Professor Henry Srebrnik

Professor Henry Srebrnik

Saturday, April 20, 2024

In a Dangerous Middle East Is Lebanon Doomed?

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

Everyone understands that Lebanon is, by any measure, a failed state, paralyzed by its sectarianism. Its various Christian, Druze and Muslim communities have over the past four decades destroyed what little unity it possessed.

More than a dozen religious sects coexist in a precarious balancing act, reflected in a power-sharing system that reserves government posts by religion. Both the presidency and central bank governor, two top posts reserved for Maronite Christians, have been vacant since October 2022 and July 2023 respectively, due to divisions over choosing successors.

And with the rise of Hezbollah, the Shia Muslim group that uses its territory as a launching pad aimed at Israel, its future in any larger Middle East war is that of a death foretold. Lebanon has become little more than a pawn of Iran’s, with virtually no agency of its own.

Iran founded Hezbollah in 1982 to export its Islamic revolution and fight Israeli forces that had invaded Lebanon. Sharing Tehran’s Shia Islamist ideology, Hezbollah recruited among Shia Muslims, at the time the poorest people in the country.

It is Iran who shaped Hezbollah and to whom Hezbollah is loyal. It demonstrated its military strength in 2006 during a five-week war with Israel, and its power grew after deploying into Syria in 2012 to help President Bashar al-Assad fight Sunni rebels.

Hezbollah also entered politics and has ministers in government and lawmakers in parliament. In 2016, the Hezbollah-allied Christian politician Michel Aoun became president. Two years later, Hezbollah and its allies won a parliamentary majority. This majority was lost in 2022, but the group continues to exercise power over the state.

Hezbollah now boasts some 150,000 precision rockets and asserts it can hit all parts of Israel. In 2021, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the group had 100,000 fighters.

Hezbollah began launching rockets from southern Lebanon at Israel on Oct. 8 in support of Hamas, which carried out an attack into Israel from Gaza the previous day. Some 90,000 people have been displaced from southern Lebanon since the conflict broke out.

Lebanon’s Christians politically dominated the country until they lost a vicious civil between 1975 and 1990 that resulted in an estimated 150,000 fatalities. They are now relatively helpless and caught in the crossfire, with little ability to steer the country away from disaster.

Maronite Patriarch Boutros al-Rai early in the current Gaza war called for Lebanon to stay on the sidelines and more recently declared that war had been “imposed” on Christians. Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Beirut Elias Audi asked in March if it was fair for “one faction of Lebanese to decide on behalf of everyone and take unilateral decisions that not all Lebanese agree on.” Even Hezbollah’s main Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement, announced that its alliance with Hezbollah had been shaken.

“The main problem that arose recently was crossing the limits of defending Lebanon and getting involved in a conflict in which we cannot make decisions,” its leader Gebran Bassil complained.

Michael Young, senior editor at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut, called Bassil’s comments an attempt to gain some leverage over Hezbollah by signaling a rift, but also reflected Christian unease with the status quo.

“The mood among the Christian community is almost a psychological divorce from the system. They don't feel that they have a say in the system and in a way it’s true -- Hezbollah is in control of much of the system,” Young told Reuters.

On Jan. 7, travelers through Beirut’s airport saw the arrival and departure screens suddenly flash a message addressed to the powerful leader of Hezbollah: “Hassan Nasrallah, you will not have any supporters if Lebanon is drawn into a war for which you will bear responsibility.” Nasrallah isn’t listening. Hezbollah fired a large barrage of rockets at northern Israel on April 12.

Lebanon was already hit hard by a financial meltdown that began in 2019. Since then, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen by 50 per cent, the currency has lost more than 90 per cent of its value, and poverty now plagues 80 per cent of the population. Salaries became nearly worthless after the pound lost most of its value.

Lebanon’s insolvent banks won’t allow depositors to withdraw their money in full. The Association of Banks in Lebanon has said the institutions do not have enough liquidity to pay back depositors.

Now things are even worse, with tourists staying away, shops closed, and schools shuttered or sheltering thousands displaced by the fighting. Lebanon’s overburdened health-care system will be unable to cope if the war spreads.

Simon Neaime, an economics professor at the American University of Beirut, fears that the Lebanese are exhausted. “In 2006, during the last war with Israel, we had a fully functioning economy, we had a functional banking system supplying credit to the private sector and contributing to growth, we had a government in place, we had a president,” Neaime explained.

In 2006, Lebanon received support from Arab countries, particularly oil-rich Persian Gulf nations, for reconstruction after the end of that war. This is not the case today, with ties to the gulf monarchies, ruled by Sunni Muslims, strained by Hezbollah’s increased regional presence. The country, or what’s left of it, is on its own.

 

Saturday, April 13, 2024

Israel and South Africa are Quarrelling About the Gaza War

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

South Africa’s Chief Rabbi, Dr. Warren Goldstein, addressed the Congressional Summit of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in Washington March 10, speaking about politics in Africa and the Middle East.

He observed that the ideology of Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Islamic State (ISIS) throughout much of Africa is the same ideology espoused, funded, and propagated by Iran and its proxies, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.

“Israel’s war with Hamas – and by extension Iran – is against the same enemy,” he asserted, suggesting that the way to fight a “diplomatic war” is to build alliances with states in Africa.

But relations between Israel and his own country have worsened. After the war in Gaza broke out last October, South Africa became one of the most outspoken countries against Israel in the world and one of its most vituperative critics, calling Israel an “apartheid state” and accusing it of “ethnic cleansing.

In December, Pretoria went further, charging Israel with genocide at the International Court of Justice. “Our opposition to the ongoing slaughter of the people of Gaza has driven us as a country to approach the ICJ,” South African President Cyril Ramaphosa said ahead of the proceedings.

“As a people who once tasted the bitter fruits of dispossession, discrimination, racism and state-sponsored violence, we are clear that we will stand on the right side of history.”

Israel’s Foreign Ministry responded by calling the claims “false and baseless” and a “sweeping counter-factual description” of the conflict with Hamas. It denounced South Africa for “collaborating with a terror group that calls for the destruction of the state of Israel” and accused it of participating in a “blood libel” against the Jewish state.

In January the court ordered Israel to take all measures within its power “to prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide” and to immediately ensure that Palestinians have access to basic services and humanitarian assistance. While South Africa had called for the suspension of Israeli military operations in Gaza, the court did not grant this provisional measure.  

The world’s reaction to the landmark case showed a predictable global split. Most countries backing South Africa’s case were from the Arab world, Asia, and Africa. No Western country supported South Africa’s allegations against Israel.

Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor, visiting Washington for talks with American officials, on March 19 maintained that the International Criminal Court should have already issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “for war crimes committed against Palestinians in Gaza.”

South Africa also recalled its ambassador to Israel and suspended diplomatic relations. The Israeli airline El Al is planning to cancel its Tel Aviv to Johannesburg route, given a steep drop in demand.

It is the nadir of a relationship that had survived some challenges, largely thanks to the leadership of Nelson Mandela, who in 1994 became South Africa’s first president after apartheid.

Mandela supported Israeli territorial concessions and was close to the Palestinian cause, but he was also supportive of Israel, which he’d visited and where he’d received an honorary doctorate. His viewpoint was that Israel had the right to exist.

Today South Africa strongly backs the Palestinian cause, with formal diplomatic relations established in 1995, a year after the end of apartheid. It downgraded its embassy in Tel Aviv to a liaison office in 2019.

The issue of whether Israel should be granted observer status in the African Union (AU) has been subject to heated debate. In February, Israel thwarted an effort by South Africa and Algeria to deprive it of observer status in the AU. The two countries had also planned to urge the 55 member states to cut off relations with Israel. Nevertheless, leaders at the AU summit in Addis Ababa condemned Israel’s offensive in Gaza.

Both the pro-Israel and pro-Palestine movements in South Africa are large. The groups are openly hostile towards each other, especially since last Oct. 7.

Pro-Palestine marches bring together up to 200,000 people. In early December a senior Hamas delegation arrived in South Africa to participate in the Fifth Global Convention of Solidarity with Palestine. Speakers from the Hezbollah and Houthi organizations addressed students at the University of Cape Town on March 27.

The South African Jewish community numbers some 75,000, making it the twelfth largest Jewish community in the world. “Israel has many allies and friends here in South Africa who are ashamed of their government’s support for terrorist regimes and despots,” declared Goldstein.

Gabriella Farber-Cohen, former spokesperson for the African National Congress (ANC) Women’s League in Gauteng, resigned from the party in mid-October. She called South Africa accusing Israel of genocide a “slap in the face for all Jews in South Africa.”

Following threats by South Africa’s government in December to prosecute citizens who served in Israel’s army, including stripping naturalized South Africans of their citizenship, leaders of the South African Jewish community Feb. 20 organized a ceremony in Israel for members who were killed or wounded defending the Jewish state.

Already part of the white minority, South Africa’s Jews are become yet more marginalized. If the ANC is re-elected in the national election May 29, many believe that there will be a Jewish exodus from the country.

 

Saturday, April 06, 2024

A Free Election in Senegal is No Small Matter

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

On March 24, opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye won Senegal’s presidential election against former prime minister Amadou Ba. This was no small matter, as the contest followed several years of unrest and political crisis.

Incumbent President Macky Sall did not seek re-election, with his ruling United in Hope (BBY) coalition instead endorsing Ba. Sall had unsuccessfully sought to postpone the election, initially scheduled for Feb. 25, to Dec. 15. In fact, prior to that, he had even suggested that he might run for a third term, beyond the constitutional limit of two terms.

But even the proposed delay to Dec. 15 had angered Senegalese. Authorities in January suspended internet services and banned a protest march against the delay of the presidential election. Opposition parties and civil society groups demanded that the Constitutional Council, the country’s highest court, intervene.

It ruled on Feb. 15 that parliament’s unprecedented postponement of the presidential vote to mid-December was not in line with the constitution. So the March voting finally took place.

Of course we might put an asterisk next to the word “free” in describing the current contest. Ousmane Sonko, who finished third in the country’s 2019 presidential election, had been widely seen as the main challenger to Sall’s ruling party. But he was sentenced to two years in prison last June 1 after a court found him guilty of “corrupting youth,” and was declared ineligible.

His imprisonment triggered deadly clashes, with supporters taking to the streets and facing off with security officers. Amnesty International accused Senegalese authorities of responsibility for the deaths of at least 23 people, including three children, during violent demonstrations on June 1-2, But Sonko was kept in jail until just three days before the vote.

Sonko’s political ally Bassirou Diomaye Faye, who had also been jailed, on charges including defamation, but had not been sentenced, was therefore selected as the opposition’s candidate.

Both men were released after Senegal’s parliament on March 6 passed a law granting amnesty to all political prisoners arrested during protests since 2021. Amnesty International estimates that more than 1,000 opposition members and activists were imprisoned in the past three years under Sall’s rule.

Faye was previously secretary-general of Sonko’s Patriots of Senegal (PASTEF) party, which was dissolved by the government last year over allegations it had called for an insurrection. Former party members joined with others in a coalition, Liberate the People (YAW), to contest the election under Faye.

Their slogan “Sonko is Diomaye, Diomaye is Sonko” resonated with the electorate. Faye also benefitted from the support of the Mourides, the most influential Muslim brotherhood in Senegal, whose population is predominantly Muslim.

Things have not been going well in the West African country, so the election results were no surprise. About one third of the population of 18 million live in poverty. Successive administrations have struggled to curb youth unemployment, an increasingly urgent issue for its fast-growing population, more than 60 per cent of whom are now under the age of 25. The median age is 19.

The share of young Senegalese who are not employed or in school or training stood at 35 per cent in 2019. Since then the economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic has further squeezed the job market. It has also caused a cost-of-living crisis. These people voice frustration over a lack of jobs, and they formed the backbone of support for Sonko and Faye.

Senegal’s problems have not come out of nowhere. Observers often present the country as one of Africa’s most stable democracies. But this claim masks a much darker history. Sall has violently degraded the country’s democratic institutions. He shut down the country’s prestigious University of Dakar, closed since June 2023, cracked down on journalists, and gave a green light to violent attacks against protesters.

Sanko and Faye presented a vision for institutional reforms and more even wealth distribution, including plans to renegotiate the country’s mining and energy contracts with foreign entities, especially oil and gas contracts for projects which are due to start production later this year.

They also want Senegal to stop using the CFA franc, the West African single currency that is pegged to the euro, which is regarded as a relic of the colonial era. In other words, they want monetary sovereignty and an end to French political intervention.

The proposals have been labelled as irresponsible by their opponents, although Sonko has sought to quell such fears by saying they would only consider introducing a national currency if other reforms fail.

In their recently published book De la démocratie en Françafrique: Une histoire de l’impérialisme électoral (Democracy in Françafrique: A History of Electoral Imperialism), French journalist Fanny Pigeaud and Senegalese economist Ndongo Samba Sylla illustrate how the currency rules have worked to benefit French business and governments and African elites.

Senegal’s political class has long defended a system that largely serves French economic and political interests as well as those of a small cadre of local elites. Even when elections are held, winners rarely help the people who voted them into power. Sall was also a reformer when first elected.

What Faye and Sonko have voiced as their goal is, first and foremost, sovereignty. And Senegalese clearly want a democracy. Will the country’s ruling class let them have one?