Professor Henry Srebrnik

Professor Henry Srebrnik

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Positioning to be Major Player 

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian


Apart from becoming a significant force in the Middle East, Turkey is trying to extend its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and central Asia. These are nations that have ethnic, historical, linguistic and religious bonds with Turkey.

Turkey has very close ties to Azerbaijan, with which it shares a border. Trade between the two countries has increased significantly and Turkish companies are the largest investors in Azerbaijan. Turkey's trade with the country amounted to about $2.5 billion last year.

Azerbaijan is an oil-producing country, and Turkey would like to become a key energy hub for the transportation of energy resources to Europe.

In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which connects the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey, was completed. Turkey is now the main outlet for westbound Azeri oil.

In December 2010, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a strategically important mutual defence treaty.

Kazakhstan, too, is an important economic partner of Turkey and Turkish companies have been investing in areas such as food, beverages, oil industries, banking, retailing and tourism. Trade between Kazakhstan and Turkey amounted to $2 billion in 2010.

Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that Kazakhstan is Turkey's most important political and economic partner in Central Asia: "Our bilateral relations continue to develop in a stable course, driven by the momentum arising from the mutual strong will of both countries."

During Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Turkey in October 2009, a Strategic Partnership Treaty was signed between the two.

Turkmenistan's President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has reaffirmed Turkey's crucial place in the shaping of his country's foreign policy. He has stated that Turkmenistan and Turkey were united through historical and cultural ties.

Turkmenistan has one of the world's largest natural gas reserves and Turkey is interested in transporting the country's gas to Europe. Some 100 agreements and protocols have been concluded between Ankara and Ashgabat, and a joint Turkish-Turkmen commission for economic cooperation was formed in 2008. Turkish trade with Turkmenistan amounted to $2 billion last year.

Earlier this year, Turkmenistan held an international forum in Ashgabat where the cultural heritage of the Turkic peoples was celebrated with an extensive program that included scientific conferences, concerts, films, demonstrations and exhibitions.

Turkish relations with Uzbekistan, the most populous of the central Asian states, have been more rocky, due to Ankara's concern over human rights abuses and a less favourable economic climate in that country.

The Tashkent government was angry at Turkey for supporting the call for an international investigation of a massacre in the city of Andijan, when troops fired into a crowd of protestors in May 2005, killing at least several hundred.

Still, Turkey is the one of the most important direct investors in Uzbekistan, and trade between the two nations amounted to $1 billion in 2010.

Prime Minister Erdogan visited Tajikistan in 2003 and trade and political relations have increased since then. Turkey has provided assistance for the development and democratization of Tajikistan, a very poor and fragile country, but its role remains limited. Two-way trade in 2010 amounted to $360 million.

Another central Asian state in trouble is Kyrgyzstan, where violence in the south of the country in April 2010 left up to 2,000 dead and forced 400,000 from their homes.

Earlier this year, though, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek Sharshenovich Atambayev met with top officials while attending the Turkey-Kyrgyzstan Trade and Investment Forum organised by Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists in Ankara.

"This is exactly the time to invest," Atambayev told them. "We are brothers and friends. We have a history we are proud of. Our future will also be common and glorious." But trade between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan remains relatively small, amounting to $160 million in 2010.

In January 2010 Turkey hosted a "Summit of Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia," held in Istanbul, and attended by numerous diplomats from countries around the world. Turkey is clearly staking out its claim to becoming a major power.

Monday, September 19, 2011

Is Turkey Creating an ‘Ottosphere’ in Middle East?

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Turkey is becoming a major player in the Middle East, as the Arab world, once mainly ruled by Ottoman emperors, continues to be convulsed by political earthquakes.

In recent weeks, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who heads the moderately Islamic Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), has come out in favour of full Palestinian UN membership and warned Israel against any further attacks on Hamas-ruled Gaza.

He recently told Arab leaders that recognition of a Palestinian state was “not an option, but an obligation.”

The Turkish leader said that Israel’s raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla in May 2010, which killed eight Turks and a Turkish American on board a Turkish ship, occurred in international waters and was “cause for war,” but added that his country had showed “patience” and refrained from taking any action.

After Israel refused to apologize, Erdogan withdrew Turkey’s ambassador, suspended military co-operation with Israel, and froze all trade ties with the Jewish state.

He described Israel as “the main threat to regional peace.”

Erdogan told al-Jazeera television that “my brothers in Gaza are waiting for me. I too long for Gaza. Sooner or later, if God allows it, I will go to Gaza.”

He also vowed to send the Turkish navy to escort Gaza-bound aid ships in the future.

“Israel will no longer be able to do what it wants in the Mediterranean,” he told an audience in Tunis earlier this month, “and you’ll be seeing Turkish warships in this sea.”

He stated that Israel would be prevented from exploiting the eastern Mediterranean’s oil and gas reserves on its own.

Erdogan received a tumultuous welcome when he visited Egypt, Tunisia and Libya in support of their new and still shaky post-dictatorial political systems.

“These countries are trying to transform into democratic system from autocratic systems,” he declared.

“We have to lend them a helping hand in their efforts.”

He hailed the advent of democracy in Libya and the “memory of martyrs who sacrificed themselves for their country and their religion.”

Turkey hopes to encourage cooperation, investments, and trade with these countries as well.

Erdogan has also warned Bashar al-Assad’s repressive Syrian government in Damascus “that there is no regime that can go against the will of the people. This is what those who oppress the people of Syria should realize.”

A century ago, almost the entire Middle East was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, and the Turks were a major force in the world.

Some analysts are calling Erdogan’s policies an attempt to create a new “Ottosphere” in the region.

There’s no doubt that he’s trying to do just that.

Saturday, September 10, 2011

Does One Have to Return to British Symbolism to be Conservative

Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

As my surname suggests, my forbearers are not from the British Isles. In fact, my family arrived in Canada in 1948.

But I did grow up in the pre-Trudeauvian Dominion of Canada, with its Red Ensign flag and little crowns above the numerals on highway signs in many parts of the country.

At our elementary school, we sang “God Save the Queen” as well as “O Canada” every morning.

Yes, much of our history and, more importantly, political institutions originate in the United Kingdom, and most Canadians outside of Quebec in the past had little problem with Canada seeing itself as an offspring of Great Britain.

From the 1970s on, however, there was a conscious attempt, partly to accommodate nationalists in Quebec, to eradicate much of the symbolism of Canada’s connection to Britain.

The Queen, though still the official head of state of Canada, was stealthily relegated to a position of less importance than the governor general, who became the de facto head of the country. The Commonwealth connection, too, was minimized.

Much of this was the work of prime ministers who originated in Quebec – with very brief interludes, they governed the country between 1968 and 2006.

We now have what is basically an English Canadian government, headed by a prime minister from anglophone Alberta.

Stephen Harper is working to bring back a sense of history for Canadians, after decades of emphasis on supposed Canadian values such as medicare and multiculturalism.

This is part of his effort to promote a more conservative national identity. Liberals often saw the period before the 1960s as a kind of “dark ages,” in which bigotry and racism flourished.

But is restoring the label “Royal” to the Canadian navy and air force not perhaps a step too far? It had its place in the past but Canada is no longer that country. Millions of us without ties to Britain had no trouble with its disappearance.

The Harper government also ordered all of Canada’s 260 embassies, high commissions, consulates and trade offices to display a portrait of the Queen.

Harper’s decisions have angered many Canadian nationalists who say the prime minister is out of touch with modern-day Canada. And it certainly won’t help him in Quebec.

What’s next, the Union Jack alongside the Maple Leaf? Surely being a conservative needn’t require a return to a British past which in any case is no longer really relevant to either country.

Turning the clock back like this isn’t conservative, it’s reactionary.



Thursday, September 08, 2011

The Lasting Impact of the Iran-Iraq War
                               
Henry Srebrnik, [Toronto] Jewish Tribune 

This coming Sept. 22 marks the date, in 1980, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran.

Taking advantage of the political turmoil in his much larger neighbour following the downfall of Iran’s Shah and his replacement by Ayatollah Khomeini’s theocratic regime, the Iraqi dictator thought he could score a quick victory and grab the oil rich, Arab-majority province of Khuzestan.
Instead, the struggle became a war of attrition that lasted eight years – it became the longest conventional conflict of the twentieth century – and cost hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides.

Oil production was affected as each country targeted the other’s oil terminals. Both nations also attacked oil tankers and merchant ships in the Persian Gulf, including those of neutral nations, in an effort to deprive the opponent of trade.

Although the war terminated in a military stalemate on Aug. 20, 1988 – Khomeini said he “drank the cup of poison” when he accepted a truce mediated by the United Nations – Iran was the effective victor, having withstood the Iraqi aggression with far less modern weaponry than Iraq possessed.

Iran also had fought without any allies, while Iraq was supported financially by the Arab Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, was supplied with arms by the Soviet Union, and even received covert help from the United States.

As we know, Saddam went on to defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, after having conquered Kuwait, and was finally eliminated altogether by the American invasion of 2003.

Iran, on the other hand, despite Khomeini’s death in 1989 and some internal opposition in recent years, has gone from strength to strength, geopolitically.

Today, ironically, the post-Saddam Iraqi government, led by prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is, like the Iranians, a Shi’a Muslim, has become quite close to Tehran. (Saddam’s Ba’ath Party regime was Sunni-dominated and oppressed the country’s Shi’a majority.)

The even more radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army commands the loyalty of followers in the poorer areas of Baghdad and in the country’s south, is believed to have spent part of the last four years studying to be an ayatollah in Iran.

For these reasons, some analysts call Iran the true beneficiary of the American defeat of Saddam.

Iran has also extended its influence in the Arab world, particularly in Lebanon – where Hezbollah is its political proxy – and Syria.

When Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, at the end of August called on the government in Damascus to recognize its people’s “legitimate” demands, this probably had more effect on Bashar al-Assad than anything Washington says.

But Salehi also warned NATO against any temptation to intervene in Syria. “Syria is the front-runner in Middle Eastern resistance” to Israel and NATO “cannot intimidate this country with an attack.” Tehran still considers Assad’s survival a key strategic goal. Iran relies on Syria to help facilitate arming and financing Hezbollah as well as Hamas.

And despite denials by current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran is clearly in the process of developing a nuclear capability, and makes no bones about threatening to wipe Israel off the map.

“Recognizing the Palestinian state is not the last goal. It is only one step forward towards liberating the whole of Palestine,” Ahmadinejad told worshippers at Tehran University on Aug. 26, ‘International al-Quds Day,’ according to The Jerusalem Post.

In August 1979, Khomeini declared the liberation of Jerusalem (al-Quds in Arabic) a religious duty to all Muslims.

In language reminiscent of Nazi rhetoric, Ahmadinejad declared that “the Zionist regime is a centre of microbes, a cancer cell and if it exists in one iota of Palestine it will mobilize again and hurt everyone.”

Three decades after the start of the Middle East’s longest and deadliest 20th century war, Iran has definitely become a major regional power.

Tuesday, September 06, 2011

Iran is a Regional Power in the Middle East

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal-Pioneer

Despite some internal opposition in recent years, the theocratic regime in Iran, founded by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, has gone from strength to strength, geopolitically One of its main enemies, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, is no more, defeated by the American invasion in 2003. The post-Saddam Iraqi government, led by prime minister Nouri al-Maliki , who is, like the Iranians, a Shi’a Muslim, has become quite close to Tehran.

Iran has also extended its influence elsewhere in the Arab world, particularly in Lebanon – where Hezbollah is its political proxy – and Syria.

When Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, at the end of August called on the government in Damascus to recognize its people’s “legitimate” demands, this probably had more effect on Bashar al-Assad than anything Washington says.

But Salehi also warned NATO against any temptation to intervene in Syria. “Syria is the front-runner in Middle Eastern resistance” to Israel, so NATO should not be allowed to “intimidate this country with an attack.”

Tehran still considers Assad’s survival a key strategic goal. Iran relies on Syria to help facilitate arming and financing Hezbollah as well as Hamas in Gaza.

And despite denials by current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran is clearly in the process of developing a nuclear capability. Indeed, the country is taking advantage of the unrest in the Arab world, which is distracting the international community, to accelerate its efforts.

In June, Iran unveiled underground silos that would make its missiles less vulnerable to attack. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed “increasing concerns” about research by Iranian scientists on nuclear warhead design.

Tehran also makes no bones about threatening to wipe Israel off the map. Ahmadinejad told worshippers at Tehran University on August 26 that “The Zionist regime is a center of microbes, a cancer cell and if it exists in one iota of Palestine it will mobilize again and hurt everyone.”

Israel is a very small state, little more than 22,000 square kilometres in area. And to compound the problem, over 70 per cent of its population, and its ports, airports, refining capacities and industry are located along the coastal plain, 260 kilometres long from north to south and some 17 kilometres deep. One nuclear weapon could destroy most of the country.

Iran is aware that, if it attacked Israel, the Israelis, who have many nuclear weapons, would counter-attack, observes political analyst Hirsh Goodman, of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, in his new book The Anatomy of Israel’s Survival.

“But with a population 10 times that of Israel and a country 75 times as large, Iran reckons that no matter how harsh the punishment meted out in return for attacking Israel, it would be mauled, not killed.”

A nuclear Iran, it is now recognized, “is not Israel’s problem alone,” writes Goodman. “It possesses missiles that bring the Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, Europe and Russia all within reach. A nuclear Iran would be transformative, a country not easily gone to war against, and one that will have considerably more power on the regional stage.”

Indeed, Turkey announced earlier this month that it would install a new radar system designed by the United States. It came as Ankara has become more critical of Iran due to Tehran’s continued support of the Syrian government.

Iran has become a power to be reckoned with.