Repression and Regime Survival in Kazakhstan

By Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

By far the largest of the post-Soviet sovereign states in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has had an unfortunate history, both under Communist terror in the 1930s and more recent repression by its own government.

The Kazakhs emerged as a nomadic confederation in the mid-fifteenth century and came under Russian and Soviet rule in the 19^th century. Much of their territory had been colonized by Russian and Ukrainian peasants in the two decades before the First World War.

Under Soviet rule, Joseph Stalin’s collectivization drive in the early 1930s starved millions of ethnic Kazakhs by forcing nomadic herdsmen to farm.

In 1929, there were six million people in in Kazakhstan. By 1934, a quarter of them were dead –including almost 40 per cent of the ethnic Kazakh population. They would remain under Russian control for another 57 years.

In 1991, with the Soviet Union in ruins, Kazakhstan gained its independence, under the presidency of Nursultan Nazarbayev. On March 19 the first and only president of Kazakhstan announced his resignation. 

For now, the loyalist chairman of the senate, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, is holding the presidency until a new election on June 9, and the seventy-eight-year-old Nazarbayev remains the head of a newly empowered security council and his ruling party, Nur Otan (Radiant Fatherland). 

Since the country attained independence, there has been a deepening of authoritarianism and coercive capacity, as the regime in Astana – now renamed Nur-Sultan in honour of the country's former president -- stepped up authoritarian methods of policing dissent in the wake of violence in remote areas.

Nazarbayev prided himself on creating economic prosperity and social stability. Under his leadership Kazakhstan’s economy had steadily grown, creating the region’s biggest middle class. 

With many ethnic Kazakhs keen to trace their lineage back to Genghis Khan, Nazarbayev drew on nomadic traditions to bolster a sense of national identity.

Nazarbayev had consistently won elections with over 95 per cent support, more through lack of political competition than as a confirmation of his policies. His political party, Nur Otan (Radiant Fatherland), enjoyed almost complete representation in the parliament.

But in December 2011, mineworkers rioted in the towns of Zhanaozen and Shepte, breaking Kazakhstan’s seeming stability. Both cities are far from the country’s major urban areas and are infamous for their difficult living conditions. The unrest resulted in bloodshed between government forces and civilian activists.

A 20-day curfew was imposed and the area was saturated with special police and intelligence forces in the months after the protests. Social media sites were blocked for several days, with major blogging platforms shuttered for years.

Kazakhstan’s government also had to address the voices coming from the one million oralmans, recently naturalized ethnic Kazakhs, who had migrated from neighbouring countries, including China, Iran and Mongolia, since 1991. Many experiencing difficulty integrating into the historical homeland.

The government blamed disgruntled oralmans for fomenting the protests. Some Kazakh media published materials calling for forcing oralmans out of Zhanozen, out of other cities, and even out of the country,

A new government program resettled oralmans in a more dispersed pattern to avoid concentrating them in one area. As well, the regime jailed Vladimir Kozlov, a member of the unregistered opposition party Alga! (Forward!), on charges of instigating the riots in Zhanaozen. He was released in 2016.

The president also expanded existing political institutions, including his Nur Otan party, to better police the periphery, allowing the state to more deeply penetrate potentially restive parts of the country.

Other disaffected groups tend to be urban dwellers with fewer economic opportunities, as well as residents of rural eastern Kazakhstan, which suffered disproportionately from the disintegration of the Soviet economy and the collapse of local industrial sites.

Flagrant repression increased, as opposition leaders and activists were beaten up, hounded out of the country and found dead in suspect suicides. 

Respublika, one of the few papers openly critical of Nazarbayev, after enduring a decade of intimidation, was finally shut down by the courts.

Though many have accepted the trade of freedoms for prosperity and stability, resentments have been building for years, especially in rural areas left out of the oil boom and among ethnic Russians, more than one-fifth of the population, who feel disenfranchised by the ascendant Kazakh majority.

The future of the 18 million citizens of this vast, oil-rich nation remains far from clear.

Is the Nation of Georgia a European State?

By Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

The nation of Georgia, located in the southern Caucasus, has had a troubled history since emerging as an independent country following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Two non-Georgian ethnic regions within the country immediately also declared themselves sovereign and, with the help of Russia, have resisted reintegration into the country. Indeed, in 2008 Moscow fought a brief war with Georgia to protect Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

As well, domestically its politics have been less than democratic.

One of its former presidents, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was head of state from 2004 to 2013, is now in exile, accused of multiple criminal acts while in office. 

He became president after President Eduard Sheverdnadze, the last foreign minister of the Soviet Union, resigned following the bloodless November 2003 “Rose Revolution,” brought about by widespread protests over disputed parliamentary elections and corruption.

Already tarnished by his foolhardy war with Russia, Saakashvili left the country in 2013, not likely to ever return. In 2012, leaked videos showed prison guards torturing inmates in Georgian jails, and Georgian officials filed criminal charges against Saakashvili for abuse of power. Last year he was sentenced in absentia to six years in prison.

Nor have things improved very much. Last October’s presidential election, which saw Salome Zourabichvili win office as the country’s fifth president, has also proved controversial.

Her main opponent in the election, Grigol Vashadze, was backed by the fugitive Saakashvili, in a campaign marred by vote-buying and violations of campaign finance rules. It highlighted the continued problem of political corruption in Georgia.

Thousands of protesters denounced the election as “rigged.” Vashadze asserted the election was a “criminal farce.”

Despite all of this, Georgia likes to present itself as a “European” country and would like to join both the European Union and NATO.

Christianity is considered one of the most important components of Georgian national identity as it was key to the struggle for survival for centuries. For many Georgians, Christianity is the main reason behind their feeling of Europeanness. 

Most people in the country belong to the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church. One of the oldest churches in the world, Georgia’s constitution recognizes its special role in the country's history.

These views were encapsulated in a speech delivered by Saakashvili in 2009 in the presence of Spanish premier José María Aznar. Saakashvili asserted that Georgia is one of the oldest European countries: 

“We must never forget it; we are not anyone’s distant relatives and connected with them by force. We are an indivisible part of this civilization.” 

Saakashvili claimed that Georgians had made a choice to leave behind the undemocratic Soviet past for a bright democratic future. European values, he insisted, were at the core of Georgian society.

Georgia’s admission to the Council of Europe in 1999 was viewed as an essential symbolic step in Georgia’s path “back to Europe.” This was followed by Georgia’s association agreement with the European Union, signed in 2014.

This re-entry to Europe was symbolized by a new flag that stressed Georgia’s Christian character with five crosses of Saint George.

Implicit in all of this was the idea that as Georgia was Europe’s frontier state in the former USSR, the West should defend Georgia against its enemies – and help it regain its lost territories.

However, does being Christian automatically make any nation a European one? Actually, Georgian intellectuals themselves have long debated whether Georgia is “European” or “Asian” and the direction they should follow for the future.

After the fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, Georgia was almost completely cut-off from Europe and it would not be until the eighteenth century that real contact would be re-established -- via Russia.

Today, though, the country has rebranded itself as European, in order to gain access to European institutions.

In late March Georgian Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani visited Brussels and attended a meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission. 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and said that the 29 NATO member states had “clearly stated that Georgia will become a member of NATO.”

NATO member states expressed their strong support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and its sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders.

Georgia’s European discourse is being employed by the its political elite as a strategy in seeking Western patronage, and it’s working. We’ll have to see what Russia thinks about it.

Will the Arab World Overcome the Problems it Faces?

By Henry Srebrnik, [Calgary] Jewish Free Press

In 2009, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published The Arab Human Development Report: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries.

The report listed seven dimensions of the threat to human security in the Arab World: “people and their insecure environment”; “the state and its insecure people”; “the vulnerability of those lost from sight”; “volatile growth, high unemployment and persisting poverty”; “hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity”; “health security challenges”; and “occupation and military intervention.”

Ten years later, things are, if anything, worse. The Arab world faces a host of threats including political instability, economic stagnation, a rise in sectarianism, proxy wars and foreign intervention, and, especially since 2011, huge increases in refugee flows.

Unstable states collapsed one after the other; Libya has fallen apart, Syria has been pulverized, and the same goes for Yemen and Iraq.

Weakened states have provided the opportunity for non-state actors to entrench themselves, huge demographic shifts have occurred as ethnic groups consolidate, and ethnic and religious groups that were long suppressed have been reawakened to national aspirations.

The lack of accountability throughout the region has meant that governments have had free rein to imprison peaceful critics, restrict the activities of civil society or use arbitrary arrest, detention and excessive use of force against protesters demanding their rights. Thousands have been victims of relentless government violations. 

Egypt is still suffering from the consequences of its 2011 upheaval, as stifling repression prevents political progress, suppresses tourism, fuels insurgency, and drives popular discontent.

It has been moving to execute detainees, with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi himself apparently backing this spike in death sentences in 2019.

Recently Sisi lectured his critics, including European leaders, at an Arab-European Union summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, suggesting that executing detainees is part of “our humanity.”

Two factors have added to the strains in the Middle East. First, there has been a massive youth bulge in the Arab world. A large share of the population is comprised of children and young adults. 

Typically, these young adults are seeking employment opportunities thus creating intense competition on the job market.

Second, there has been rapid urbanization. The Middle East today is the second most urbanized region in the world. Overcrowding in megacities has put a strain on infrastructure and services.

Increases in population have led to severe environmental problems like desertification and overgrazing. This has led to conflict and threats of conflict between states over water rights.

The refugee crisis threatens even more long-term damage to the region’s development. The humanitarian situation in Syria remains volatile. The persecution of human rights defenders in both government and rebel-controlled areas remains endemic.

Arab women enjoy the least political participation. This is because of a deeply entrenched patriarchal society, discriminatory laws, chauvinistic male peers, and the conservative and tradition-minded nature of the Arab world.

Many women remain victims of legalized discrimination, social subordination, and enshrined male dominance. Abused women rarely attempt to file complaints with police and when they do they frequently encounter officers who are reluctant to get involved in what is perceived as a family matter.

In Saudi Arabia, until last year, women could not drive. Bahraini women do not have the right to initiate divorce. The curricula taught in Arab countries seems to encourage subordination and compliance, rather than free critical thinking.

More recent reports indicate that human security in the Arab word has sharply deteriorated. The 2010-11 uprisings known as the “Arab Spring” were therefore not an isolated and short-term phenomenon but rather a culmination of decades-long agitation for human and democratic rights and social and economic justice in the region.

The years since the Arab uprisings have seen an increase in repression across the Arab world, as leaders face further challenges.

Even relatively successful states, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, are grappling with massive economic problems, discontented youth, and unstable neighbors. In almost every country, the economic and political problems that drove the region toward popular uprising in 2011 are more intense today than they were seven years ago. 

Arab leaders must bring an end to the widespread repression that has become a hallmark of governments in the region, Heba Morayef, Amnesty International’s Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, recently stated. 

“As a first step, they should commit to releasing all prisoners of conscience who have been imprisoned solely for expressing their peaceful opinions and ending their crackdowns on protesters.”

However. the international community’s engagement on human rights in the Arab world, never particularly strong or consistent, has also changed significantly since 2011. 

A sense that the Arab revolutions failed, along with fear of migration and terrorism emanating from the region, have all corroded the willingness of Western leaders to confront these issues.

Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Genocide

By Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

 

Armenia, a small country in the Caucasus, faces hostile neigbours and has been involved in wars with some of them. 

The Armenians view these conflicts from the lens of a pre-existing trauma: the genocide that killed some 1.5 million of them during the First World War. They also came under the rule of foreign powers for centuries. 

The independent Armenian state that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is just a rump state, in the words of one historian, “a mangled bit of land.” 

Most of medieval Armenia now belongs to Turkey, including such national symbols as Lake Van and Mount Ararat. Many “heritage maps” illustrate a territorial reach much wider than that of contemporary Armenia.

To add to this feeling of dispossession, under Moscow’s rule the largely ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, east of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, but physically separated from it, came under the control of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. It was known as the Nagorno-

Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (Region).

What made this more galling was the fact that a part of Azerbaijan, too, was physically separated from the rest of that republic, by Armenia.

However, since Nakhchivan was a full-fledged part of Azerbaijan, rather than subordinate to Armenia, it remained under Baku’s control, and did not have to fight to extricate itself from Armenia. However, one small area, Karki, is occupied by Armenia.

There was no love lost between Armenians and Azeris, who prior to Soviet rule were periodically involved in physical confrontations, including wars in 1905 and 1917-18.

But the new USSR clamped down on such “un-socialist” manifestations of enmity and kept a tight lid on potential trouble spots.

By the late 1980s, though, it was clear the Soviet state was a crumbling empire, so restive peoples began to seek their own national destinies, even prior to the final 1991collapse.

Suddenly, Armenia and Azerbaijan were about to become sovereign (and hostile) states – but the Armenians in the Oblast naturally wanted to join an independent Armenia. 

Of course, citing territorial integrity and the sanctity of international (as opposed to internal) borders, the Azeris would have none of it. And so a war would ensue.

In 1991 a referendum held in the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast resulted in a deceleration of independence based on its right of self-determination. Large-scale ethnic conflict led to the 1991–1994 Nagorno-Karabakh War.

The Armenians in the Oblast, supported by Armenia, not only prevailed, but considerably enlarged the territory of the old Soviet region. They captured seven Azerbaijani districts that had not been part of Nagorno-Karabakh, including the Lachin Corridor, so they are now physically connected to Armenia proper.

Their state, now the Republic of Artsakh (an old medieval name), is dependent on, and to all intents and purposes, is part of Armenia – though Yerevan has not gone as far as recognizing it as a sovereign entity. Other than three similar de facto breakaway entities in the old USSR, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, no one else has either. 

The people of Artsakh see its independent status as temporary, since in reality they wish to be integrated into Armenia. In fact the third president of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, in office from 2008 to 2018, was born in Stepanakert, now the capital of Artsakh.

What complicates the matter is this: Azeris are culturally, ethnically and religious close to the Turks, who have supported them in their struggle with Armenia, providing military support and closing their own frontier with landlocked Armenia.

The close association of Turkey and its identification with Azerbaijan in the conflict has influenced the way Armenians perceive it.

It brings up very unpleasant memories, because the Ottoman Empire was the country that carried out the genocide, and its memory has remained the cornerstone of Armenian identity and activism.  (Indeed, many Armenians refer to Azeris as “Turks.”)

Enormous numbers of Armenians were massacred across the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and hundreds of thousands more were deported and sent to die in rudimentary camps in the Syrian deserts. In 1918, Ottoman troops entered Russian territory and murdered Armenians there also.

April 15 marks the 104^th anniversary of the start of the genocide, and it forms a backdrop to the current “frozen conflict” between Armenia and Artsakh on one side, and Azerbaijan and Turkey on the other.