Is an Entente Between Sudan and South Sudan Possible?

By Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

 

Their previous relationship was dominated by civil war and violence. But the overthrow of Sudan’s long-term ruler Omar al-Bashir, recently sentenced to two years in a rehabilitation center over charges of money laundering and corruption, is changing the country’s relationship with South Sudan, which in 2011 extricated itself from Khartoum’s repressive rule.

The two countries have had a very acrimonious relationship, following some four decades of brutal civil war fought between Sudan’s government in the predominantly Muslim, Arabic-speaking north and the Christian rebels belonging to various ethnic groups in the south.

Yet when Sudan's new prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, arrived in the capital of neighboring South Sudan in September, he expressed how “very delighted” he was.

Hamdok leads a transitional government in Sudan formed after the overthrow of al-Bashir, who ruled Sudan from 1989 to April 2019. And it seems the relationship may be thawing, now that South Sudan is itself in turmoil.

In 2013, South Sudan was plunged into a civil war pitting soldiers loyal to President Salva Kiir against fighters who support former vice president, Riek Machar.

South Sudan has 64 ethnic groups, the largest being the Dinkas, who constitute about 35 per cent of the population and predominate in government. The second largest are the Nuers, at more than 15 per cent.

It started after Kiir, a Dinka, removed Machar, who is Nuer. as his deputy as a result of a power struggle.

When fighting broke out, people fled to their respective groups for security.

Some 400,000 people have been killed in the violence and more than a third of the country’s 12 million people have fled their homes. 

Bashir meddled in the conflict, backing Machar’s rebel group and others opposing the South Sudanese government. In turn, rebel groupings inside Sudan received aid from South Sudan.

In particular, the Nuba Mountains area, located in Sudan’s far south, has historically and culturally had strong ties to what is now South Sudan, and the Juba government supported the Nuba rebels in their fight against Bashir.

Sudan’s government had already started mediating between Kiir and Machar, who signed a peace agreement in September 2018 and agreed to form a transitional government of national unity. But it has not been implemented.

Machar, who lives in exile in Khartoum, has asked for more time to discuss security and state boundary arrangements. Both Kiir and Machar agreed that there were “critical tasks” related to the deal that remained incomplete.

Sudan and South Sudan, despite their past, need each other. They are linked by their reliance on oil. While the oil fields are largely located in landlocked South Sudan, the only way to get oil out is via Sudan’s pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

If South Sudan can resume its oil exports, it would be a win for both nations. Sudan is suffering a serious economic crisis – it was rising food prices and high inflation that finally pushed Bashir out of office. 

As for South Sudan, it is one of the poorest countries in the world and the civil war has ravaged what little economic activity took place when it became independent. Is a rapprochement possible?

The Federal Tories Must Say "Nay" to Jean Charest

By Henry Srebrnik, (Fredericton, NB) Daily Gleaner

With Andrew Scheer stepping down as Conservative Party leader following his recent election defeat, the names of many potential contenders to succeed him are being brought forward. One of them is Jean Charest.

Both of English Canada’s Toronto-based national newspapers have been beating the drums for him. In the National Post, Jackson Doughart and Chris Selley have called on Charest to enter the ring, and the Globe and Mail’s John Ibbitson has done likewise.

Montreal’s Le Devoir finally got Charest to comment. “The information is true that I am in the process of considering (the question),” Charest told the newspaper a few days ago.

But, while he brings many positive qualities to the table, electing him would be a mistake. I say this looking at the recent history of this fractured federation’s fault lines.

Jean Charest was a 26-year-old lawyer from Sherbrooke, Que., when first elected in 1984 as Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives came to power.

Later a cabinet minister in Mulroney’s government, Charest lost the Conservative leadership in 1993 to Kim Campbell after Mulroney stepped down but became leader of the truncated party when Campbell was defeated in the 1993 federal election.

Leader of the rump PC caucus until 1998, Charest then joined the Quebec Liberal Party and led it to victory in 2003, becoming Liberal premier of the province until 2012, when he lost to the sovereigntist Parti Québécois.

So Charest, formerly a federal Progressive Conservative and a provincial Liberal, epitomizes what many have come to call the Laurentian elites, the central Canadian economic and political rulers of the country, who are mostly located in the Montreal-Ottawa-Toronto triangle. 

Ibbitson himself coined the term in a 2011 article, later expanded into a book, where he defined them as “the political, academic, cultural, media and business elites” of central Canada.

As the Laurentians presided, their worldview ruled. The lack of competition gave them ideological hegemony but has created social and political rifts outside central Canada.

This ruling class, in the period between 1987 and 1995, was responsible for almost allowing the country to be ripped apart.

Those of us old enough to remember this period, from the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords through the near-fatal Quebec Referendum, recall that it destroyed the old Progressive Conservative Party and led to the rise of the Bloc Québécois and the western-based Reform Party.

Angered by western Canada being again on the losing end of an election, University of Calgary political science professor Barry Cooper wrote on Nov. 10 in the C2C Journal, “The imperative is to cast off the yoke of Laurentian Canada − and soon.”

Charest has never been an MP in the reconstituted Conservative Party of Stephen Harper – Canada’s only western-based prime minister in office who lasted more than a year since way back in 1963, the year Tory John Diefenbaker was defeated by Lester Pearson. That alone speaks volumes about this country -- and, not coincidentally, both Diefenbaker and Harper were detested in much of central Canada.

I lived and taught in Calgary during the early 1990s and felt the anger Albertans had towards the eastern-based elites. I predicted Reform would sweep the west in the 1993 federal election, when most pundits refused to believe it could happen.

So, given this history, why would the Conservatives choose as their leader a former Liberal Party premier of Quebec? Would the Liberals choose a former Alberta Tory to head their party? 

Charest is not in any sense of the word a conservative and his record has been one as a foot soldier for the Laurentian elites and at best another federalist Quebecer like Brian Mulroney.

He would lose much of the west and gain little in the rest of Canada outside Quebec and the Maritimes, especially if the next Liberal leader will be (as I suspect) Chrystia Freeland.

This is shallow opportunism and in no way would differentiate the party Stephen Harper created from the humdrum liberal centre that is today’s Canada. 

A Charest at the helm of the Conservative Party would amount to the revenge of the old PCs and would inevitably lead to a Reform Party 2.0 and perhaps even a “Wexit” by Alberta and Saskatchewan. As for the Bloc, they’re already back!

Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers Were Powerful

By Henry Srebrnik, [Ssummerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer 

 

Until their final defeat a decade ago, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly known as the Tamil Tigers, were one of the more successful nationalist movements in the world.

They held off the army of the Sinhalese-majority Sri Lankan state for almost three decades. They also had overwhelming support from the Tamil diaspora, in Canada and elsewhere.

Despite the LTTE’s reliance on coercion to induce compliance, civilians in the Tamil-majority areas in he north and east of the country also supported the LTTE and their imagined state of Tamil Eelam voluntarily. 

After all, the costs for a rebel group of relying only on coercion are usually high and its effects last only as long as the coercion is effectively applied, while an element of legitimacy may provide sustainability.

Civilian support is the essential element of successful protracted guerilla operations since civilians can provide food, information and be a source of new recruits.

Hence the leadership of rebel groups will attempt to consolidate support among its constituents. A rebel leader without followers or civilian support will probably not get far in achieving political and military goals.

Different LTTE strategies helped create legitimacy in its quasi-state. Effective forms of legitimation were rooted in Hindu Tamil nationalism, tradition, charismatic leadership, and sacrifices made by LTTE cadres on behalf of the Tamil community’s need for protection. 

By making itself the sole representative of the Tamil people, the LTTE silenced competing Tamil voices, which were based on internal caste differences.

The Tamil Tigers in particular recruited younger Tamils who were upset by the economic dominance of Jaffna-based upper-caste Vellalar Tamils.

Initially, the LTTE comprised both Tamils and Muslims, but later they started to exclude Muslims and even forcefully expelled them from the Northern Province in 1990.

The LTTE called itself the national liberation movement of the Eelam Tamils, as articulated in their political program:

“We have a homeland, a historically constituted habitation with a well-defined territory embracing the Northern and Eastern Provinces, a distinct language, a rich culture and tradition, a unique economic life and a lengthy history extending to over three thousand years. As a nation we have the inalienable right to self-determination.”

How did those living under Tiger rule perceive the LTTE’s emblems? At meetings, they sang the Eelam national anthem. A national flag, bird, tree and flower also symbolised the separate nation.

The very name and logo of the insurgency, the “Tigers,” referred to the Tamil Chola dynasty in India who conquered the island in the 11^th century, under whom Tamil culture and power flourished.

Between the 1980s and the end of the war, the military wing of the LTTE transformed from a guerrilla organisation to a type of regular army with a conventional fighting force – it even had a navy and air force. 

It had a disciplined structure with the charismatic Velupillai Prabhakaran, who possessed an almost-mythical status, as its supreme leader. There were even suicide commandos, known as the Black Tigers, who were suicide commandos.

In its base areas the LTTE set up its own administrative structures, such as the police, the judiciary 

and tax collection. Though finally defeated, their legacy remains alive in the Tamil community.