Mexico’s New President is (Sort of) a Jewish Woman

  By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

I am probably the only writer starting a column about the incoming president of Mexico by citing a once-prominent Marxist theoretician who died more than half a century ago. Because it provides an insight into who Claudia Sheinbaum is.

Isaac Deutscher, who died in 1967, wrote a very influential article, “The Non-Jewish Jew” in 1958. It could have been a portrait of Mexico’s newly-elected president.

The concept of the “non-Jewish Jew” has been adopted by many secular leftist Jewish intellectuals as a badge of identity. Defined by a universal and secularist humanist outlook that is rooted in Jewish thought, they are revolutionaries of modern thought who transcend their Jewish background.

Deutscher attributes their exceptional breadth to the fact that as Jews they live in the boundaries of various civilizations, religions, and national cultures This, Deutscher suggests, has what enabled them to lift their gaze above their own community and to strike mentally into new horizons. It fits Sheinbaum to a T.

Sheinbaum, who headed outgoing president Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador’s left-wing Morena (National Regeneration Movement), gained 59.3 per cent of the vote, winning handily over her main opponent, Xochitl Galvez -- also, as it happened, another woman.

Running for a right-of-centre coalition comprising the PAN (National Action Party), PRI (Institutional Party of the Revolution) and PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), she came in at about 30 per cent.

Of course virtually every columnist has emphasized that Sheinbaum is the first woman to assume Mexico’s highest office, especially notable for a country often criticized for its machismo and violence towards women.

Journalists also speculate that she is probably going to follow in the footsteps of her left-wing mentor, who has completed his six-year term as head of state, since Mexico’s presidents are limited to one term in office.

Sheinbaum has promised continuity, saying that she will continue to build on the welfare programs which have made the outgoing president very popular. She points to her term as Mexico City mayor, during which she oversaw a 50 per cent reduction in the murder rate in the capital.

Yes, Sheinbaum’s Jewish background has been noted – and her opponents have in fact used it against her, in this very Catholic country. She has been the target of hyper-nationalist, antisemitic prejudice, including online birther conspiracy theories alleging that she was born in Bulgaria. Former PAN president Vicente Fox has referred to her as a “Bulgarian Jew” and “Jewish and foreign” in separate posts on X. 

Sheinbaum’s maternal grandparents were indeed Sephardic Jews who fled Bulgaria before the Holocaust. Her paternal grandparents were Ashkenazi Jews who arrived in Mexico, fleeing persecution in Lithuania, in the 1920s. Her paternal grandfather left Europe because, she has stated, he was “Jewish and communist.” 

But while that may be one reason why she downplayed her roots, she really is a “non-Jewish Jew” who has rarely addressed her Jewishness in public. When she does, she tends to convey a more distant relationship to Judaism than many others in Mexico’s Jewish community.

“Of course I know where I come from, but my parents were atheists” and leftists, Sheinbaum told the New York Times in a 2020 interview. “I never belonged to the Jewish community. We grew up a little removed from that.” Her own Mexican identity is rooted in science, socialism, and political activism.

Both of Sheinbaum’s parents were well-off scientists and Sheinbaum studied physics before going on to receive a doctorate in energy engineering. She spent years at a renowned research lab in California studying Mexican energy consumption patterns and became an expert on climate change. That experience and her student activism eventually earned her the position of secretary of the environment for Mexico City at the time when Lopez Obrador was mayor of the capital.

On the campaign trail this year, she gained attention for wearing a Catholic rosary necklace and skirts decorated with an image of the Virgin of Guadalupe, the “Queen of Mexico.” The Basilica in Mexico City is the most-visited Catholic shrine in the world.

“You have the right not to believe in God, it is a personal issue, but you don’t have the right to use Mexicans’ faith for political opportunism. That’s hypocrisy,” maintained Galvez, who highlighted her own Catholic credentials in her campaign.

Ironically, Xochitl Galvez took to X last September to wish the Jewish community a happy new year and a “blessed” Yom Kippur. And the Mexican Jewish community in this election mostly supported Galvez, rather than Sheinbaum, who, even when mayor, never integrated herself with the tightly knit Jewish community of Mexico City. 

In her victory speech June 2, Sheinbaum acknowledged the significance of her becoming Mexico’s first female president, but made no mention that she will also be the country’s first Jewish president.

As Sheinbaum prepares to tackle some of Mexico’s most pressing social issues, including a crisis of murder and drug cartel violence, she might also strive to showcase the multiple identities and ancestries that comprise Mexican society. But she doesn’t seem to want to include Mexico’s 60,000 Jews in that tapestry.

In a few months, she will occupy the National Palace, and she will always be remembered as the woman who managed to break the glass ceiling in Mexican politics. But few will remember she was Jewish by birth.

Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science

 

Gaza: What Will The “Day After” Look Like?

  By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

What will Gaza look like when the current war between Hamas and Israel finally ends? Who will rule and try to reconstruct the small enclave? Will Israel retain some say? Does Hamas remain a viable political force? All these questions are being asked in the capitals of the Middle East, Europe, the United States, and Canada.

Israel has categorically ruled out any governing role for Hamas after the conflict ends. Hamas has also rejected any form of Israeli administration in Gaza.

Hamas has begun to lay the groundwork for reconciling with the rival Fatah-led PLO, which runs the Palestinian Authority (PA) that now governs the West Bank, thereby guaranteeing that Hamas is part of whatever governance structure emerges.

Hamas may wish to emulate the Hezbollah model. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is nominally part of the weak Lebanese state, allowing it to influence policy and have at least some say in directing government funds, yet it maintains complete autonomy in running its own powerful military and in fighting Israel.

Under a new arrangement for Gaza, Hamas hopes to exert the same influence and independence with its own movement and militia, neither beholden to nor controlled by a larger Palestinian government.

Can this happen? After all, as a longtime sworn enemy of Fatah and the PA, Hamas took over Gaza by armed force in 2007 after a civil war with the PLO. Even if they two agreed to partner, would other countries acquiesce?

In his multiple visits to the region during the first months of the war, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s presented scenarios for governing the Gaza Strip. The goal: a reformed and less corrupt PA to re-exert control over the Strip and regain enough legitimacy in the eyes of its people to govern an eventual Palestinian state. 

He visited Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and presented the proposal to him. Abbas conditionally accepted but only within a political process that leads to a Palestinian state.

The U.S. plan would establish a PA government that would be tasked with rebuilding Gaza under international auspices. It would reorganize itself to run the Gaza Strip, including security control, which may involve recruiting local elements, bringing in forces from the West Bank or diaspora refugee camps.

Hamas “technocrats” might be part of this unity government, if the group abandons its dependence on the so-called axis of resistance led by Iran. This would pave the way for several Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, to take responsibility for rebuilding Gaza.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has also held talks with the so-called Arab Quint -- Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar -- about participation in a multinational Arab peacekeeping mission operating under a UN Security Council resolution, as long as it is coupled with support of Palestinian self-determination.

Though UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan has responded that his country would not participate in a new civil administration in Gaza, Bahrain has indicated a willingness to join such a force.

The war has opened the door for other possible scenarios. One proposal assumes that after the end of the war, and to fill the vacuum that may arise because of the collapse of the Hamas regime, influential countries, Egypt and Jordan in particular, might form an Arab force with the participation of local representatives from Gaza to manage the reconstruction process. They, along with Saudi Arabia, are crucial to stabilizing and rebuilding Gaza.

The Arab League on May 16 called for a United Nations peacekeeping force to be deployed until a two-state solution can be negotiated. This plan is very much on the table, as Arab countries have announced their readiness to send troops to Gaza to contribute to its security. Its realization is mainly linked to Israel’s success in effectively weakening Hamas to the point where it cannot resist.

Under this scenario, the PA would not be able to extend its control from its West Bank base to the Gaza Strip. The status of Jerusalem and the West Bank would be suspended and separate from that of the Gaza Strip, so that the fate of that area would be dealt with in the future.

The Gaza Strip represents strategic depth for Egypt, which administered it from 1948 until June 1967, when Israel occupied it. In this third plan, Egypt would have to play this role again to fill any vacuum that may arise because of Hamas’s military defeat, as Egypt has had bitter experience in the war against terrorism in Sinai, whose borders are connected to the southern Gaza Strip.

Egypt would not necessarily administer Gaza directly but could do so by expanding the influence of the Egyptian intelligence service there, as it is currently doing in eastern Libya. On the Palestinian side, Hamas may view Egypt’s management as a way to preserve itself from completely disappearing. However, this would not be welcomed by the PA, which considers Gaza an essential part of the territory of the Palestinian state, giving it the exclusive right to govern the Strip.

Whatever comes next, is it too much to hope that the war may yet provide an opportunity towards a settlement that achieves some measure of stability in the Middle East?

 

As War Continues, Israel’s Arabs Worry

 Henry Srebrnik, [Halifax] Chronicle Herald

After eight months of war in Gaza, calm has been maintained between the Jewish and Arab sectors in Israel, despite concerns expressed by the political establishments. However, amid the harsh reality of the ongoing conflict, potential dangers could undermine the stability of these delicate relations.

Though Arab citizens have the same legal rights as Jewish Israelis, they suffer from poverty, unemployment, and crime, as well as discrimination in the allocation of budgetary resources, including the distribution of lands and housing.

Many Israeli Jews were terrified and traumatized by Hamas’s massacre and were afraid that the Arab citizens would commit similar acts. Hamas’ military commander Mohammad Deif called on Arabs inside Israel to “set the earth on fire under the feet of the occupiers.”  These fears never materialized, as the Arab public ignored Hamas’ calls to open a domestic front against Israel.

In practice, most Israel’s Arab citizens denounced unreservedly Hamas’ terror attack and expressed their sense of a shared fate with the Jewish majority and their loyalty to the state in both word and action.

Most Arab citizens of Israel want to continue their lives as an integrated minority in Israel and reject Hamas and its ideology. But the longer this war persists, the greater the anger among the Arab public and an increasing urge to protest against it.

There is a concern that protests and disturbances could increase, leading to clashes between radical, nationalist, and religious groups. A January poll conducted by Israeli statistician Mano Geva found that only 34 per cent of Israel’s Jewish population say they trust the country’s Arab population, and more than 60 per century stated that they are against an Arab party being part of an Israeli government coalition. 

The Institute for National Security Studies regularly conducts public opinion surveys. Its April 2024 poll found that approximately 47 per cent of the Arab population has felt a decline in relations between Jews and Arabs since the outbreak of the war. More than half of the Arab public, 56 per cent, reported feeling a low or very low sense of personal security, which was more than double the rate of the Jewish population.

The war in Gaza has also had a negative impact on the economic well-being of Israeli Arabs, with data showing that this part of the workforce has been more adversely affected than any other. According to a report by the Bank of Israel, the unemployment rate in the Arab sector has sharply risen since the start of the war, particularly among men. Their employment decreased by 27 per cent during this period, largely because of firings and downturns in sectors with a large proportion of Palestinian Israeli workers, compared to 11 per cent among Jewish men.

Employment also suffered due to concerns raised by both Jewish and Arab employees. Surveys indicate that both groups feared that workplace interactions would undermine their sense of personal security. These concerns have also harmed Arab-owned businesses, which have reported a significant drop in demand from Jewish consumers.

A poll conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at Tel Aviv University last November found 10 per cent of Arab Israelis had personal experience of harassment. A December survey by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 71 per cent of Arabs living in Israel are worried about voicing their views on social media. The survey also found that 84 per cent of respondents feared for their physical safety, while 86 per cent worried about their economic security. 

In addition, budget cuts by Israeli ministries have affected the five-year plan announced in 2021 for Arab society, resulting in a 15 per cent reduction in budgets allocated to the Arab sector. These funds were intended to address years of neglect.

Studies suggest that increasing economic assistance to Arab regional councils, businesses, and those in need will have a positive impact. This should be done alongside efforts to safeguard freedom of speech, address crime and violence, restrain radical elements on both sides, and prevent attacks or clashes between Jews and Arabs that could spark nationwide violence.