Henry Srebrnik [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian
In the 1960s, many people around the world were inspired by the Cuban Revolution. It was the first state that had proclaimed itself a socialist society in the Americas, and the North American New Left looked to Cuba as a model for the Third World; some went to Cuba as volunteers. (Later, the Vietnam War would become its focus of attention.)
Many African-American intellectuals, then fighting for civil rights in the segregationist American South, were particularly enthusiastic, as Cuba proclaimed the elimination of racial discrimination as its official policy.
On New Year's Day 1959, the 26th of July Movement led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto ‘Che' Guevara had marched into Havana after more than two years of guerrilla warfare, and the dictator Fulgencio Batista fled the country.
The exuberant revolutionaries proceeded to nationalize agriculture and industry - mostly American-owned - at breakneck speed. As Washington reacted with economic and military pressure, including the failed April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for help and protection and later that year Castro proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist.
Cuba had become, as far as the U.S. was concerned, an outpost of ‘Soviet imperialism'.
As we know, the closest the Cold War came to becoming a nuclear conflagration was during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Indebted to the Soviets, in the 1970s Cuban troops fought on behalf of left-wing regimes in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, as surrogates for the Soviet Union. Communism, for many, appeared to be on the march.
Cuba back then saw itself as a vanguard of Marxist revolution - though when Guevara had tried to incite one in Bolivia, he was killed for his trouble in 1967. (Dead almost 46 years now, his image remains ubiquitous, thanks to the posters of him so many students had taped onto their dorm walls back then!)
Like many, I was caught up in the enthusiasm over Cuba. In the late 1960s, I wrote my MA thesis in political science at McGill University on Cuban-American relations.
I spent 10 days in Cuba in late December 1975, at a time when few North Americans could travel to the country. (I flew in via Jamaica.) I was able to walk around Havana, travel on buses, and speak to people at the university, without any hindrance.
The First Congress of the Communist Party was being held, December 17-22, and the various parks and sides of buildings were festooned with revolutionary slogans. The old Havana Hilton had been renamed the Hotel Habana Libre and was a hive of activity at the time.
This is all, so to speak, now ancient history. Announcing that "history is on our side" is a foolhardy enterprise. The Soviet Union and its east European allies were themselves nothing but history by 1991, leaving Cuba economically adrift. Very hard years followed, a time that came to be known as the "Special Period."
To survive, Cuba has in many ways reverted to what it was prior to the revolution.
The country now allows for self-employment, freer travel, and the buying and selling of homes and cars.
Small businesses have sprung up everywhere. Tourism once again has become a mainstay of the economy, and foreign capital, from Canada, Spain, and elsewhere has flowed in.
Many socially unsavoury practices have followed in its wake, and (despite the continuing American trade embargo) the U.S. dollar is again king, fuelling an underground economy. The health and education systems, too, have suffered declines.
The country has moved backward in terms of race relations as well.
Cuba was a Spanish-ruled sugar plantation economy, with a largely black workforce, until the Spanish-American War of 1898. Slavery had only been abolished a decade earlier.
After independence in 1902 little changed. The population of African descent remained at the bottom of the economic and political ladder and whites at the top, with Mulattoes (of mixed European and African lineage) in between.
In the years following the triumph of the revolution the Cuban government was one of the world's most dedicated regimes in the fight against discrimination. It achieved significant gains in racial equality through a series of egalitarian reforms in the 1960s.
But today things are different - Afro-Cubans are often excluded from positions in tourism related jobs, where they could earn tips in hard currencies. They are relegated to poor housing.
"The government hasn't allowed racial prejudice to be debated or confronted politically or culturally, often pretending instead as though it didn't exist," contends essayist Roberto Zurbano in a recent article in the New York Times. After all, it's a socialist country!
Meanwhile, the aging and ailing Fidel Castro handed over power to his brother Raul in 2008, and the latter has said he will step down in 2018.
What happens then? Many older Cubans in the largely white anti-Communist expatriate community in Miami foresee a triumphant return to their homeland, but it's doubtful that they will ever regain control of the country.
It is more likely that post-Castro Cuba will become a country with a mixed economy and a pluralist political system, on the Scandinavian model.
Professor Henry Srebrnik
Thursday, March 28, 2013
Monday, March 25, 2013
Some of the Reasons Why Nations Fail
Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer
“Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills are more conducive to economic growth than extractive economic institutions that are structured to extract resources from the many by the few.”
This is the thesis propounded by economist Daron Acemoglu and political scientist James A. Robinson, in their book “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty,” published last year.
In countries with “extractive” economies, those in power destroy incentives and discourage innovation by creating an uneven playing field.
The elites who gain from the extraction also benefit from rigged political institutions, “wielding their power to tilt the system for their benefit.”
However, this inevitably produces instability and failure because it creates the motivation for others to depose the existing elites and take over, often through a coup d’etat. One set of exploiters succeeds another.
So states that are at the mercy of “extractive” economic institutions eventually collapse, the authors contend.
They cite numerous examples to illustrate their argument.
North Korea is a kleptocracy controlled by the armed forces and the Kim family, and its economic institutions make it almost impossible for people to own property. The state controls everything, so people don’t work for themselves, thereby destroying their incentive to succeed.
Such a regime, regardless of its military prowess, will never acquire legitimacy, whereas its South Korean neighbour has created a society with economic institutions that “encourage private property, uphold contracts,” and allows for “the entry of new businesses that can bring new technologies to life.”
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, who ruled from 1981 until deposed on 2011, allowed big businessmen known as the “whales” to use their power to create monopolies and block the entry of new people and firms.
This, the authors note, blocked opportunities for the vast mass of Egyptians to move out of poverty. The country’s economic future remains precarious.
Libya’s Gadhafi family looted their country’s resources, to its detriment. Oil-rich states are particularly prone to this type of behaviour on the part of despots.
Central American countries like El Salvador and Guatemala, where small elites rule over an impoverished peasantry and appropriate most of the wealth, also make sustainable growth next to impossible.
In other places, the problems result from the failure to maintain an effective state, assert Acemoglu and Robinson. In such circumstances, there is no hope of providing order, a system of laws, a market economy, property rights, mechanisms for resolving disputes, or basic public goods. Many African countries, such as the Congo and Somalia, fall into this category.
Countries with extractive economic and political institutions may achieve temporary success – the Soviet Union was one such case – but they eventually stagnate.
The authors emphasize that none of this is preordained; human agency is always involved. Had a rising economic class in Britain in the 17th century been unable to overcome a repressive monarchy, for example, things might have gone in a very different direction. Whereas Russia might have followed a more “inclusive” path after 1917, had the Communists not seized power.
So the jury is still out on whether China can continue its present rate of growth. It is contingent on the path its rulers will follow.
In a nutshell, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the wealth of a country depends on the degree to which the average person can participate in economic opportunities and share in the overall growth of its economy.
Economic opportunity sustains political democracy. This is a lesson even some developed nations seem to have forgotten in recent years.
“Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills are more conducive to economic growth than extractive economic institutions that are structured to extract resources from the many by the few.”
This is the thesis propounded by economist Daron Acemoglu and political scientist James A. Robinson, in their book “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty,” published last year.
In countries with “extractive” economies, those in power destroy incentives and discourage innovation by creating an uneven playing field.
The elites who gain from the extraction also benefit from rigged political institutions, “wielding their power to tilt the system for their benefit.”
However, this inevitably produces instability and failure because it creates the motivation for others to depose the existing elites and take over, often through a coup d’etat. One set of exploiters succeeds another.
So states that are at the mercy of “extractive” economic institutions eventually collapse, the authors contend.
They cite numerous examples to illustrate their argument.
North Korea is a kleptocracy controlled by the armed forces and the Kim family, and its economic institutions make it almost impossible for people to own property. The state controls everything, so people don’t work for themselves, thereby destroying their incentive to succeed.
Such a regime, regardless of its military prowess, will never acquire legitimacy, whereas its South Korean neighbour has created a society with economic institutions that “encourage private property, uphold contracts,” and allows for “the entry of new businesses that can bring new technologies to life.”
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, who ruled from 1981 until deposed on 2011, allowed big businessmen known as the “whales” to use their power to create monopolies and block the entry of new people and firms.
This, the authors note, blocked opportunities for the vast mass of Egyptians to move out of poverty. The country’s economic future remains precarious.
Libya’s Gadhafi family looted their country’s resources, to its detriment. Oil-rich states are particularly prone to this type of behaviour on the part of despots.
Central American countries like El Salvador and Guatemala, where small elites rule over an impoverished peasantry and appropriate most of the wealth, also make sustainable growth next to impossible.
In other places, the problems result from the failure to maintain an effective state, assert Acemoglu and Robinson. In such circumstances, there is no hope of providing order, a system of laws, a market economy, property rights, mechanisms for resolving disputes, or basic public goods. Many African countries, such as the Congo and Somalia, fall into this category.
Countries with extractive economic and political institutions may achieve temporary success – the Soviet Union was one such case – but they eventually stagnate.
The authors emphasize that none of this is preordained; human agency is always involved. Had a rising economic class in Britain in the 17th century been unable to overcome a repressive monarchy, for example, things might have gone in a very different direction. Whereas Russia might have followed a more “inclusive” path after 1917, had the Communists not seized power.
So the jury is still out on whether China can continue its present rate of growth. It is contingent on the path its rulers will follow.
In a nutshell, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the wealth of a country depends on the degree to which the average person can participate in economic opportunities and share in the overall growth of its economy.
Economic opportunity sustains political democracy. This is a lesson even some developed nations seem to have forgotten in recent years.
Monday, March 18, 2013
Contending Territorial Claims are a Result of the Vestiges of Empire
Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer
Boundary disputes and land claims often simmer between countries long after the major powers that collided over these regions are gone.
Two of the world’s largest empires, those of Great Britain and Spain, are, to all intents and purposes, no more. But in some cases, successor independent countries have continued the fight.
These claims and counter-claims stretch back centuries and often involve recourse to colonial maps and treaties as interpreted by each side to back its own position.
The best-known of these conflicts involves the Argentinian claim to the Falkland Islands, where a referendum held on March 10-11 reaffirmed the islanders’ desire to remain British.
But there are others. One vestige of the colonial demarcation of frontiers in South America concerns the old colony of British Guiana, which became independent as Guyana in 1966. Its western border with Venezuela continues to be a bone of contention (as does its eastern one with the former Dutch colony of Suriname).
The Guyana-Venezuela border largely follows theSchomburgk Line, so called after the German-born British explorer who sketched it in 1840.
The Venezuelans, however, have long maintained that the Essequibo River, further east, not the Schomburgk Line, is their natural eastern boundary. The area in between the line and the river, referred to as Guayana Esequiba on Venezuelan maps, covers fully 62 per cent of Guyana’s territory of 214,970 square kilometres!
In 1899 the dispute went to international arbitration. A tribunal, composed of two American, two British and two Russian judges, ruled largely in favor of the British. But Venezuela claimed they were biased.
Guyana’s 756,040 inhabitants consist mostly of English-speaking Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese, who consider themselves to be part of the Caribbean, not Latin America, and resist the idea of having part of their country absorbed by Spanish-speaking Venezuela.
Venezuela maintains its position to this day, though two years ago President Hugo Chavez declared that Guyana and Venezuela were “two sister nations” and that the issue would be treated “in a responsible way.” It’s uncertain whether his recent death will change things.
A similar story in Central America involves Guatemala and the old colony of British Honduras, which gained its independence in 1981 as Belize.
This small nation of 356,000 English-speaking inhabitants in an area of 22,966 square kilometres, bordering Mexico and Guatemala, also considers itself more Caribbean than Latin American.
Most Belizeans are of multiracial descent, with Mestizos (mixed Mayan-Europeans) and Kriols, of African background, making up a majority of the population.
While all of Central America was part of the Spanish Empire from the 16th century onwards, the Spanish never settled in this region, however, and increased British trade and settlement finally resulted in British Honduras being formally annexed as a crown colony in 1862.
Meanwhile, Guatemala had declared its independence from Spain in 1821, and under the terms of the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1859, Guatemala agreed to recognize British rule, while Great Britain promised to build a road from Guatemala to the Caribbean port of Punta Gorda.
As this never happened, the territory of Belize has been claimed in whole or in part by Guatemala since 1940. When Belize became a sovereign state, the territorial dispute remained unresolved. Currently, Guatemala claims everything south of the Sibun River, a total 12,272 square kilometres – more than half the country.
There have been periodic border clashes, but this past January the two countries signed an accord agreeing to refer their territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice for binding resolution. (Voters in both countries must still ratify the accord in referenda this coming October before it can be sent to the Court for final settlement.)
Then there is Gibraltar. Still a British possession, it is located at the western entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. It has an area of 6.8 square kilometres and borders Spain itself. At the foot of the Rock of Gibraltar sits the densely populated city area, home to almost 30,000 people.
Acquired by Britain from Spain “in perpetuity” by the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, following the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar guarded the sea lanes that led to the Suez Canal, at the other end, and the passageway to India.
Spain continues to lay claim to Gibraltar. Its dictator General Francisco Franco closed the land border in 1969, to put pressure on Britain. In 1982, it was reopened and in 2006 the Spanish government agreed to relax border controls.
Today, while Gibraltar’s strategic value to Britain is gone, its inhabitants, the descendants of Britons, Indians, Italians, Maltese, Moroccans, Sephardic Jews, and Spaniards, do not want to become Spanish.
In referenda held in 1967 and 2002, they have overwhelmingly reaffirmed their desire to remain British. But recovering Gibraltar remains a stated objective of successive Spanish governments.
The legacy of imperial rule still haunts many parts of the world.
Boundary disputes and land claims often simmer between countries long after the major powers that collided over these regions are gone.
Two of the world’s largest empires, those of Great Britain and Spain, are, to all intents and purposes, no more. But in some cases, successor independent countries have continued the fight.
These claims and counter-claims stretch back centuries and often involve recourse to colonial maps and treaties as interpreted by each side to back its own position.
The best-known of these conflicts involves the Argentinian claim to the Falkland Islands, where a referendum held on March 10-11 reaffirmed the islanders’ desire to remain British.
But there are others. One vestige of the colonial demarcation of frontiers in South America concerns the old colony of British Guiana, which became independent as Guyana in 1966. Its western border with Venezuela continues to be a bone of contention (as does its eastern one with the former Dutch colony of Suriname).
The Guyana-Venezuela border largely follows theSchomburgk Line, so called after the German-born British explorer who sketched it in 1840.
The Venezuelans, however, have long maintained that the Essequibo River, further east, not the Schomburgk Line, is their natural eastern boundary. The area in between the line and the river, referred to as Guayana Esequiba on Venezuelan maps, covers fully 62 per cent of Guyana’s territory of 214,970 square kilometres!
In 1899 the dispute went to international arbitration. A tribunal, composed of two American, two British and two Russian judges, ruled largely in favor of the British. But Venezuela claimed they were biased.
Guyana’s 756,040 inhabitants consist mostly of English-speaking Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese, who consider themselves to be part of the Caribbean, not Latin America, and resist the idea of having part of their country absorbed by Spanish-speaking Venezuela.
Venezuela maintains its position to this day, though two years ago President Hugo Chavez declared that Guyana and Venezuela were “two sister nations” and that the issue would be treated “in a responsible way.” It’s uncertain whether his recent death will change things.
A similar story in Central America involves Guatemala and the old colony of British Honduras, which gained its independence in 1981 as Belize.
This small nation of 356,000 English-speaking inhabitants in an area of 22,966 square kilometres, bordering Mexico and Guatemala, also considers itself more Caribbean than Latin American.
Most Belizeans are of multiracial descent, with Mestizos (mixed Mayan-Europeans) and Kriols, of African background, making up a majority of the population.
While all of Central America was part of the Spanish Empire from the 16th century onwards, the Spanish never settled in this region, however, and increased British trade and settlement finally resulted in British Honduras being formally annexed as a crown colony in 1862.
Meanwhile, Guatemala had declared its independence from Spain in 1821, and under the terms of the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1859, Guatemala agreed to recognize British rule, while Great Britain promised to build a road from Guatemala to the Caribbean port of Punta Gorda.
As this never happened, the territory of Belize has been claimed in whole or in part by Guatemala since 1940. When Belize became a sovereign state, the territorial dispute remained unresolved. Currently, Guatemala claims everything south of the Sibun River, a total 12,272 square kilometres – more than half the country.
There have been periodic border clashes, but this past January the two countries signed an accord agreeing to refer their territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice for binding resolution. (Voters in both countries must still ratify the accord in referenda this coming October before it can be sent to the Court for final settlement.)
Then there is Gibraltar. Still a British possession, it is located at the western entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. It has an area of 6.8 square kilometres and borders Spain itself. At the foot of the Rock of Gibraltar sits the densely populated city area, home to almost 30,000 people.
Acquired by Britain from Spain “in perpetuity” by the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, following the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar guarded the sea lanes that led to the Suez Canal, at the other end, and the passageway to India.
Spain continues to lay claim to Gibraltar. Its dictator General Francisco Franco closed the land border in 1969, to put pressure on Britain. In 1982, it was reopened and in 2006 the Spanish government agreed to relax border controls.
Today, while Gibraltar’s strategic value to Britain is gone, its inhabitants, the descendants of Britons, Indians, Italians, Maltese, Moroccans, Sephardic Jews, and Spaniards, do not want to become Spanish.
In referenda held in 1967 and 2002, they have overwhelmingly reaffirmed their desire to remain British. But recovering Gibraltar remains a stated objective of successive Spanish governments.
The legacy of imperial rule still haunts many parts of the world.
Friday, March 15, 2013
The Falkland Islands Remain Resolutely British
Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian
Two of the world’s largest empires, those of Great Britain and Spain, left behind many contested areas. The best-known of these conflicts involves Argentina’s claim to the Falkland Islands, a 12,170 square kilometre archipelago located in the South Atlantic some 500 kilometres east of the mainland.
Over the past 400 years, the Falkland Islands, home to 2,841 people, have been variously claimed by the Dutch, the French, the Spanish, the Argentinians and the British.
In January, Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, declared that the islands had been forcibly stripped from Argentina in “a blatant exercise of 19th century colonialism,” and accused Britain of defying a United Nations resolution by not holding negotiations on the handover of sovereignty to Argentina.
In response, the people of the Falkland Islands on March 10-11 again spoke of their desire to remain an overseas territory of the United Kingdom. They cast their ballots in a referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly to remain British.
British Prime Minister David Cameron said that Argentina should take “careful note” of the referendum result and that Britain would always be there to defend the Islanders.
“We believe in self-determination. The Falkland Islanders have spoken so clearly about their future and now other countries right across the world, I hope, will respect and revere this very, very clear result,” he remarked.
The Argentinian claim to the Malvinas, as they call the islands, is based on the fact that the Falklands had been Spanish possessions prior to their occupation by Britain in 1833. Spain had ruled the islands intermittently as part of its American empire and Argentina, after declaring its independence from Spain in 1816, was in control of the islands for a brief period.
Buenos Aires contends that the principle of self-determination is not applicable since the current inhabitants are not aboriginal and were brought in to replace the previous population.
On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces invaded and occupied the islands. The resulting conflict lasted 74 days and ended with the Argentine surrender on June 14, 1982. During the conflict, 649 Argentinian and 255 British military personnel died.
While there have been no further attempts to conquer the Falklands, Argentina has persuaded South American neighbours to turn away Falklands-flagged ships, curtailed over-flights and imposed sanctions on companies that exploit the resources of the islands. Its constitution maintains its claim over the islands.
This dispute, protracted as it is, will remain an ongoing concern for many more years.
Two of the world’s largest empires, those of Great Britain and Spain, left behind many contested areas. The best-known of these conflicts involves Argentina’s claim to the Falkland Islands, a 12,170 square kilometre archipelago located in the South Atlantic some 500 kilometres east of the mainland.
Over the past 400 years, the Falkland Islands, home to 2,841 people, have been variously claimed by the Dutch, the French, the Spanish, the Argentinians and the British.
In January, Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, declared that the islands had been forcibly stripped from Argentina in “a blatant exercise of 19th century colonialism,” and accused Britain of defying a United Nations resolution by not holding negotiations on the handover of sovereignty to Argentina.
In response, the people of the Falkland Islands on March 10-11 again spoke of their desire to remain an overseas territory of the United Kingdom. They cast their ballots in a referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly to remain British.
British Prime Minister David Cameron said that Argentina should take “careful note” of the referendum result and that Britain would always be there to defend the Islanders.
“We believe in self-determination. The Falkland Islanders have spoken so clearly about their future and now other countries right across the world, I hope, will respect and revere this very, very clear result,” he remarked.
The Argentinian claim to the Malvinas, as they call the islands, is based on the fact that the Falklands had been Spanish possessions prior to their occupation by Britain in 1833. Spain had ruled the islands intermittently as part of its American empire and Argentina, after declaring its independence from Spain in 1816, was in control of the islands for a brief period.
Buenos Aires contends that the principle of self-determination is not applicable since the current inhabitants are not aboriginal and were brought in to replace the previous population.
On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces invaded and occupied the islands. The resulting conflict lasted 74 days and ended with the Argentine surrender on June 14, 1982. During the conflict, 649 Argentinian and 255 British military personnel died.
While there have been no further attempts to conquer the Falklands, Argentina has persuaded South American neighbours to turn away Falklands-flagged ships, curtailed over-flights and imposed sanctions on companies that exploit the resources of the islands. Its constitution maintains its claim over the islands.
This dispute, protracted as it is, will remain an ongoing concern for many more years.
Monday, March 11, 2013
What Does the Future Hold for Northern Ireland?
Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer:
The official name of the country usually referred to as Great Britain is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It consists of England, Scotland, Wales, and the six predominantly Protestant counties in Ulster that remained part of the UK when the rest of Ireland, where Catholics were a majority, attained independence in 1922.
Ireland, for centuries ruled by Britain, had been incorporated as an integral part of the United Kingdom in 1801, when the Cross of St. Patrick was added to those of St. George and St. Andrew on the Union Jack, and Ireland was given representation in the Westminster Parliament in London.
Throughout the 19th century, though, Irish Catholics sought to govern themselves, either through “Home Rule,” a form of autonomy within the British state, or outright independence. Home rule opponents whipped up opposition with slogans like “Home rule is Rome rule.” Full sovereignty, on the other hand, became the rallying cry of Sinn Fein and its Irish Republican Army.
Following the First World War and the 1916 Easter Rising, the Irish War of Independence of 1919-1921 forced Britain into signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty. But Ireland was partitioned, and only 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties (including three from Ulster) formed the Irish Free State. (It became the Republic of Ireland in 1949.)
In Northern Ireland, the Protestant majority retained their ties with Britain, with their own assembly at Stormont. “We are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State,” announced its first prime minister. In this “Orange State,” Roman Catholics remained second-class citizens, discriminated against politically and economically.
Ever since the partition, a key aspiration of Irish nationalists has been to bring about a united Ireland and erase the border, while Unionists, who consider themselves “British” and prefer to call the province “Ulster,” wish to remain part of the UK.
Beginning in the late 1960s, Catholics in Northern Ireland began to rebel against their situation. Violence on both sides, during the “Troubles,” resulted in the deaths of more than 3,600 people, with another 107,000 injured.
Finally, in 1998, the Belfast -- or Good Friday -- Agreement was signed by the governments of Britain and Ireland, and ratified by referenda in both the Irish Republic and in Northern Ireland. It created a power-sharing system between Catholic (Republican) and Protestant (Unionist) parties in the Northern Irish Assembly.
It also stated that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland and of the Republic of Ireland wished otherwise. Should that happen, then the British and Irish governments are under “a binding obligation” to implement that choice.
The agreement thus acknowledges that Northern Ireland is not a permanent and inalienable part of the United Kingdom; its political future is contingent on the will of a majority of its population, which now numbers 1,789,000. (The Republic has 4,588,252 people.)
When the province was created, Protestants were the great majority of the population, but in the succeeding decades, the proportion of people in the Catholic community has increased. Today, they comprise 45 per cent of the population, and they now outnumber Protestants in half of Northern Ireland’s 26 districts. (In the south, about 84 per cent are Catholics.)
Protestant fears of being eventually outnumbered surfaced recently. In early December, the Belfast City Council decided to reduce the number of days the Union Jack would fly over the Council building. This was made possible by the fact that nationalists now hold 24 seats on the council, compared with 21 for the Unionists, reflecting the rapid growth of the Catholic population.
Weeks of Loyalist Protestant demonstrations have followed: firebombs and rocks were hurled at churches, police cars and lawmakers’ offices; and neighborhoods were sealed off by police or protesters’ barricades.
Ulster Protestants fear that Britain – England in particular -- is losing interest in them. The Protestants who settled Ulster from the 17th century on came mostly from Scotland, and Presbyterians form the largest Protestant denomination. Geographically, Northern Ireland is very close to Scotland, not England and Wales.
So in cities like London, Birmingham, Manchester, and Leeds, many people might not be all that unhappy were the province left to its own devices.
Such attitudes would only intensify were Scotland itself ever to leave the UK -- a referendum on independence is scheduled there for next year. A rump “United Kingdom of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland” would look absurd.
Should the UK dissolve, die-hard Unionists in Ulster might opt for a unilateral declaration of independence, but this would, needless to say, be resisted by the Catholics, who would of course prefer joining the Irish Republic. (This would also be the preferred option in Dublin.)
All of this would most likely lead to yet another round of “Troubles,” even worse than the previous ones.
The official name of the country usually referred to as Great Britain is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It consists of England, Scotland, Wales, and the six predominantly Protestant counties in Ulster that remained part of the UK when the rest of Ireland, where Catholics were a majority, attained independence in 1922.
Ireland, for centuries ruled by Britain, had been incorporated as an integral part of the United Kingdom in 1801, when the Cross of St. Patrick was added to those of St. George and St. Andrew on the Union Jack, and Ireland was given representation in the Westminster Parliament in London.
Throughout the 19th century, though, Irish Catholics sought to govern themselves, either through “Home Rule,” a form of autonomy within the British state, or outright independence. Home rule opponents whipped up opposition with slogans like “Home rule is Rome rule.” Full sovereignty, on the other hand, became the rallying cry of Sinn Fein and its Irish Republican Army.
Following the First World War and the 1916 Easter Rising, the Irish War of Independence of 1919-1921 forced Britain into signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty. But Ireland was partitioned, and only 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties (including three from Ulster) formed the Irish Free State. (It became the Republic of Ireland in 1949.)
In Northern Ireland, the Protestant majority retained their ties with Britain, with their own assembly at Stormont. “We are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State,” announced its first prime minister. In this “Orange State,” Roman Catholics remained second-class citizens, discriminated against politically and economically.
Ever since the partition, a key aspiration of Irish nationalists has been to bring about a united Ireland and erase the border, while Unionists, who consider themselves “British” and prefer to call the province “Ulster,” wish to remain part of the UK.
Beginning in the late 1960s, Catholics in Northern Ireland began to rebel against their situation. Violence on both sides, during the “Troubles,” resulted in the deaths of more than 3,600 people, with another 107,000 injured.
Finally, in 1998, the Belfast -- or Good Friday -- Agreement was signed by the governments of Britain and Ireland, and ratified by referenda in both the Irish Republic and in Northern Ireland. It created a power-sharing system between Catholic (Republican) and Protestant (Unionist) parties in the Northern Irish Assembly.
It also stated that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland and of the Republic of Ireland wished otherwise. Should that happen, then the British and Irish governments are under “a binding obligation” to implement that choice.
The agreement thus acknowledges that Northern Ireland is not a permanent and inalienable part of the United Kingdom; its political future is contingent on the will of a majority of its population, which now numbers 1,789,000. (The Republic has 4,588,252 people.)
When the province was created, Protestants were the great majority of the population, but in the succeeding decades, the proportion of people in the Catholic community has increased. Today, they comprise 45 per cent of the population, and they now outnumber Protestants in half of Northern Ireland’s 26 districts. (In the south, about 84 per cent are Catholics.)
Protestant fears of being eventually outnumbered surfaced recently. In early December, the Belfast City Council decided to reduce the number of days the Union Jack would fly over the Council building. This was made possible by the fact that nationalists now hold 24 seats on the council, compared with 21 for the Unionists, reflecting the rapid growth of the Catholic population.
Weeks of Loyalist Protestant demonstrations have followed: firebombs and rocks were hurled at churches, police cars and lawmakers’ offices; and neighborhoods were sealed off by police or protesters’ barricades.
Ulster Protestants fear that Britain – England in particular -- is losing interest in them. The Protestants who settled Ulster from the 17th century on came mostly from Scotland, and Presbyterians form the largest Protestant denomination. Geographically, Northern Ireland is very close to Scotland, not England and Wales.
So in cities like London, Birmingham, Manchester, and Leeds, many people might not be all that unhappy were the province left to its own devices.
Such attitudes would only intensify were Scotland itself ever to leave the UK -- a referendum on independence is scheduled there for next year. A rump “United Kingdom of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland” would look absurd.
Should the UK dissolve, die-hard Unionists in Ulster might opt for a unilateral declaration of independence, but this would, needless to say, be resisted by the Catholics, who would of course prefer joining the Irish Republic. (This would also be the preferred option in Dublin.)
All of this would most likely lead to yet another round of “Troubles,” even worse than the previous ones.
Tuesday, March 05, 2013
Our Growing Concern for Animal Rights
Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian
Referring to the recent brutal killing of some fifty seals on a beach in eastern P.E.I., and the 2010 incident involving snowmobilers who harassed and killed a fox, Jane Thomas, in a March 1 Guardian letter to the editor, asserted that “violence towards animals is a symptom of lack of compassion toward all beings.”
A day earlier, an opinion piece by Elizabeth Schoales criticized “the utilitarian animal welfare model that underpins our existing laws, a model that categorizes animals based on our subjective interpretation of their value to humans. The level of suffering that we are legally allowed to inflict on them is measured against our perceived -- often simply imagined -- benefit to ourselves.”
This manner of thinking, she argues, “has little to do with any impartial moral obligation to protect other species from harm.”
Our concern for other sentient beings, including those which are slaughtered for food, has become more pronounced in recent decades. Indeed, many people have opted to become vegetarians, or even vegans, as a result.
I think we are witnessing a paradigm shift in the way we perceive our relationship with animals, one that is similar to previous changes in the way we perceive other human beings.
Since the beginning of recorded history, certain classes of people were regarded, like animals today, as property.
Until very recent history, women were treated as the possession of men, with few rights to property or the right to hold office.
It many countries, including Canada, they could not even vote a century ago. It took a great amount of political work by suffragists and others, to rectify this.
As well, chattel slavery was considered entirely acceptable as recently as the 19th century. The United States almost fell apart in a horrific civil war over this issue.
Today it seems incredible to us that anyone could condone the idea of owning another person and having the power of life and death over them.
How do such changes in attitude occur? Obviously, they involve a great transformation in bedrock moral values by vast numbers of people – indeed, the legal system usually plays “catch-up” with such ideological shifts.
In his book Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, Niall Ferguson traces this incredible shift regarding slavery, noting that “it is not easy to explain so profound a change in the ethics of a people.”
The same country that, for hundreds of years, condoned, and got rich from, the slave trade, by the late 18th century took to heart the admonitions of abolitionists like William Wilberforce, grew ashamed of its disregard for human life, and became an advocate for the eradication of this evil.
Let’s hope that our increasing concern for the welfare of animals will produce similar results.
Referring to the recent brutal killing of some fifty seals on a beach in eastern P.E.I., and the 2010 incident involving snowmobilers who harassed and killed a fox, Jane Thomas, in a March 1 Guardian letter to the editor, asserted that “violence towards animals is a symptom of lack of compassion toward all beings.”
A day earlier, an opinion piece by Elizabeth Schoales criticized “the utilitarian animal welfare model that underpins our existing laws, a model that categorizes animals based on our subjective interpretation of their value to humans. The level of suffering that we are legally allowed to inflict on them is measured against our perceived -- often simply imagined -- benefit to ourselves.”
This manner of thinking, she argues, “has little to do with any impartial moral obligation to protect other species from harm.”
Our concern for other sentient beings, including those which are slaughtered for food, has become more pronounced in recent decades. Indeed, many people have opted to become vegetarians, or even vegans, as a result.
I think we are witnessing a paradigm shift in the way we perceive our relationship with animals, one that is similar to previous changes in the way we perceive other human beings.
Since the beginning of recorded history, certain classes of people were regarded, like animals today, as property.
Until very recent history, women were treated as the possession of men, with few rights to property or the right to hold office.
It many countries, including Canada, they could not even vote a century ago. It took a great amount of political work by suffragists and others, to rectify this.
As well, chattel slavery was considered entirely acceptable as recently as the 19th century. The United States almost fell apart in a horrific civil war over this issue.
Today it seems incredible to us that anyone could condone the idea of owning another person and having the power of life and death over them.
How do such changes in attitude occur? Obviously, they involve a great transformation in bedrock moral values by vast numbers of people – indeed, the legal system usually plays “catch-up” with such ideological shifts.
In his book Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, Niall Ferguson traces this incredible shift regarding slavery, noting that “it is not easy to explain so profound a change in the ethics of a people.”
The same country that, for hundreds of years, condoned, and got rich from, the slave trade, by the late 18th century took to heart the admonitions of abolitionists like William Wilberforce, grew ashamed of its disregard for human life, and became an advocate for the eradication of this evil.
Let’s hope that our increasing concern for the welfare of animals will produce similar results.
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