest economic disparity from side to side in the world. It’s the border between the developed world and the Global South. So the relationship between the two countries is as thick and complex as globalization itself. It is also part of a larger geopolitical conflict that involves Algeria, Israel, and the United States, relating to Morocco’s occupation of the old Spanish Sahara.

Morocco’s sudden lapse in border enforcement may be in response to deepening ties between the left-wing government of socialist prime minister Pedro Sanchez in Spain with Algeria, including the reopening of lucrative economic ties, as well as Moroccan resentment over the perceived colonial nature of Spanish rule in Ceuta. (Rather than rebuking Morocco, Sanchez thanked Rabat for defusing the situation.)

Algeria has long supported Sahrawi separatists in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. And it considers itself a paragon of Third World leadership, the legacy of its bloody revolution against France from 1954 to 1962. So it doesn’t like the increasingly close relationship by monarchist Morocco with the Trump administration in Washington and Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, under the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and several Arab states, including Morocco, in 2020. Morocco also signed a security agreement with Israel in 2021, proving vital for the conflict in Western Sahara, and in January, the two nations signed an additional joint military work plan.

The dispute over Western Sahara traces back to Spain’s 1975 withdrawal from what was then called Spanish Sahara, which handed administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania; Mauritania withdrew from its share in 1979 after heavy losses to Sahrawi guerrillas. A 16-year war followed, pitting Moroccan forces against the Polisario Front. Rabat eventually built an extensive sand wall, fortified with landmines and troops, partitioning the territory.  A shaky stalemate is now in place.

To show its appreciation to Trump on the Western Saara issue, Morocco recently announced that it was naming the Dakhla-Tiznit highway, which runs through Western Sahara, after the U.S. president. Meanwhile, the Polisario Front sits across the border in the Algerian town of Tindouf, where thousands of displaced Saharawi people live in refugee camps.

The Ceuta crisis also stems from Morocco’s internal political dynamics. Morocco is a semi-constitutional monarchy led by a king, who governs alongside an elected parliament where Islamist, secular, and nationalist parties compete for political influence. Islamist groups dedicated to challenging the legitimacy of the monarchy itself also operate within the country, because they believe the king does not conform to their interpretation of Islamic law and governance.

This opposition intensified after Morocco normalized relations with Israel and it gained momentum after the Gaza war began three years ago. Also, though Morocco has never formally recognized Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves, successive Moroccan governments refrained from actively pursuing these territorial claims.

Islamists in Morocco consider the territories to be part of historic Muslim land, and reclaiming them to be a religious imperative. “We are still required to work diligently for the return of Ceuta and Melilla to the homeland,” asserted Abdelilah Benkirane, Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), the main Islamist party, earlier this year. In contrast to other Islamist players, the PJD has a longer record as an officially recognised and institutional actor.

According to their narrative, Morocco is not worth anyone’s loyalty until the government is overhauled. Young Moroccans are urged toward a permanent stance of confrontation with the West. The PJD and others claim that Morocco in its current political system has no future, and Islamist rule is the only viable salvation.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to blunt their message, King Mohammed VI asked Fatima Zahra El Mansouri, a lawyer from the centrist Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), to form a new government. The Moroccan king, who took the throne in 1999, has been broadly supportive of women’s rights.

Her selection comes after legislative elections held Sept. 23 were characterized by low turnout, amid widespread frustration over unemployment and poor public services, as well as concern about the exodus of Moroccans in search of better economic opportunities. Unemployment is high, with about one-third of young Moroccans jobless. About one-fifth of the work force is considered underemployed. Schools and hospitals are crumbling, and the space for public expression is shrinking.

Her party won 97 of 395 legislative seats, far from a majority, so she promised to form a coalition government with other moderates promptly. But the Islamist PJD took 54 seats – a big gain of 41.

El Mansouri has been nicknamed the “pasha’s daughter” because she comes from a prominent Marrakesh family and her father was formerly a municipal governor. She referred to her selection as “historic,” and framed it as a win for all women in Morocco. “This isn’t just pride for me but pride for all women,” she declared. “This is a message to all women in the kingdom.” It’s a work in progress.

 

Will Yemen’s Houthis Block the Red Sea?

 

By Henry Srebrnik, Saint John Telegraph-Journal

The ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States has made the world aware of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passageway that serves as a chokehold between the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. On one side lies Ian, on the other an exclave of Oman.

On the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab el-Mandeb strait serves a similar function between the Red Sea, with the Suez Canal connecting it to the Mediterranean Sea, at its north, and the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to the south. It separates Yemen on the Middle Eastern side and Djibouti and Eritrea on the African side. And it is a waterway through which about 12 per cent of seaborne-traded oil travels.

While Iran blocks the first waterway, Yemen’s Houthis might now do the same at the second. They are the strongest remaining member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and they are currently exerting significant pressure on America’s Gulf allies.

The Houthi rebels emerged in the 1990s from the Zaydi Shi’ite heartland of northern Yemen, fought six wars against the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010, and seized the capital city of Sanaa in 2014. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led an Arab coalition in a major anti-Houthi military intervention, yet more than 11 years of warfare have failed to dislodge them from the capital or much of Yemen’s densely populated northwest.

The Saudis back the Aden-based ruling Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (YPLC), the official recognized government of Yemen. There had been an on-again, off-again truce by the various contending forces in Yemen after 2022, but no longer. In July, the Iranians flew a Houthi delegation from Tehran to Sanaa, challenging the anti-Houthi Saudi-led coalition’s control of Yemen’s airspace.

To prevent the aircraft from landing, Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government bombed the Sanaa airport’s sole runway. Although the plane landed at the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah instead, the Saudi action gave the Houthis a pretext for abandoning the fragile truce. It was at that point that the group began their bold escalation against Saudi interests and launched their new offensive against government forces in Yemen. The Saudi airstrikes and the rapid Houthi response may signal the beginning of a new and dangerous phase in the conflict.

In the past few weeks, the Houthis have launched a major new bid for military dominance in the country. Backed by Iran, they unleashed a wave of drones and ballistic missiles strikes on Saudi Arabia, setting fire to oil facilities. They defeated Saudi-backed government forces along the Red Sea coast, captured the strategic port of Mokha, and seized Perim Island at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb.

Houthi control of these will allow the group to more easily harass Red Sea shipping, placing further pressure on global energy and financial markets. Saudi oil exports through the Bab el-Mandeb have plummeted 95 per cent. Now, by also targeting infrastructure and ships near the Saudi Red Sea port complex of Yanbu, an industrial center known for its oil refineries, the Houthis are threatening the transit of oil exports sent by pipeline from eastern oil fields and then shipped northward through Egypt’s Suez Canal.

Israel and the United States caused significant damage to Houthi strongholds during the Gaza War. In the spring of 2025, the Trump administration undertook more than 1,000 airstrikes; a few months later, the Israelis targeted Houthi infrastructure and assassinated the group’s de facto prime minister and its military chief of staff.

Yet, with Iranian support, these campaigns simply emboldened the group, and they assumed that Saudi Arabia would also step back. This was a miscalculation. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has clearly had enough and has been preparing for confrontation.

On July 30, Riyadh announced a 14-country naval defence coalition for the Red Sea that included Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan and Djibouti. The crown prince signed a mutual defence agreement with Turkey and Pakistan at a ceremony in Mecca with the leaders of both countries at his side. The chiefs of staff of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey then met in Riyadh July 25 under the Mecca defence pact, as Houthi attacks continued.

Yemen has many armed groups apart from the Houthis, who oppose the internationally recognized regime. In January, Saudi Arabia had a falling out with its ally in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), when Abu Dhabi-aligned separatist forces led by the Southern Transition Council (STC) tried to assert control over all of south Yemen, which had once been the British-governed Aden Protectorate. The north has been an independent state, ruled for centuries by a monarchy.

Riyadh wants a Yemeni state capable of securing the Saudi border, while Abu Dhabi cultivated those southern forces in Yemen whose ambitions for autonomy or independence conflicted with Saudi priorities. Since then, the Emiratis have withdrawn from Yemen entirely, allowing Riyadh to unify government military forces under its direct command.

Yemen’s government has now called for a general mobilisation. Rashad al-Alimi, head of the ruling YPLC, has asked citizens to “contribute in every way possible” in the fight. He pledged to recapture Sanaa and restore government sovereignty over the whole of Yemen. This will not be easy, even with Saudi help. The Houthis are a resilient movement.