In the
horrific Syrian civil war, now into is eight year, the international
humanitarian system served as an enabler of the Assad regime.
By
accepting its claims as a sovereign state, international aid agencies helped
the regime generate tangible benefits and resources in its wider efforts to
persist at all costs.
Indeed, at
a time when it faced almost certain defeat, they were critical to the regime’s
resilience and its insistence – against all empirical evidence -- on being
recognized as the only legitimate player in a country that had actually been
ripped apart by contending rebel groups.
An
understanding was hammered out between May and August 2012 allowing eight UN
agencies and nine international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
operate inside Syria. But only by acknowledging the “sovereignty, territorial
integrity and national unity” of the country.
So Syrian
officials insisted that the Damascus government was to be fully in charge and
that all outside groups provide unconditional respect for state sovereignty --
already a fiction by that time.
NGOs were
further restricted by being allowed to work only with local relief agencies
affiliated with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC) – an organization
hose claim to independence from government control was dubious at best.
SARC was
given a gatekeeper’s role over the UN’s humanitarian operations in Syria. It
became a mandatory operational partner and a focal point for all NGOs.
In fact, among
the senior local staff employed by UN agencies in the country were individuals
known for their ties to the Syrian secret police (Mukhabarat) and relatives of
senior regime incumbents.
Humanitarian
assistance was subjected to a host of crippling administrative and politically
motivated hurdles. For instance, throughout 2015, only 23 per cent of UN convoy
requests reportedly received government approval, and less than half of those
were able to proceed, primarily because of the Syrian government’s refusal to
give security clearances.
Requests to
deliver medical assistance, such as surgical supplies, were rejected or
ignored. In some cases, regime forces distributed aid items they had seized to
regime supporters and military personnel.
On the
other hand, the regime labelled unlicensed aid workers escaping government
control as criminals and terrorists. The Syrian Civil Defence rescue workers
known as “White Helmets” were targeted in air strikes, though they asserted
impartiality in the Syrian conflict.
Under
further threat from the Assad government, may of them were evacuated in 2018,
finding asylum in Canada, Jordan, and Great Britain.
Saudi
Arabia also provided some aid through its International Islamic Relief
Organization, but this went mostly to Syrian refugees in camps in Jordan.
So, through
its loud assertions of state sovereignty, the Syrian regime has maneuvered
itself into the driving seat and became by far the dominant partner in its
relations with UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs.
It gained significant
financial resources directly from the humanitarian aid efforts as it provided
business and financial opportunities to privileged members of the government.
These included enterprises that were subject to American and European Union
sanctions.
“We
recognize and respect Syria’s state sovereignty despite the difficult situation
and the extra ordinary circumstances,” the UN’s own resident humanitarian
coordinator, Yaqoub al-Hilo, remarked a few years ago, in explaining his
mission.
Opposition-held
areas received far less aid in proportion to the scope and severity of their
needs. UN agencies fell prey to the regime’s manipulations, causing aid to be
channeled away from rebel-held areas.
Damascus
continued to wield its nominal sovereignty over its borders by denying the UN
authorization to use at least nine border crossings that could have served
millions of people in need, especially in Idlib and Aleppo, though most of
these crossings weren’t even under government control.
Yet donors rarely
raised questions, because they had no interest in tarnishing the UN-led aid
effort.
As Stanford University political scientist Stephen Krasner observed in his book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, “rulers seek legal sovereignty because it provides them with an array of material and normative resources and benefits” while it “imposes no costs.”
As Stanford University political scientist Stephen Krasner observed in his book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, “rulers seek legal sovereignty because it provides them with an array of material and normative resources and benefits” while it “imposes no costs.”
This is
indeed a cautionary tale. It demonstrates the skills that an authoritarian
regime used in order to build, sustain, and set the terms in its dealings with
international aid groups despite the well-known knowledge of its brutality.