Professor Henry Srebrnik

Professor Henry Srebrnik

Monday, November 05, 2018

Authoritarian Rule in an African Country


By Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Pioneer Journal

In many African states, authoritarian rulers have gone from refusing to hold elections to finding new ways to rig them, and to keep themselves in power. This is sometimes accomplished without having to resort to violence.

Cameroon, a union of former British and French colonies, is one of Africa’s most enduring electoral authoritarian regimes. While multiparty elections exist on paper, these elections are not free and fair and are tilted in the regime’s favor.

Paul Biya, age 85, has been in power for 36 years. On Oct. 7, running for a seventh term under the banner of the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, he won yet another presidential election.

This, even though a devastating uprising is taking place in the minority English-speaking areas in the northwest and southwest by separatists who want to form their own country, called Ambazonia.

Following the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles divided the colony, which had been German, between France and Great Britain. Colonialists imposed their own cultures on each region. 

Still, the two parts formed a single country in 1961. 

The French colonial government had established extensive emergency powers in its part, and subsequent presidents in Cameroon have made full use of these.

Biya is able to use nearly exclusive control of political appointments and state institutions to both reward supporters and punish detractors. 

When he became president, he declared nine states of emergency between 1982 and 1986.

At the time, Cameroon enjoyed a booming economy with solid exports of cocoa, timber, and coffee and a growing petroleum industry. 

Thanks to corruption and ethnic cronyism, while Biya and his friends grew rich on oil money, the Cameroonian economy shrank for nine straight years beginning in 1987.

Biya’s Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) was the only legal political party until December 1990. Under serious pressure, he accepted the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. But this didn’t end his hold on power.

In 1992, in the midst of economic crisis, many elites in Cameroon defected to form rival political parties. Significant election fraud, repression and an influx of international cash from France helped Biya eke out a narrow victory with just 40 per cent of the vote.

In 2004, Biya came up with a new tactic in the world of rigged elections. 

He signed a $400,000 deal with the Washington, D.C., law and lobbying firm of Patton Boggs.

One of the lobbyists, former Congressman Greg Laughlin, formed a group called the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress.  

It flew in six ex-congressmen, who observed the Oct. 11 vote, declared it a free election, and flew home.  

In 2008, the constitution was changed to remove term limits.

Cameroon’s emergency powers and state control continue to limit electoral competition. The government uses libel laws to shut down media outlets for extensive periods of time.

During elections, state officials constrain the opposition by limiting rally permits or restricting travel for security purposes. 

Nevertheless, governing this complex state of some 250 ethnic groups requires finesse as well. 

Under Biya, a Roman Catholic from the Beti ethnic group in the south, many Cameroonians see disproportionate political representation in senior political posts from his home territory. 

Much of the north (now under threat from Boko Haram in neighbouring Nigeria) is Muslim; it was ruled by a Fulani emirate prior to European colonization.

So Biya uses carrots as well as sticks, offering opposition party leaders positions of prestige. 

Today, Cameroon has the largest cabinet on the continent with more than 65 ministers, secretaries and special delegates. 

Similarly, Cameroon has not liberalized much of its state-controlled economy, leaving Biya with many fiscal tools to secure political support.

So, even with a multiplicity of parties and periodic elections, he has, as Keith Somerville noted in his book Africa’s Long Road since Independence, retained “an overall structure that ensured the locus of power remained unchanged.”

Supporters of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement Party candidate, Maurice Kamto, claimed fraud. But Biya’s victory was a foregone conclusion.

He received 71.09 per cent of the votes, with Kamto far behind, at 14.4. 

One-fifth of the electorate is English speaking, and many, due to separatist violence, could not reach the polls in this election. So the overall election turnout was 53 per cent.

Biya’s party has vowed to continue with protests.



Religious Dimension of Russian-Ukranian Conflict


By Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

The war between Russia and Ukraine has claimed more than 10,300 lives, and Moscow in 2014 annexed Crimea from Ukraine in a move that brought international denunciations.

But the military and political conflict between Russia and Ukraine also has an important religious dimension.

The Russian Orthodox Church on Oct. 15 moved to sever all ties with the Constantinople Patriarchate, the Eastern Orthodox mother church in Istanbul.

It is currently led by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, the spiritual leader of the world’s Orthodox Christians.

Russia’s move was taken to protest Bartholomew’s steps towards creating a single, self-governing Church in Ukraine, led by its own patriarch. 

More than two-thirds of Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians. But the country’s main religious body falls under the authority of Moscow, not Kyiv. 

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is part of the Russian church. This degree of supervision over Ukraine was originally granted to the Moscow patriarchate in 1686.

Ukraine currently has three Orthodox bodies: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) created in 1991, and the small Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, born early in the 20th century.

In April Ukraine’s lawmakers voted overwhelmingly in favor of President Petro Poroshenko’s appeal to Patriarch Bartholomew to recognize an independent and inclusive Ukrainian church. Poroshenko called it part of Ukraine’s westward integration.

Ukraine’s political leaders want the main Ukrainian Orthodox Church to be fully free of Russia’s oversight. 

An independent Ukrainian church -- or “autocephalous” in ecclesiastical terms -- would mark another important symbolic break from Russia and would rupture the last significant Russian imperial link to Ukraine.

The Moscow Patriarchate announced that its believers would face punishment for praying in churches belonging to Constantinople.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, declared that Russia would “protect the interests of Orthodox Christians” just as it had always protected the interests of Russian speakers.

Moscow’s move stopped short of a complete break, however, with the Russian church calling on the leaders of the other 13 independent Orthodox churches, which largely conform to national borders. to press Constantinople rather than demand that they break with it as well.

The Eastern Orthodox Church lacks an all-powerful central authority figure like the Pope. Instead, the Patriarch in Constantinople is considered a “first among equals” among the other Orthodox patriarchs. 

A newly independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate would most likely seek to take over houses of worship and other property from the church under Moscow’s jurisdiction, which, until now, is the largest in Ukraine and the only one recognized by other churches.

The roughly 12,000 parishes in Ukraine constitute about one-third of all parishes in the Russian Orthodox Church, so an independent church there would drastically shrink the Russian church.

The Russian Orthodox Church claims 150 million followers, or half the estimated 300 million Orthodox worldwide.

A smaller church would undermine Moscow’s effort to call itself the protector of all Orthodox Christians and the so-called Third Rome, after the loss of Rome in the original Christian schism and then Constantinople (now Istanbul) to the Muslim Ottomans in 1453.

The control of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has buttressed Putin’s claim that they were still one people, one church and one culture. They all belonged to the “Russian World,” a concept promoted by both the Kremlin and Patriarch Kirill I, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Kiril has made no public effort to halt the bloodshed in eastern Ukraine. “There was no condemnation of the war on the part of the church leadership in Moscow,” Vyacheslav Gorshkov, who teaches the catechism at a Kyiv cathedral, remarked. “The church conducted itself in a way that showed it is not on the side of the people.”

The Russian patriarch has been unwelcome in Ukraine since 2014 despite being the nominal head of the church.