Questioning Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Political thinkers over the past two centuries have grappled with the question of what constitutes a nation, and who belongs – or doesn’t belong – to it.

Civic or territorial nationalists define the nation as an association of people with equal and shared political rights, and an allegiance to similar political procedures. The nation is a political entity, inclusive and liberal. Anyone can, so to speak, join through becoming a citizen.

Ethnic nationalists define the nation in terms of a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, faith, and ancestry. They base membership on descent or heredity. It is clearly a more restrictive form of nationalism.

Let’s use one illustration to d

emonstrate the confusion that can occur when we try to pigeonhole people based on their differing identities.

We’ll take three families: the Rahmans are Muslim Bengalis from Bangladesh, the former East Pakistan. The Barkatis are Muslim Bengalis, but from the Indian state of West Bengal and therefore citizens of India. The Banerjees, who are Hindus, are also West Bengalis from India.

All three families move to Glasgow, Scotland. While it does have its own assembly and legal system, Scotland is not a sovereign state, but a devolved part of the United Kingdom.

Are the three families now Scots? In terms of ethnicity, no. But for civic or territorial nationalists, the answer is yes, they are Scottish. But are they then Indo-Scots, Bengali Scots, or, in the case of the Rahmans, Bangladeshi Scots?

Or, for that matter, since Scotland remains part of the British state, are they – at least once they acquire citizenship – simply British, thereby bypassing the tricky business of whether they are Scottish or not? That would work for some.

However, since Scottish ethno-nationalists, especially those who wish to create an independent Scotland, see the inhabitants of Great Britain as English, Scottish, and Welsh, the term British means little to them. It is merely a matter of legal citizenship.

So if nationalists were victorious and Scotland became a sovereign country, would the three families now be defined as Scottish, given that they are already UK citizens living in Glasgow?

For civic and territorial nationalists, the answer would be yes. But for some Scottish ethnic nationalists, the families would still not be Scots, even though citizens of a new Scotland -- though perhaps through assimilation, their descendants might become Scottish. (Racists, an extreme subgroup of ethnic nationalists, would deny that they could ever be Scots.)

What of the reverse? If the MacGregor family, ethnically Scottish, decide to leave Glasgow and move to London, would they cease being Scots? Not to ethnic nationalists, they wouldn’t – they’d become part of a Scottish diaspora.

Yet should the United Kingdom dissolve, and England, like Scotland, become – as it was for centuries – a country on its own, the MacGregors would become citizens of England.

And then perhaps they would become “Scots English” in terms of ethnic identity, despite the oxymoronic sound of that definition.

Is it a wonder these issues are never resolved?

Political Culture More Important Than Formal Structures

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian       

Rio de Janeiro and Charlottetown both have traffic lights at major intersections. However, in Rio there are often police officers at the intersections as well, something Charlottetown manages without.

Why? Because otherwise - as I noticed when I was in Brazil years ago -- many drivers in Rio would, after looking to see no oncoming traffic on the cross street, continue driving right through the intersection.

In Charlottetown, not many people would do that, even in the dead of night and with no traffic on either the cross street or on the one on which they were travelling.

It all boils down to culture, and driving habits are a part of culture, of course.

People's attitudes and values regarding their political system are what we term political culture.

It's often the most volatile countries, ones with little sense of overarching national consciousness or a democratic political culture, that have the most stringent rules and regulations on the books.

Their political structures usually include intricate power-sharing arrangements between identifiable ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities or rival regions, including broad governing coalitions.

Their electoral procedures are designed to be as ‘fair' and ‘inclusive' as possible, through the crafting of complex formulas, such as the alternative vote, single-transferable vote, two-round runoff, proportional representation, and mixed-member-proportional systems.

This ensures that most political parties on the ballot - and there are always many -- gain seats in their legislatures, allowing disparate groups a voice in governance.

Some countries also reserve places or implement quotas for women, minorities, and even occupational and social groups in their parliaments.

They may also allow communities a large measure of control over culture and education.

On the other hand, some countries that are troubled by very deep political divisions only sanction parties that have a ‘national' character.

Such parties must demonstrate support in more than a few regions in order to run in national elections. Groups that are overtly the vehicles of particular sub-national entities are banned as being "divisive" and a danger to the unity of the state.

Yet despite their elaborate constitutional architecture and political safeguards, many of these countries still dissolve into civil strife or end up governed by brutal authoritarian regimes.

This happens because they are, typically, artificial states within whose borders live peoples who may be historic enemies or, at the least, have no interest in inhabiting the same polity with their fellow citizens. Patriotism and loyalty towards the nation, in such places, is clearly in short supply.

These unstable countries sometimes implode altogether and become failed states. And all their fancy structural designs do not save them.

In old and consolidated democracies such as Canada, we manage to muddle along with a patently ‘unfair' first-past-the-post winner-take-all system for electing MPs.

This usually allows a party to win a majority in the House of Commons with only a plurality of the vote. Even when a party fails to do so, we frown upon coalition government.

We also permit an openly separatist party like the Bloc Québécois to run in federal elections. And we tolerate an unelected senate.

Why are we not more incensed about this? Because we have a democratic political culture and don't think the country is in danger of falling apart or becoming a dictatorship.

Does this make us less ‘democratic'? Of course not. How many Canadians would prefer to live in some of the countries I've described, entities such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Nepal or Uganda?

What counts is the underlying political culture, something that can't simply be constructed through clever political engineering.

Canada is not as polarized, nor suffers from the same kind of political violence, as do many of these other countries.

We trust our politicians not to cross certain lines, such as fixing elections, bribing voters, jailing opponents, revoking civil liberties, or using the military to suppress dissent.

Our governments don't have the same level of control over our day-to-day lives. An independent judiciary serves as a check on their actions. So elections, for us, are not a matter of life and death, as is - literally - the case in other places. We can therefore afford to be more nonchalant about our democratic shortcomings.

It's like legislation concerning alcohol: the strict regulation of liquor (or its outright prohibition) is a society's response to rampant alcoholism. In places where this is not a major issue, laws regulating the sale and consumption of spirits are less stringent, because less necessary.

The same holds true for a country's political system. Where democracy already exists, there's less zeal to create a "perfect" version of it among the citizenry.   

Palestinians Are a Nation

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Speaking to an audience at the Republican Jewish Coalition in Washington recently, Newt Gingrich, now the front-runner in the race to become the Republican nominee for president of the United States, declared the Palestinians are an “invented” people.

He later elaborated on his remarks. “Remember there was no Palestine as a state. It was part of the Ottoman Empire,” Gingrich told a television interviewer. “We’ve had an invented Palestinian people, who are in fact Arabs, and were historically part of the Arab community.”

For this he has been criticized by the Arab League, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and even Republican opponents Mitt Romney and Ron Paul. He has been especially denounced by people on the left, who see in his remarks a “hard line” pro-Israel position.

Actually, anti-Zionists do the same thing, insisting that Jews are simply members of a religion and are not an ethnic group, and hence have no right to part of Palestine. Indeed, an Israeli academic, Shlomo Sand, recently published a controversial book entitled “The Invention of the Jewish People.”

The whole thing is somewhat ironic, given that the critics don’t seem to know that left-wing theoreticians like the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawn claim that all nations are “constructed” by clever elites and are thus “inventions.”

Back when Golda Meir was prime minister of Israel, she famously said that there are no such people as the Palestinians. She meant that until the 1960s they had no separate consciousness as “Palestinians” (a simple geographic term, and a fuzzy one, at that).

They were called “Arabs” when they revolted against British rule in the Palestine Mandate in 1936-39 and when the 1947 partition plan, which called for “Arab” and “Jewish” states, was passed by the UN.

It was the “Arab Higher Committee,” led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, which opposed the creation of Israel by the Jews (who of course weren't yet “Israelis,” either).

Prior to 1948, Jews used the term Palestinian more than the Arabs did. The Jerusalem Post newspaper used to be called the Palestine Post. And during the Second World War, more than 5,000 Jewish volunteers from Palestine were organized into three battalions of the Palestine Regiment.

But never mind all that. People who say they’re a nation are one, it’s that simple. They define themselves, and don’t get defined by others. So of course the Palestinians are now a nation. Like every other nation, they have, so to speak, invented themselves – just the way Americans, Canadians, and others did before them.

Whether invented or not, there are now two nations within the old Palestine Mandate – Israelis and Palestinians. Each should have a state.

Arguing for Real Gender Equality

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Our society is obsessed by numbers. Statistics hold us spellbound. Everything is reduced to percentages, sometimes to the exclusion of more meaningful measures. But figures can mislead, especially in politics.

For instance, statistics regarding the composition of assemblies by gender in themselves tell us little about democracy or the empowerment of women.

In our own 2011 federal election, 25 per cent of the seats were won by women. That number has, in fact, been increasing, and that’s good.

But in Ecuador the National Assembly, after their 2009 election, included 40 women out of 124 members, 32 per cent, thanks to gender quotas.

In the recent balloting in Tunisia, won by an Islamic party, women took 29 per cent of the seats, again, because of a quota system.

And in Rwanda, the election of 2008 saw 45 of 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies occupied by women, a full 56 per cent – because 24 women, two from each province and from the city of Kigali, were elected on women-only ballots.

Yet who would honestly say that women are better off in those less fortunate and less democratic countries than here?

Former Communist states also made sure that women were well represented in their parliaments. Why not? It’s not as if the women could wrest power from the Communist apparatchiks – almost all men – who actually ran the state.

In fact, many of the women legislators in today’s sham democracies are mere pawns, their names placed on proportional representation lists to do the bidding of the male “bosses” who run the political parties and to make the countries these men govern “look good” to the outside world.

These women haven’t really been elected as individuals in their own right. And the parliaments in which they sit, in any case, exercise little power.

It’s more façade than reality, often propagandistic and superficial window dressing.

We may have fewer women in our Canadian legislatures, but we know that they have actually been selected to run for office in a party’s open nomination meeting and have then won a competitive race within their riding.

They can exercise the same degree of power, and represent their constituents just as competently, as any of their male colleagues.

And as time moves on and prejudices lessen, women will indeed reach gender parity – for real.

Is the Middle East Edging Towards War?

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

Current events in the Middle East don’t give us much hope that democracy is the new zeitgeist in the region.

Early results from the first round of the ongoing Egyptian parliamentary election indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party is winning about 40 per cent of the vote.

Founded in 1928, the Brotherhood is the largest Islamic party in the Middle East, with branches and allies in many countries (including Hamas in Gaza). It was officially banned in Egypt until the ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak.

And the Al-Nour Party, organized by ultra-conservative Islamists called Salafis, who are more extreme than the Brotherhood, appears to be gaining a further 25 per cent of the ballots cast.

These figures might even increase, because the results now tabulated came from the more liberal urban areas, including Cairo itself and Port Said. The second and third stages of voting will take place in more conservative rural areas in the coming months.

Should these numbers hold, the two groups might control at least 65 percent of the parliamentary seats, enough to gain power – should the Egyptian army permit it. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces remains the ultimate power in the land.

“It means that, if the Brotherhood chooses, Parliament can be an Islamists affair -- a debate between liberal Islamists, moderate Islamists and conservatives Islamists, and that is it,” Michael Wahid Hanna, an Egyptian-born researcher at the Century Foundation in Cairo, told the New York Times.

This is a worry for Israel, since the Islamists in Egypt have always opposed the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and would like to abrogate it. An Israeli official acknowledged concerns: “Obviously, it is hard to see in this result good news for Israel.”

Israel has begun building a fence along its long border with Egypt along the Sinai Peninsula desert. It fears that radical Islamic groups will use the Sinai for attacks on Israel.

Also, maintains Geneive Abdo, author of No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam, no matter which party picks up the most seats in parliament, the new Egypt will be less compliant to American demands and cultivate warmer relations with Iran.

Islamic parties calling themselves moderates have now formed governments in Tunisia and Morocco and will no doubt play a role in Libya as well, with the mercurial Muammar Gadhafi gone. The Libyan dictator was clearly a sociopath, but not particularly devout.

Meanwhile, Iran has been covertly developing nuclear weapons. A Nov. 8 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency was a wake-up call, even for those who have refused to see the danger. The report noted that “Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities” and is also working to develop long-range missiles.

Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, asserted recently that Iran has enough material for four or five nuclear bombs; all that is required is a decision to proceed.

The Islamic Republic proceeds from strength to strength, thumbing its nose at western sanctions. Two months ago the Iranians were accused of hatching a brazen plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington.

And last week the British Embassy compound in Tehran was trashed by a mob of militants, mostly members of Iran’s paramilitary Basiji brigades loyal to Iran’s ruling clerics.

Britain’s ambassador to Iran, Dominick Chilcott, described it as a mix of “mindless vandalism” and “sinister targeted theft.”

British historian Michael Burleigh, author of Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism, has stated that “Unless the international community acts in concert to neutralise this danger, there will sooner or later be an Israeli strike to frustrate Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. If that happened, the world really would be in a new dark age.”

Israel must feel as if the noose is tightening around its neck and wonders whether its only real major ally, the United States, would be willing to defend it, should war break out.

U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta recently asserted that Israel is partly responsible for its increasing isolation and that it now must take diplomatic “bold action” to mend ties with its Arab neighbours and come to a settlement with the Palestinians. It is understood that Panetta’s comments are widely shared by U.S. officials.

“Stuck in the Middle With You” was a rock song released by Stealers Wheel in 1972. The refrain went like this:

“Clowns to the left of me,

Jokers to the right, here I am,

Stuck in the middle with you.”

Today’s Israeli version might sound like this:

Egypt to the left of me,

Iran to the right, here I am

 Stuck in the middle with USA.

A Student Newspaper Best Indicator of Intellectual Vibrancy on Campus

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

There are many ways to gauge the excellence of a university, and ranking them has become a major growth industry. But my favourite is one that seems never to be used as an indicator: the excellence of the student newspaper.

I write as someone who has over the years become familiar with many student publications. I obtained degrees from universities in Britain, Canada and the United States, and I taught at Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania, a liberal arts school, and the University of Calgary, a big research institution, before coming to the University of Prince Edward Island.

A friend who lives in Montreal has been sending me copies of the McGill Daily, McGill University's main student paper. (There is more than one.)

And in reading the wide variety of news articles and opinion pieces, as well as the in-depth coverage of the arts and sciences, I find that the paper is, professionally and intellectually, the equal of any college paper - or, for that matter, most daily newspapers. (Full disclosure: four decades ago, I was a student at McGill and also a contributor to the Daily.)

The Daily has a storied history: this year marks the centenary of its founding, and through the decades many famous names have appeared on its masthead and in its by-lines. During the 1960s and 1970s, it was in the forefront of student activism and radical politics. That tradition continues: it is still far to the left of most Canadian newspapers, including those published at universities.

If the Daily is a reflection of McGill's student body, then the university remains a vibrant academic institution, where "critical thinking" is a reality and not merely a PR platitude.

And this relates to my main point: Naturally, McGill and similar world-class universities have a more outstanding faculty than a smaller school such as UPEI - though I can think of some professors here who would not be out of place teaching there.

But the real difference probably lies in the student body itself. At UPEI, we have many excellent, even outstanding, students, but not the same "critical mass" found at larger places like McGill. And so we do not have the same climate of intellectual inquiry.

Much of real learning goes on outside the classroom, in lounges, the union, the library, and elsewhere, places where students interact, issues are debated, and heated arguments may ensue about matters that are not just "on the exam" or related to grades.

Of course, it helps that students at McGill, the University of Toronto, and similar big-city Canadian schools are exposed to more in the way of culture than those studying in smaller towns.

Obviously, Charlottetown can never match that.

In the U.S., many large universities are located in college towns which serve the same function: they provide the cultural and political milieu of an urban centre without, so to speak, the rest of the city.

So it's unfair to compare a small school like UPEI - which in any case has offsetting advantages, such as smaller classroom sizes and better faculty-student ratios - to big research universities.

But it never hurts to aim higher. And we are indeed doing just that.

What’s to Become of Mideast’s Christians?

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside. PEI] Journal-Pioneer

The Arab awaking has been, at best, a mixed blessing for the Middle East’s Christian Arab minorities. The uprisings in Libya and Tunisia have had little impact on the region’s Christians, as these two countries are almost entirely Sunni Muslim in religion.

But Egypt and Syria are a different story. The fall of Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak earlier this year, and the ongoing rebellion against Bashar al-Assad, the authoritarian president of Syria, has exposed these minorities to violence and persecution by extremists.

The upheavals have prompted concerns that regimes that were seen as guarantors of Arab Christian survival, whatever their other faults, may be replaced by ideological Islamists.

In fact, Christian Arabs have been leaving the Middle East for decades, fearing the growth of fundamentalist Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is estimated that about half of Iraq’s 1.4-million Christians have fled the country since the American invasion in 2003, and even in Lebanon, which once had a Christian majority, the 1.7-million Christians are now only about one third of the country’s population.

They are now a negligible presence in the Palestinian territories – even in places such as Bethlehem. In Israel some two per cent of Arab citizens are Christian. And in Jordan Christians comprise about three per cent of the population.

Egypt has some 10-million Christians, the largest remaining non-Muslim population in the Middle East by far. The ancient Coptic Orthodox Church is the main Christian denomination in Egypt, led by Pope Shenouda III. They represent more than 10 per cent of the total population.

Mubarak allowed them religious freedoms and punished Islamists who persecuted them. That protection is now gone.

A car bomb exploded in front of a Coptic Church in Alexandria last New Year’s Eve, killing 23 people and injuring at least 79. There was further sectarian violence in the country between Christians and Muslims in March and April.

The destruction at a Coptic church in southern Egypt on Sept. 30 further heightened tensions. When liberal Muslims joined Coptic Christians as they marched through Cairo’s Maspero area on Oct. 9 in protest, they were attacked.

Egyptian security forces then rammed their armed vehicles into the crowd and fired live ammunition indiscriminately. At least 36 people were killed and 272 injured.

The first stage of staggered parliamentary elections will begin on Nov. 28 amidst continuing turmoil and many Copts fear a strong showing by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Given these conditions, large numbers are leaving the country. “If emigration of Christians continues at the present rate,” said Naguib Gabriel, director of the Cairo-based Egyptian Union of Human Rights Organizations, “it may reach 250,000 by the end of 2011.”

Syria’s Christian population, once more than 30 per cent of the country’s total, is now down to 10 per cent. The 2.5-million Christians in Syria belong to various eastern rite Orthodox, Catholic and Assyrian churches.

The Assad regime in Syria is dominated by the Alawite minority, itself just 10 percent of the population. They came to political power in the 1960s by dominating the army and the Ba’ath Party.

A Shi’a sect, they are viewed by many Sunni Arabs – who are the vast majority of Syrians -- as heretics.

Many Christians fear that Assad’s downfall would deprive them of the semblance of protection the Assad family has provided for four decades. (Bashar’s father Hafez ruled the country from 1970 until 2000.) They might be subjected to reprisals at the hands of a conservative Sunni leadership that has long been out of power.

The Damascus regime has claimed that it is being challenged by Islamic radicals. The demonstrators deny that, but many Christians appear to believe it.

Hence there have been interventions from bishops and priests, Orthodox and Catholic, on behalf of the government. As the Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Mario Zenari recently stated, Syria has been a country that has been “exemplary in terms of harmony between different religious confessions, for mutual respect between the Muslim majority and Christian minority.”

But the Assad regime is probably living on borrowed time. Syria has already been suspended from the 22-member Arab League. Its only Middle Eastern ally is fellow Shi’a Iran, while most Sunnis in the region, including the Egyptians, Jordanians, Saudis, and non-Arab Turks, would shed few tears if it disappeared.

As Syria edges ever closer to civil war, Christians could well find themselves on the losing side. And should the regime fall, Syria might witness a bloodbath far worse than what we saw in Libya.

Reflections on the Demise of the So-Called "King of Kings"


Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

There has been no end of commentary about Moammar Gadhafi's bizarre reign of chaos and terror in Libya.

His grisly death at the hands of fighters from the city of Misrata, which had suffered so grievously during the long civil war that finally led to his ouster, was captured by video cameras and broadcast around the world.

The essence of his rule was one almost unique for a 20th-21st-century ruler. The so-called ‘King of Kings' was truly an absolute monarch, a modern-day Egyptian pharaoh or Roman emperor.

Monsters such as Hitler, Mao, Kim Il-Sung, Saddam Hussein, and Stalin were, after all, to some extent bound by their own ideological formulations and political parties.

Saudi kings, even when absolute rulers, must govern within the strictures of Wahabi Islam.

But Gadhafi was literally able to do whatever he felt like doing; he was, after all, his own creation, a deity, and not beholden to any ideologues, dead or alive.

His "Green Book," a treatise that spelled out his "third universal theory" that would supplant both capitalism and communism - could it have been just an elaborate cruel joke, mocking his own people? - allowed him, in effect, to crown himself a philosopher-king. No popes or ayatollahs or caliphs stood in his way.

His idiosyncrasies were legendary and his every whim carried out: at one point he had decided that camels on roads near Tripoli made the city look "backward." They were immediately shot by his compliant military.

For all his buffoonery and comic-opera outfits, Gadhafi was a brutal tyrant, ordering the deaths of people at home and abroad with absolutely no qualms. He was a sociopath without a conscience.

And his family used the country's oil wealth to live in untold luxury. Libyans visiting their various compounds since Gadhafi's downfall have come away astounded by the affluence. The humble Bedouin persona Gadhafi affected was nothing but a pose.

"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men." Lord Acton's warning remains as relevant today as it did when he expressed it in 1887.

Gadhafi left behind no institutions, not even the kind other dictatorships have allowed, such as tame parliaments, compliant political cabinets, or political parties that had been hollowed out. Libya is starting from scratch. It is a political as well as a physical desert.

Still Trying to Figure out why Quebec Chose the NDP

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer 
 
Almost six months after last May’s federal election, I’m still trying to figure out why the francophones of Quebec, en masse, suddenly switched from the Bloc Quebecois to the New Democratic Party, in the process decimating the former.

It had nothing to do with the NDP itself, or its charismatic standard-bearer, Jack Layton. It wasn’t as if the NDP had a new leader Quebecois could suddenly relate to.

After all, Layton had already fought two previous elections, in 2004 and 2006, as head of the party, and had not a single measly seat in the province to show for his efforts. (Thomas Mulcair, the only NDP member from Quebec before 2011, was elected MP for Outremont in a by-election in 2007.)

The NDP had no base in Quebec – they had virtually no party members nor any historic support in the province. The party had in its entire existence, in fact, elected only two Quebec MPs. Insofar as it had any loyalists at all, it was in anglophone parts of Montreal.

Nor was the “Orange Crush” due to the quality of the local NDP candidates, most of whom were unknowns or sacrificial lambs who had little presence in their ridings – one was in Las Vegas during the campaign and had never even visited her constituency!

As well, the electorate’s move away from the Bloc was not a result of that party’s miscues. Gilles Duceppe ran his usual decent campaign, made no gaffes, nor did any scandals attach to the party.

So what happened?

Clearly, Quebecois en masse decided they still needed to continue punishing the Liberals, thanks to the sponsorship scandal, and simply couldn’t countenance voting for the Conservatives, whom they perceive to be an anglophone, western-based party, the successor to the Reform Party, and home to many whose ancestors may have been members of the ultra-Protestant Orange Order. But why not, then, continue sending Blocistes back to Ottawa?

As a minority within Canada, in federal elections Quebecois vote, first and foremost, on the basis of protecting their culture and powers within Confederation.

The Bloc and NDP had platforms that were, as usual, fairly similar. Both are left-of-centre parties whose domestic agendas are not all that different.

And while the Bloc is sovereigntist, the NDP’s attitude towards Quebec nationalism is far more friendly than that of the Conservatives and Liberals.

The party, for example, supports legislation that would extend Quebec’s French Language Charter to employees in the province who work in sectors covered under federal law.

And their interim leader, Nycole Turmel, is a former member of the Bloc.

Fearing the continued advances of the Harper Conservatives, Quebecois felt the need to seek allies outside Quebec who could oppose the Tories.

The Bloc could not provide that, but the NDP, as a national party, fit the bill – this time around, anyhow.

Locked in Ethnic and Territorial Disputes

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

The collapse of Soviet power in the southern Caucasus and central Asia in the 1990s opened up a political space for the re-emergence of the nationalist ideology known as pan-Turkism.

This political movement, which originated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, had as its goal the political union of all Turkic-speaking peoples in the Ottoman lands, the Crimea and other parts of tsarist Russia, eastern Turkestan in western China, and parts of Iran and Afghanistan.

Some 170 million people speak a Turkic language, with the largest, Turkish, used by about 85 million people.

The Turkic world encompasses a huge portion of southeastern Europe and central Asia. Today there are six independent Turkic countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Turkey itself.

There are also several Turkic national entities in the Russian Federation, including the Altai Republic, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Tatarstan, and Tuva.

The Crimean Tatars inhabit the Ukrainian peninsula that borders the Black Sea, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of western China is home to the Uighurs, another Turkic people.

A main "fault line" between the Turkic Muslim and pro-Russian Christian peoples has always run through the southern Caucasus.

The nation of Armenia has been at odds with its Muslim Turkic neighbours for centuries and hence welcomed Russian rule in the region.

It has suffered whenever the Russians and Turks were at war.

During World War I, the Armenians within the Turkish Ottoman Empire were accused of aiding Russia, and in 1915 upwards of one million of them were massacred.

Between 1918 and 1920, Armenia and neighbouring Azerbaijan were sovereign countries, and fought an indecisive war over territory. But both soon became part of the new Communist-ruled Soviet Union.

During the Soviet period, Armenia and Azerbaijan were full Soviet republics. But the 4,400-square- kilometre area known as Nagorno-Karabakh, though inhabited mainly by Armenians, became an autonomous oblast (region) within the borders of Azerbaijan, cut off from Armenia proper.

By the late 1980s, as Soviet rule in the Caucasus disintegrated, and the two countries once again became independent states, old enmities resurfaced.

There were massacres of Armenians in the Azeri capital, Baku, and killings of Azeris in Yerevan in Armenia.

In 1991, Azerbaijan unilaterally abolished the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh. In response, the Armenians in the enclave declared their independence.

Full-scale fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan ensued, and by the time a cease-fire ended major hostilities in 1994, the Armenians were in control of almost all of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as a considerable amount of Azerbaijani territory outside the enclave.

More than 30,000 people were killed in the fighting from 1992 to 1994. As many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azeris from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh were displaced as a result of the conflict.

The war also drew in the two major powers in the region, Russia and Turkey. In 1993, as Armenia's forces were routing the Azeris, Turkey demanded that the Armenians pull out of Azerbaijani territory, and thousands of Turkish troops were sent to the border between Turkey and Armenia. Russian in response warned Turkey against any military involvement.

Though there has been little fighting since 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan are still technically at war and the two countries have no formal diplomatic relations.

Turkey imposed a blockade on Armenia in 1993, resulting in a total shutdown of land and air communications between the two countries; they also have no formal diplomatic relations.

In May 2009 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told the Azeri parliament that Turkey and Azerbaijan were "one nation with two states." He added that there would be no normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations unless "the occupation of Azerbaijani territory ends."

Armenia's Defence Minister Seyran Ohanian in turn stated in January 2010 that defence fortifications have been beefed up significantly in recent years. "We are maintaining the balance of forces vis-à-vis the Azerbaijani armed forces."

The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is one of several "frozen" conflicts in the cultural zone separating the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus from their neighbours, and Nagorno-Karabakh remains a de facto independent republic of some 140,000 people, protected by Armenia.

Cypress Could Be New Flashpoint

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

The island of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean has been a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey for decades.

Independent from Great Britain since 1960, for the past 37 years it has been divided between a self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a state recognized only by its patron Turkey, and a southern Republic of Cyprus, governed by Greek Cypriots, which claims sovereignty over the entire island.

The capital, Nicosia, is also partitioned between the two entities. But as far as the United Nations and other international bodies are concerned, the Greek Cypriot government is the legitimate ruler of the island.

Indeed, the Greek Cypriot state has since 2004 been a member of the European Union, despite its unwillingness to grant concessions to the Turkish population in the north, and so keeping the island split in two.

Now, thanks to Turkey’s new assertiveness, the already troubled island is being dragged into the Middle East conflict.

The Greek Cypriot government has licensed U.S.-based Noble Energy Inc. to search for oil and gas near recently-discovered Israeli offshore fields that contain more than 450 billion cubic metres of natural gas. The distance by sea between Cyprus and Israel is about 200 kilometres.

Israel and the Republic of Cyprus last December signed an agreement defining their maritime border, thus allowing them both to search for energy sources in the eastern Mediterranean. Noble Energy began exploratory drilling for offshore oil and gas deposits off Cyprus in mid-September.

In response, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Dervis Eroglu, the president of the Turkish Cypriot state, describing this as a “provocation,” in late September signed a deal paving the way for their own offshore drilling.

Turkey maintains the Greek Cypriots are disregarding Turkish Cypriot rights and it sent a warship-escorted research vessel, the Koka Piri Reis, to also look for gas off Cyprus. Ankara claims the natural resources around Cyprus belong to both the Turkish and Greek parts of the island.

But President Dimitris Christofias of the Republic of Cyprus in the south has insisted that exploration will continue despite Turkey’s strong opposition.

He asserted the right to search for potential deposits inside the Republic’s exclusive economic zone is non-negotiable and any foreign meddling is unacceptable. (His government does not, of course, recognize any such rights for the Turkish Republic in the north.)

Greece and Israel, too, argue the Turkish vessel has no business being in the area.

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou urged “restraint” by all countries in the region, but added Greece supports the Greek Cypriot activities.

Greece also hopes Israel will want to export its own natural gas resources to European markets via a pipeline running through Greek Cyprus to Greece, and that the Turks will not interfere.

Just to make sure, Athens and Jerusalem signed a mutual defence pact in September.

Still, Israeli diplomats worry the Turkish threat could prove dangerous.

“Israel and Cyprus reached agreement dividing the water between the two of them for gas drilling,” Alon Liel, a former ambassador to Turkey remarked.

He worried that things could escalate.

“If Israel and Turkey come to face each other in the Eastern Mediterranean,” it may even require direct American involvement, according to Sinan Ulgen, director of EDAM, a center for economics and foreign policy studies in Istanbul. Then what?
 

Positioning to be Major Player 

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian


Apart from becoming a significant force in the Middle East, Turkey is trying to extend its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and central Asia. These are nations that have ethnic, historical, linguistic and religious bonds with Turkey.

Turkey has very close ties to Azerbaijan, with which it shares a border. Trade between the two countries has increased significantly and Turkish companies are the largest investors in Azerbaijan. Turkey's trade with the country amounted to about $2.5 billion last year.

Azerbaijan is an oil-producing country, and Turkey would like to become a key energy hub for the transportation of energy resources to Europe.

In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which connects the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey, was completed. Turkey is now the main outlet for westbound Azeri oil.

In December 2010, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a strategically important mutual defence treaty.

Kazakhstan, too, is an important economic partner of Turkey and Turkish companies have been investing in areas such as food, beverages, oil industries, banking, retailing and tourism. Trade between Kazakhstan and Turkey amounted to $2 billion in 2010.

Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that Kazakhstan is Turkey's most important political and economic partner in Central Asia: "Our bilateral relations continue to develop in a stable course, driven by the momentum arising from the mutual strong will of both countries."

During Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Turkey in October 2009, a Strategic Partnership Treaty was signed between the two.

Turkmenistan's President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has reaffirmed Turkey's crucial place in the shaping of his country's foreign policy. He has stated that Turkmenistan and Turkey were united through historical and cultural ties.

Turkmenistan has one of the world's largest natural gas reserves and Turkey is interested in transporting the country's gas to Europe. Some 100 agreements and protocols have been concluded between Ankara and Ashgabat, and a joint Turkish-Turkmen commission for economic cooperation was formed in 2008. Turkish trade with Turkmenistan amounted to $2 billion last year.

Earlier this year, Turkmenistan held an international forum in Ashgabat where the cultural heritage of the Turkic peoples was celebrated with an extensive program that included scientific conferences, concerts, films, demonstrations and exhibitions.

Turkish relations with Uzbekistan, the most populous of the central Asian states, have been more rocky, due to Ankara's concern over human rights abuses and a less favourable economic climate in that country.

The Tashkent government was angry at Turkey for supporting the call for an international investigation of a massacre in the city of Andijan, when troops fired into a crowd of protestors in May 2005, killing at least several hundred.

Still, Turkey is the one of the most important direct investors in Uzbekistan, and trade between the two nations amounted to $1 billion in 2010.

Prime Minister Erdogan visited Tajikistan in 2003 and trade and political relations have increased since then. Turkey has provided assistance for the development and democratization of Tajikistan, a very poor and fragile country, but its role remains limited. Two-way trade in 2010 amounted to $360 million.

Another central Asian state in trouble is Kyrgyzstan, where violence in the south of the country in April 2010 left up to 2,000 dead and forced 400,000 from their homes.

Earlier this year, though, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek Sharshenovich Atambayev met with top officials while attending the Turkey-Kyrgyzstan Trade and Investment Forum organised by Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists in Ankara.

"This is exactly the time to invest," Atambayev told them. "We are brothers and friends. We have a history we are proud of. Our future will also be common and glorious." But trade between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan remains relatively small, amounting to $160 million in 2010.

In January 2010 Turkey hosted a "Summit of Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia," held in Istanbul, and attended by numerous diplomats from countries around the world. Turkey is clearly staking out its claim to becoming a major power.

Is Turkey Creating an ‘Ottosphere’ in Middle East?

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Turkey is becoming a major player in the Middle East, as the Arab world, once mainly ruled by Ottoman emperors, continues to be convulsed by political earthquakes.

In recent weeks, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who heads the moderately Islamic Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), has come out in favour of full Palestinian UN membership and warned Israel against any further attacks on Hamas-ruled Gaza.

He recently told Arab leaders that recognition of a Palestinian state was “not an option, but an obligation.”

The Turkish leader said that Israel’s raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla in May 2010, which killed eight Turks and a Turkish American on board a Turkish ship, occurred in international waters and was “cause for war,” but added that his country had showed “patience” and refrained from taking any action.

After Israel refused to apologize, Erdogan withdrew Turkey’s ambassador, suspended military co-operation with Israel, and froze all trade ties with the Jewish state.

He described Israel as “the main threat to regional peace.”

Erdogan told al-Jazeera television that “my brothers in Gaza are waiting for me. I too long for Gaza. Sooner or later, if God allows it, I will go to Gaza.”

He also vowed to send the Turkish navy to escort Gaza-bound aid ships in the future.

“Israel will no longer be able to do what it wants in the Mediterranean,” he told an audience in Tunis earlier this month, “and you’ll be seeing Turkish warships in this sea.”

He stated that Israel would be prevented from exploiting the eastern Mediterranean’s oil and gas reserves on its own.

Erdogan received a tumultuous welcome when he visited Egypt, Tunisia and Libya in support of their new and still shaky post-dictatorial political systems.

“These countries are trying to transform into democratic system from autocratic systems,” he declared.

“We have to lend them a helping hand in their efforts.”

He hailed the advent of democracy in Libya and the “memory of martyrs who sacrificed themselves for their country and their religion.”

Turkey hopes to encourage cooperation, investments, and trade with these countries as well.

Erdogan has also warned Bashar al-Assad’s repressive Syrian government in Damascus “that there is no regime that can go against the will of the people. This is what those who oppress the people of Syria should realize.”

A century ago, almost the entire Middle East was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, and the Turks were a major force in the world.

Some analysts are calling Erdogan’s policies an attempt to create a new “Ottosphere” in the region.

There’s no doubt that he’s trying to do just that.

Does One Have to Return to British Symbolism to be Conservative

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

As my surname suggests, my forbearers are not from the British Isles. In fact, my family arrived in Canada in 1948.

But I did grow up in the pre-Trudeauvian Dominion of Canada, with its Red Ensign flag and little crowns above the numerals on highway signs in many parts of the country.

At our elementary school, we sang “God Save the Queen” as well as “O Canada” every morning.

Yes, much of our history and, more importantly, political institutions originate in the United Kingdom, and most Canadians outside of Quebec in the past had little problem with Canada seeing itself as an offspring of Great Britain.

From the 1970s on, however, there was a conscious attempt, partly to accommodate nationalists in Quebec, to eradicate much of the symbolism of Canada’s connection to Britain.

The Queen, though still the official head of state of Canada, was stealthily relegated to a position of less importance than the governor general, who became the de facto head of the country. The Commonwealth connection, too, was minimized.

Much of this was the work of prime ministers who originated in Quebec – with very brief interludes, they governed the country between 1968 and 2006.

We now have what is basically an English Canadian government, headed by a prime minister from anglophone Alberta.

Stephen Harper is working to bring back a sense of history for Canadians, after decades of emphasis on supposed Canadian values such as medicare and multiculturalism.

This is part of his effort to promote a more conservative national identity. Liberals often saw the period before the 1960s as a kind of “dark ages,” in which bigotry and racism flourished.

But is restoring the label “Royal” to the Canadian navy and air force not perhaps a step too far? It had its place in the past but Canada is no longer that country. Millions of us without ties to Britain had no trouble with its disappearance.

The Harper government also ordered all of Canada’s 260 embassies, high commissions, consulates and trade offices to display a portrait of the Queen.

Harper’s decisions have angered many Canadian nationalists who say the prime minister is out of touch with modern-day Canada. And it certainly won’t help him in Quebec.

What’s next, the Union Jack alongside the Maple Leaf? Surely being a conservative needn’t require a return to a British past which in any case is no longer really relevant to either country.

Turning the clock back like this isn’t conservative, it’s reactionary.

The Lasting Impact of the Iran-Iraq War
                               
Henry Srebrnik, [Toronto] Jewish Tribune 

This coming Sept. 22 marks the date, in 1980, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran.

Taking advantage of the political turmoil in his much larger neighbour following the downfall of Iran’s Shah and his replacement by Ayatollah Khomeini’s theocratic regime, the Iraqi dictator thought he could score a quick victory and grab the oil rich, Arab-majority province of Khuzestan.
Instead, the struggle became a war of attrition that lasted eight years – it became the longest conventional conflict of the twentieth century – and cost hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides.

Oil production was affected as each country targeted the other’s oil terminals. Both nations also attacked oil tankers and merchant ships in the Persian Gulf, including those of neutral nations, in an effort to deprive the opponent of trade.

Although the war terminated in a military stalemate on Aug. 20, 1988 – Khomeini said he “drank the cup of poison” when he accepted a truce mediated by the United Nations – Iran was the effective victor, having withstood the Iraqi aggression with far less modern weaponry than Iraq possessed.

Iran also had fought without any allies, while Iraq was supported financially by the Arab Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, was supplied with arms by the Soviet Union, and even received covert help from the United States.

As we know, Saddam went on to defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, after having conquered Kuwait, and was finally eliminated altogether by the American invasion of 2003.

Iran, on the other hand, despite Khomeini’s death in 1989 and some internal opposition in recent years, has gone from strength to strength, geopolitically.

Today, ironically, the post-Saddam Iraqi government, led by prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is, like the Iranians, a Shi’a Muslim, has become quite close to Tehran. (Saddam’s Ba’ath Party regime was Sunni-dominated and oppressed the country’s Shi’a majority.)

The even more radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army commands the loyalty of followers in the poorer areas of Baghdad and in the country’s south, is believed to have spent part of the last four years studying to be an ayatollah in Iran.

For these reasons, some analysts call Iran the true beneficiary of the American defeat of Saddam.

Iran has also extended its influence in the Arab world, particularly in Lebanon – where Hezbollah is its political proxy – and Syria.

When Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, at the end of August called on the government in Damascus to recognize its people’s “legitimate” demands, this probably had more effect on Bashar al-Assad than anything Washington says.

But Salehi also warned NATO against any temptation to intervene in Syria. “Syria is the front-runner in Middle Eastern resistance” to Israel and NATO “cannot intimidate this country with an attack.” Tehran still considers Assad’s survival a key strategic goal. Iran relies on Syria to help facilitate arming and financing Hezbollah as well as Hamas.

And despite denials by current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran is clearly in the process of developing a nuclear capability, and makes no bones about threatening to wipe Israel off the map.

“Recognizing the Palestinian state is not the last goal. It is only one step forward towards liberating the whole of Palestine,” Ahmadinejad told worshippers at Tehran University on Aug. 26, ‘International al-Quds Day,’ according to The Jerusalem Post.

In August 1979, Khomeini declared the liberation of Jerusalem (al-Quds in Arabic) a religious duty to all Muslims.

In language reminiscent of Nazi rhetoric, Ahmadinejad declared that “the Zionist regime is a centre of microbes, a cancer cell and if it exists in one iota of Palestine it will mobilize again and hurt everyone.”

Three decades after the start of the Middle East’s longest and deadliest 20th century war, Iran has definitely become a major regional power.

Iran is a Regional Power in the Middle East

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Despite some internal opposition in recent years, the theocratic regime in Iran, founded by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, has gone from strength to strength, geopolitically One of its main enemies, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, is no more, defeated by the American invasion in 2003. The post-Saddam Iraqi government, led by prime minister Nouri al-Maliki , who is, like the Iranians, a Shi’a Muslim, has become quite close to Tehran.

Iran has also extended its influence elsewhere in the Arab world, particularly in Lebanon – where Hezbollah is its political proxy – and Syria.

When Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, at the end of August called on the government in Damascus to recognize its people’s “legitimate” demands, this probably had more effect on Bashar al-Assad than anything Washington says.

But Salehi also warned NATO against any temptation to intervene in Syria. “Syria is the front-runner in Middle Eastern resistance” to Israel, so NATO should not be allowed to “intimidate this country with an attack.”

Tehran still considers Assad’s survival a key strategic goal. Iran relies on Syria to help facilitate arming and financing Hezbollah as well as Hamas in Gaza.

And despite denials by current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran is clearly in the process of developing a nuclear capability. Indeed, the country is taking advantage of the unrest in the Arab world, which is distracting the international community, to accelerate its efforts.

In June, Iran unveiled underground silos that would make its missiles less vulnerable to attack. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed “increasing concerns” about research by Iranian scientists on nuclear warhead design.

Tehran also makes no bones about threatening to wipe Israel off the map. Ahmadinejad told worshippers at Tehran University on August 26 that “The Zionist regime is a center of microbes, a cancer cell and if it exists in one iota of Palestine it will mobilize again and hurt everyone.”

Israel is a very small state, little more than 22,000 square kilometres in area. And to compound the problem, over 70 per cent of its population, and its ports, airports, refining capacities and industry are located along the coastal plain, 260 kilometres long from north to south and some 17 kilometres deep. One nuclear weapon could destroy most of the country.

Iran is aware that, if it attacked Israel, the Israelis, who have many nuclear weapons, would counter-attack, observes political analyst Hirsh Goodman, of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, in his new book The Anatomy of Israel’s Survival.

“But with a population 10 times that of Israel and a country 75 times as large, Iran reckons that no matter how harsh the punishment meted out in return for attacking Israel, it would be mauled, not killed.”

A nuclear Iran, it is now recognized, “is not Israel’s problem alone,” writes Goodman. “It possesses missiles that bring the Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, Europe and Russia all within reach. A nuclear Iran would be transformative, a country not easily gone to war against, and one that will have considerably more power on the regional stage.”

Indeed, Turkey announced earlier this month that it would install a new radar system designed by the United States. It came as Ankara has become more critical of Iran due to Tehran’s continued support of the Syrian government.

Iran has become a power to be reckoned with.

Three Down, Two to Go? Apparently Not

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

There are five Arab countries along the Mediterranean in North Africa: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, known collectively as the Maghreb.

In three of them, dictators have effectively been eliminated. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and now Moammar Gadhafi, are history.

However, rulers in Algeria and Morocco, both former French possessions, are hanging on.

Algeria, a huge state that borders Libya and Tunisia to its east, has had a particularly violent history. From 1954 to 1962, the National Liberation Front (FLN) fought a war against the country’s French overlords, gaining independence after the deaths of as many as one million people.

As well, about one million European settlers, the so-called pied-noirs, of mostly French descent, who accounted for some 10 percent of the population, fled to France.

The FLN proclaimed a socialist state, the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, and the country’s first president was the FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella. He was overthrown by his defence minister, Houari Boumédienne, in 1965.

Boumédienne turned the country into a military dictatorship, allowing the FLN to effectively wither away. After his death in 1978, his successor, another officer, Chadli Bendjedid, took over as president.

By the early 1990s there was massive unrest in Algeria, so Bendjedid allowed the formation of political parties, and scheduled elections for 1991. However, when it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), founded two years earlier, was poised to win, the army mounted a coup and cancelled the elections.

A civil war followed in which between 160,000 and 200,000 people were killed over the next decade.

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in office since 1999, continued repressive emergency rule. However, in January opposition parties, unions, and human rights organisations, inspired by events in neighbouring Tunisia, began to spearhead popular demonstrations against the regime.

Forced to accommodate their demands, Bouteflika lifted political restrictions in February. He also announced new measures to create jobs.

While sporadic opposition to the regime continues to flare up, at the moment no serious challenge to the government seems to be in the offing.

The ancient kingdom of Morocco, divided between and ruled as a protectorate by France and Spain between 1912 and 1956, has been far more stable than Algeria.

The Alaouite dynasty, which has ruled Morocco since the seventeenth century,traces its ancestry back to the Muslim prophet Muhammad, and so has far more legitimacy than most Arab rulers.

The current king, Muhammad VI, who ascended to the throne in 1999, has strengthened the economy and improved Morocco’s human rights record. Still, in February thousands of Moroccans rallied in the capital, Rabat, to demand that he give up some of his powers.

In June, the king announced a series of constitutional reforms, giving the country’s prime minister and parliament more executive authority. Elections are now scheduled for November.

While some protests have continued, organized by the February 20 Movement, this seems to have satisfied most Moroccans.

For the moment, therefore, the revolutions that have toppled other autocrats in the Arab world have bypassed these two nations.

Tribal Revenge a Worry in Post-Gadhafi Libya

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

If a man is known by the company he keeps, it doesn’t say much for Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, who will apparently allow his new best friend, Moammar Gadhafi, to seek asylum in his country.

I suspect even Chávez’s other comrade, Fidel Castro, is embarrassed.

After an inconclusive six months of battle, the opposition in Libya is finally on the verge of defeating the mad tyrant of Tripoli.

But now the real work will begin.

Libya is little more than a notional state.

Most people’s loyalty is first and foremost to their own tribal group. Many Libyans have traditionally relied on tribal connections more than civil society for justice and security.

In recent weeks, anti-Gadhafi insurgents in Libya’s western mountains and around Misrata have attacked civilians whose tribes supported Colonel Gadhafi, looting mountain villages and emptying a civilian neighbourhood.

The city of Yafran, southwest of Tripoli, has become the easternmost outpost of a cultural and linguistic reawakening of the Amazigh, the Berber people long oppressed by the Gadhafi regime.

Amazigh cultural and political leaders have framed a set of public demands for a post-Gadhafi Libya.

As part of their vision, their native language, Tamazight, will have an equal standing with Arabic.

But at the same time, the houses in Yafran of the Mashaashia, a tribe whose members supported the Gadhafi dictatorship, were burned.

There were similar reports of arson against the tribe in other towns in the region.

As well, General Abdul Fattah Younes, one of the commanders of the opposition forces, was murdered by some rebels, apparently in revenge for his previous role as Gadhafi’s security chief.

In response, the head of his tribe, the Obeidi, threatened to retaliate against those responsible, setting off a crisis in the opposition’s ranks.

Members of the tribes close to Colonel Gadhafi, such as his own tribe, the Qaddafa, or the larger Maghraha, may face the greatest danger from “tribal revenge,” George Joffe, a specialist on North African politics at Cambridge University, told the New York Times.

Reprisals have been a source of embarrassment for the Transitional National Council, the de facto rebel authority, but with much of Libya close to anarchy, there is little they can do about it.

Meanwhile in Syria, another dictator fights to hold on to power.

Will Bashar al-Assad be the next to go?

It’s going to get crowded in Caracas.

Woodstock and America, Then and Now


Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

Most people have at some time heard these lyrics, from the Crosby, Stills, Nash &Young song “Woodstock”:

“By the time we got to Woodstock, we were half a million strong,
And everywhere there was song and celebration.”

The year was 1969, of course. It was one of the highs – Americans walked on the moon – and lows – the war in Vietnam was dividing the country.

The three-day concert, which has become an iconic event in the history of the 1960s, was held at Max Yasgur’s 240-hectare dairy farm near the little town of White Lake, New York, in the Catskill Mountains, from August 15 to August 18.

I was in the Catskills earlier this month, in the town of Woodstock. It has long been a gathering place for artists, musicians, and writers, even before the music festival – which was actually held some 65 kilometres away -- made the name famous. (It was originally to be held in Woodstock itself but the venue there proved too small.)

Yet how different America seems four decades later. The hippies and flower children -- now in their sixties! -- have given way to “millennials,” younger people who wonder if they’ll ever have a decent career. The euphoria of the 1960s is now a memory, replaced by economic crisis and paranoia about terrorism.

There’s no need to reiterate the depressing data regarding debt, deficits, and dismal unemployment numbers. Things remain dire and there seems little government nor business can do about it.

Concerns over security have made it almost impossible to walk into many buildings or board airplanes without waiting in lines to be searched. Gone are the days when it was as easy to get onto a plane as to hop on a bus.

In New York City, I spoke to friends and relatives – doctors, professors, real estate agents, journalists -- about America’s woes. All were pessimistic. They were all liberal Democrats, as well, and feared Barack Obama might lose next year’s presidential election to a Republican.

“Woodstock,” it turns out, was in retrospect not “the dawning of the Age of Aquarius,” but a fleeting moment in American history.

Things are not looking good in America. But as my mother once said, at least “New York is New York.”

The State that Gets No Respect

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

Later this month I'll be visiting New York and New Jersey.

Everybody loves New York, of course. But New Jersey probably gets more bad press, and endures more ridicule in popular culture, than any other American state.

Who has not at times chuckled at the uncouth accents (think "Joyzee"), cringed while watching movies and television shows about the Mob, or gasped when inhaling the terrible pollution on the Turnpike when driving in the northern part of the state.

Although two National Football League teams, the Giants and the Jets, play in New Jersey's Meadowlands sports complex in East Rutherford, both call themselves New York teams!

The many jokes about the state perpetuate a stereotype of New Jerseyites as classless yahoos.

If Connecticut, which borders New York to the east, is perceived as the home of New England gentility, then New Jersey, on the western side of the Hudson River, is the place where the rough and tumble working class aspires to grab a piece of the American dream.

That's not easy to do these days. Some of the state's cities, such as Newark, Paterson and Trenton, are amongst the poorest in the nation, rife with crime, corruption and all manner of social pathologies. They are urban wastelands.

The state's unemployment rate is close to 10 per cent. Conservative Republican Governor Chris Christie has dealt with the financial crisis by slashing budgets and taking on public sector unions.

But there's another side to the Garden State (which actually has vast farms covered with vegetables and floral products and is also home to Ivy League Princeton University). It is exemplified by people like Bruce Springsteen, the populist singer who voices the frustrations of America's forgotten underclass in songs like "Born to Run" and "Born in the U.S.A."

One of the beach towns along the Atlantic, Asbury Park, is home to the Stone Pony, which was a starting point for many musicians, including Springsteen, his wife Patty Scialfa, and Jon Bon Jovi. It's become something of a pilgrimage site for fans of rock and roll.

"It is a place that is important -- not just to us, but to the world," then New Jersey governor Christine Todd Whitman said on Memorial Day weekend in 2000.

In 1976 casino gambling was legalized in Atlantic City as a way to restore the fortunes of the famous resort, which had become a rather shabby place, experiencing a long period of economic decline.

Although the city revived considerably after the 1970s, with many new hotels and casinos built - it became the Las Vegas of the east -- the current recession has again hit the city hard. The unemployment rate stands at almost 13 per cent.

Poor New Jersey —- it gets no respect.

Hold 'Em or Fold 'Em?

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Why is it that some countries will invest so much effort and money in hanging on to certain territories but not to others?
 
In the last two decades we have seen examples of this seeming inconsistency in various parts of the world.
 
Ethiopia has managed to hold on to Tigray and the Ogaden, areas with long-standing grievances against the Amhara-dominated state, but allowed Eritrea to secede in 1993.
 
Serbia let Montenegro go its own way in 2006 but fought tooth and nail, unsuccessfully, to maintain its control of Kosovo in 1999, and still refuses to acknowledge Kosovo’s sovereignty.
 
Indonesia has snuffed out separatist uprisings in Aceh and other parts of the archipelago but gave up its attempt to keep East Timor, which became a sovereign state in 2002.
 
Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982 and abandoned Gaza in 2005, while it continues to occupy much of the West Bank.
 
And the Sudan, while refusing to release its genocidal grip on Darfur, finally acceded to the independence of South Sudan this year.
 
Ian Lustick, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, may have an answer to this seeming paradox. In an article published in his co-edited anthology Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders, Lustick tries to explain why states will disengage from some territories, but not others.
 
Lustick suggests that often, a country’s political elite comes to regard a territory as being so integral to the identity of the country, that the area’s status cannot be reduced to a question of interests, costs and benefits.
 
On the other hand, another territory may become seen as a place apart. So leaving it does not alter the state’s very conception of itself.
 
Eritrea, East Timor, and Montenegro had been incorporated into the states that finally let them go for a relatively brief period of time. They had all been separate political entities prior to their annexation and therefore also had well-defined borders. So their departure did not alter the core identities of Ethiopia, Indonesia and Serbia.
 
The Sinai and Gaza have little real ideological significance for a Jewish state. And in the Sudan, the Muslim north had in colonial times been governed separately from the largely animist and Christian south.
 
Darfur, Tigray, and Aceh on the island of Sumatra, however, have been central to the modern politics of the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Indonesia. Losing these territories would be a blow to each country's sense of self-definition.
 
As for Kosovo and the West Bank (the biblical Judea and Samaria), both have tremendous religious-ideological importance for Serbs and Jews.
 
They are considered the respective birthplaces of their nations and are therefore crucial to each country’s national identity, even though other peoples -- Kosovar Albanians and Palestinian Arabs -- over time had become the majority population.
 
In such cases, it becomes a battle of history versus demography. These are among the most difficult political issues to resolve, because they are fraught with emotions that trump all else.

Reshaping the State to Avoid Secession

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

If you can’t reshape a country politically, you may have to resize it.

That, simply put, is the theory posited by Ian Lustick, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, in his co-edited anthology Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders.

What he means is that states unwilling to accommodate demands by ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities, and therefore unable to contain secessionism, may end up smaller than they once were.

In the past few decades, we have observed a number of nations acceding to sub-nationalist or regionalist demands, usually by reshaping themselves into federations or granting the units involved more autonomy.

In Europe, for instance, Spain, Italy and Great Britain are no longer unitary states.

The Spanish constitution, ratified in 1978, granted both Catalonia and Euskadi (the Basque region) their own instruments of self-government. The autonomous communities – more have been added since -- constitute a highly decentralized form of territorial organization, and Madrid hopes this arrangement will help dampen secessionist feelings in the country.

Italy, to counter centrifugal forces, now has 15 regions with limited autonomy and another five with “special” self-rule. They all acquired more powers following a constitutional reform in 2001.

In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair’s Labour government was elected in 1997 with a promise of creating devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales; both now have their own assemblies.

Northern Ireland has even been granted the theoretical right to join the Republic of Ireland, should a majority vote that way in a future referendum. The 1998 Belfast Agreement states that any future change in its status can be brought about by “a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.”

Even France, the epitome of a centralized state, has allowed a measure of autonomy for the Mediterranean island of Corsica, which is now termed a territorial collectivity.

India has reshaped itself numerous times, in order to contain the vast and diverse population within its borders. In 1956, there was a wholesale reorganization of the Indian states along linguistic lines. Since then, many new states have been carved out of existing ones, to satisfy tribal groups and other minorities. The country now has 28 states, along with seven union territories.

African states, largely artificial constructs, have been less successful in meeting demands by regional or ethnic groups, perhaps because there are simply too many such groups to satisfy. Many countries have become failed states as a result and so face eventual downsizing. This has already happened to Ethiopia and the Sudan, as well as to Somalia, which has effectively ceased to exist. Others, such as the Congo and Nigeria, may follow and break apart.

Canada, too, has faced the issue of nationalist discontent, centred in Quebec. The wholesale reshaping of the country under Pierre Trudeau, which gave us official bilingualism and multiculturalism, went far in meeting the demands of francophone Canadians.

However, many Quebec nationalists wanted more autonomy and legislative powers for the province. Attempts to satisfy them through asymmetrical federalism, in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, failed, and as a result separatists almost managed to pull the province out of Canada in 1995.

Since then, parliament passed the Clarity Act in 2000, setting out the terms by which any future referendum will be deemed legitimate, and Stephen Harper’s government recognized the Québécois as a nation in 2006. Will this suffice, or is resizing the country, through the departure of Quebec, still in Canada’s future?

The Case for Israel

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

As most people who follow events in the Middle East know, the Jewish state of Israel is under increasing ideological attack by those who wish to delegitimize, and thus eventually eliminate, the country.

They claim that the Jewish people have no right to the territory, but are interlopers and imperialists who stole the land known to these opponents as Palestine.

Yet Jews are one of the most ancient historical nations in the world. And Zionism attaches Jewish “nation-ness” to a specific territory, that of biblical Israel.

But the Zionist movement was about more than just the reclamation of an ancient homeland. It asserted that Jews, like other nations, needed sovereignty in order to survive and not remain helpless victims.

Hitler’s was only the last of many attempts to wipe out Jewish communities in Europe, beginning with the First Crusade at the end of the 11th century, when soldiers on the way to the Holy Land killed Jews in the Rhineland. Jews were perceived as just as much an enemy as Muslims.

In 1648-49, Bogdan Chmielnicki’s peasant army in eastern Europe massacred upwards of 300,000 Jews. And after the First World War, soldiers loyal to Symon Petliura in the Ukraine, murdered from 35,000 to 50,000 Jews in a series of pogroms.

Twentieth century Zionism was thus a form of nationalism, in response to these and other tragedies, in an era of nation-state building. It was no more “racist” than other versions. After all, anyone can, through conversion, become Jewish – even the leader of Hamas.

Whereas in truly segregationist societies, such as the old U.S. South or South Africa, neither Martin Luther King nor Nelson Mandela could have become “white.” These were ascriptive and immutable caste categories based on so-called race theories.

Historically, many Jews, especially on the left, had their own ideological reasons for opposing Zionism. The Jewish Labour Bund, the eastern European Jewish socialist party, had advocated instead its notion of do’ikayt (“here-ness”), which claimed Jews should focus on building viable communities in any place in which they lived.

And that opposition still holds true for some in today’s ultra-Orthodox Jewish sects, who are against it on theological grounds.

But the Second World War demonstrated the weakness of these competing beliefs – 6 million Jews were killed despite the (half-hearted) efforts by the Allied countries to save them. Jews were not the top priority in the war effort.

Despite the claims of many of today’s multiculturalists, it seems likely that, in the long run, national groups can only survive if they have a territorial base. Can Germany depend on Germans who emigrated to the United States, or Poland on Canadians of Polish descent? The same holds true for Jews, who are rapidly assimilating in such countries.

Today, almost half of the world’s Jewish population lives in Israel, where they don’t have to “work” at being Jewish – even if they are totally secular.

As for those who propose a “one-state” solution to the current Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, they should be reminded that such a prospect is highly unlikely.

Anyhow, why not have two states, as was proposed by the United Nations in 1947? The issue of borders acceptable to both sides is a different matter.

No one suggests neighbours Portugal and Spain should unite, or Norway and Sweden.

And those nations are closer in terms of culture, religion, and language to each other than are Israelis and Palestinians, nor have they recently fought each other.

Canada Courts a World Power

By Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have declared 2011 the Year of India in Canada.

India has become one of the world’s most powerful nations, politically, militarily and economically.

In 2010, bilateral merchandise trade between Canada and India totalled $4.2 billion, an increase of 73 percent since 2004. Canadian merchandise exports to India increased 142 percent over this period, reaching nearly $2.1 billion in 2010. Two-way direct investment was more than $7 billion. But India remains Canada’s 15th-largest trading partner, and Canada ranks just 33rd on India’s list.

Canada and India have now entered formal discussions for a comprehensive free trade pact that could be worth $6 billion a year. India has also announced plans to locate North America’s first Indian Cultural Centre in Toronto.

This makes perfect sense. About 1 million Canadians of Indian origin live in this country, more than half of them in Toronto, which is home to the largest Hindu temple in Canada.

Toronto also recently became the first North American city to host the “Indian Oscars,” the International Indian Film Academy awards. The awards gala drew an audience of 22,000 in the Rogers Centre, with another 700 million worldwide viewing it on television.

India is now the largest producer of films in the world, and its production centre in Mumbai, formerly Bombay, has given the industry the informal name “Bollywood.”

Also, after China, India has the largest diaspora in the world, estimated at 25 million people, living in countries such as Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States.

India retains strong links with its diaspora. It even issues Person of Indian Origin cards to people of Indian background living abroad, allowing them, according to the government, “to reconnect with their roots, as well as to respect their desire to participate in the development of the country of their origin.”

As India’s economy continues to strengthen, a growing middle class in the country seeks quality education for their children at the university level, and universities in India can’t keep up with the demand.

So about 160,000 Indian students are enrolled at universities abroad, mainly in Australia and the United States – but only 3,000 are studying in Canada.

Canadian universities are now working hard to recruit more Indian students. Senior Indian and Canadian university leaders and government officials recently attended a Canada-India education summit at Carleton University in Ottawa.

Some Canadian univerisites are also creating joint study or research programs with Indian universities.

York University’s Schulich School of Business plans to build a campus in Hyderabad, and the University of Waterloo is considering doing the same.

What a difference a century makes. In 1911, when India was a colony within the British Empire, King George V and Queen Mary had their durbar in Delhi. A durbar was a mass gathering in Delhi to commemorate the coronation of a British king and queen as emperor and empress of India.

A description of the event noted that Silver medal 1911, British India“The Sovereigns had appeared in their Coronation robes, the King-Emperor wearing the Imperial Crown of India with eight arches, containing six thousand one hundred and seventy exquisitely cut diamonds and covered with sapphires, emeralds and rubies.”

A feature film, titled “With Our King and Queen Through India,” was released a year later. This was the high tide of British imperialism. It must have seemed to those in attendance that it would never end.

Yet, just 36 years later, a near-bankrupt Britain granted India (and Pakistan) their independence. Nothing lasts forever.

In the Company of Microstates, P.E.I. Is a Giant

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

Europe is home to five miniscule microstates - these are countries that are geographically extremely small and, with one exception, have populations far less than 100,000.

While the Mediterranean island nation of Malta, a former British colony encompassing 316 square kilometres, has only been an independent country since 1964, the others - Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino - have been self-governing jurisdictions for centuries.

San Marino traces its existence back to the late Roman Empire and claims to be the world's oldest republic. Andorra arose out of a 13th-century treaty that created a jurisdiction jointly ruled by a Catalonian bishop and a French count. Monaco also emerged in the 13th century as a Genoan colony under the control of the House of Grimaldi. Liechtenstein had been part of the old Holy Roman Empire and acquired full sovereignty at the beginning of the 19th century.

Andorra, with a territory of 468 square kilometres, is nestled in the Pyrenees Mountains between France and Spain, and Liechtenstein, at 160 square kilometres, is in the Alps between Austria and Switzerland. Monaco, just two square kilometres in size, is surrounded by France, and San Marino, at 61 square kilometres, is an enclave inside Italy.

Compared to these countries, Prince Edward Island, at 2,194 square kilometres, is a giant.

Malta has a population of 410,000, Andorra 85,000, Liechtenstein 36,000, Monaco 35,000, and San Marino 31,000.

(Vatican City in Rome, the home of the Catholic Church, is technically a state and has observer status at the United Nations but it's not a real nation. Iceland and Luxembourg are by some definitions microstates, but they are far larger in area and population than these five countries.)

In the past considered too tiny to be full partners in the international community, these countries were viewed as anomalies, merely the leftover quirks of history.

When the League of Nations was founded after the First World War, none of them joined. And when the successor United Nations was formed in 1945, again none were among the original 51 signatories to its charter.

However, post-war global decolonization resulted in a wave of sovereign microstates, most of them small islands in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and South Pacific. Today's Commonwealth (of which Malta is a member) is largely a collection of such countries.

This paradigm shift allowed the European microstates to take their rightful place as full members of the international community.

Today, these tiny entities are all members of the greatly-expanded 192-member United Nations. Andorra and Malta joined in the 1960s, and the very tiny states of Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino in the 1990s.

They participate fully in European affairs. All are members of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They belong to many other international organizations as well.

They conduct bilateral diplomatic relations with many countries around the world. Andorra has five embassies abroad, Liechtenstein six, Monaco nine, San Marino 14, and Malta 23. They also staff numerous consulates and diplomatic missions in various capitals and other cities.

Professor Barry Bartmann, one of our colleagues in the Department of Political Studies at UPEI and a specialist on the politics of microstates, recently interviewed many of their UN-accredited diplomats in New York for a study on their foreign relations.

No longer is size an impediment for countries wishing to make their mark in the world.

Libyan War Could Signal NATO’s Collapse

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Christopher Hill, a former United States special envoy for Kosovo and now dean of the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, has remarked that the NATO operation against Moammar Gadhafi is in danger of failing.

It suffers, he has written, from a “strategy/policy mismatch. The policy is to remove Colonel Gadhafi from power. The strategy – the mandate for the means – is to protect civilians. The latter will not ensure the success of the former.”

His warning echoes that of outgoing U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates, who recently pulled no punches when he told the leaders of the alliance that it faces a “dim” and “dismal” future, if so many of its member states refuse to get involved in the current war against the Libyan dictator.

Gates said that less than half of NATO’s members have participated in the effort, and only one-third have contributed militarily. (Canada is among the one-third involved.) Shortcomings in capability and will, he remarked, “have the potential to jeopardize the alliance’s ability to conduct an integrated, effective and sustained air-sea campaign.”

Not only is Gadhafi continuing to defy the alliance, but had himself photographed playing chess with the visiting Russian head of the World Chess Federation in Tripoli recently.

The U.S. Congress is also tiring of the Libyan campaign and has not hesitated to let President Obama know it.

The House of Representatives last week rejected a bill to authorize continued American military operations in Libya.

This was mostly symbolism, as a measure that would have limited financing to support those efforts failed. It was, however, a warning to the administration.

America is drowning in debt, caused partly by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there is little appetite for this conflict.

The total cost of American operations in Libya is expected to top $1 billion by the end of the summer.

Barack Obama doesn’t want to throw his weight around the way George W. Bush did.

But the Libyan mess actually illustrates the shortcomings of multilateralism and dependence on organizations such as NATO, the Arab League and the UN Security Council itself, which has forced the U.S. and its allies to conduct a campaign with not one, but almost both hands, tied behind their backs.

If the United States, and other willing countries, had attacked Libya’s armed forces, and killed or captured Gadhafi, right at the start (even if this had involved elite ground forces), this war would have been over within weeks, if not days.

Maybe it would have been “illegal” by the standards of international law today, but think of how many lives, buildings, and other infrastructure –  not to mention money – would have been saved.

No “Arab Spring” in Yemen

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Yemen, the poorest Arab state, with a gross domestic product per capita of little more than $1,000 a year, has descended into political chaos.

Located at the south-western edge of the Arabian peninsula, the present-day Yemeni state was formed in 1990, when the north, an ancient Arab kingdom and then a republic, united with the south, the former British colony of Aden and later a Marxist-ruled “people’s democratic republic.”

Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s president, who took power in the north in 1978, has ruled the loosely unified Republic of Yemen since its formation.

Yemen’s population, which now stands at more than 24 million, has far outstripped its meagre resources. Much of the country is desert, and its predominantly rural population has a literacy rate barely above 50 percent.

Yemen is a small petroleum producer, but output from the country’s oil fields is falling and they are expected to be depleted by 2017 – a major concern, since oil provides around 90 percent of the country’s exports.

Saleh supported Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait in 1990, alienating not only that emirate but also Saudi Arabia, which was providing critical financial assistance to Yemen. The Saudis, in retaliation, expelled 1 million Yemeni expatriate workers.

Also, endemic civil warfare, mainly various northern tribes and secessionist socialists in the south fighting the central government, has further hampered economic growth. As a consequence, for the past 10 years Yemen has relied heavily on aid from multilateral agencies to sustain its economy.

The northern part of the country is controlled by tribes belonging to the Zaidi stream of Shia Islam; they constitute about 40-45 percent of the country’s population. Sunni Muslims live mainly in the south and southeast.

In 2004, one Zaidi insurgent group in the northwest, the Houthis, launched an uprising against the government. The Yemeni regime accused them of having ties with Shi’ite Iran, and in 2009, the Saudis, fervent Wahhabi Sunnis, intervened on the side of the government, bombing Houthi regions.

Yemen has now also been swept up by the turmoil that has spread across the Arab Middle East.

More than 20,000 anti-government protesters gathered in Sana’a, the capital, for a “day of rage” against President Saleh in early February. They called for immediate regime change and rejected Saleh’s offer to step down in 2013.

They want a transitional government of national unity, composed of technocrats, that will function until new parliamentary and presidential elections can be held. The Houthis announced their support for the pro-democracy protests.

More protests followed throughout March and April, but Saleh stood his ground. However, in May, the powerful Hashid tribal confederation, also composed of Zaidi Shi'ites, joined the fight against the president.

Battles soon ensued in Sana’a, and in early June Saleh was himself severely injured by a bomb, and was flown to Saudi Arabia for treatment. Meanwhile, vice president Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi has assumed power. Many in the opposition movement like him, because he is a southerner and shows no signs of tribal loyalties.

Saleh’s return is uncertain, but he has left behind a failed state which has little prospect for a transition to democracy.