Violence Puts Ethiopia’s Future in Doubt

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Moncton, NB] Times & Transcript

There is bound to be a surge in responses to recent atrocities in Ethiopia, given the violent conflict and spiralling human rights violations over the past two years, under the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

In July 2020, the Ethiopian government cracked down on protests in the Oromia region with extrajudicial killings and mass arrests. Soon afterwards, regional militias targeted local minorities in what was described as ethnic cleansing.

In early November 2020, Tigray erupted into armed conflict, following a dispute between the regional government, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government, and leading to intense warfare and violence.

The TPLF had opposed key elements in Prime Minister Abiy’s political agenda including the dissolution of the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), of which it had been the leading member, and the postponement of national elections.

Since then, various armed forces – principally the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) – have perpetrated massacres, sexual violence and forced starvation, all likely to amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or possibly even genocide.

Early on, there were reciprocal mass killings in Mai Kadra involving both Tigrayan
and Amhara militia; and a well-documented massacre in the city of Axum, in which Eritrean soldiers are accused of killing over 700 Tigrayan civilians. Subsequently, evidence has emerged of widespread targeted killing of Tigrayan men and boys with more than 230 sites of mass killing.

On July 18, 2021, Prime Minister Abiy further reinforced fears. In a speech to parliament, he labelled the TPLF a “cancer” that, like “weeds,” needed to be “uprooted.” There were detentions of ethnic Tigrayans in Addis Ababa, closures of their businesses, restrictions on their travel, and other forms of targeted harassment.

But ethnic Amhara, Gumuz, Qemant and Oromo communities, among others, have also been subject to violence, and there have been reciprocal claims of genocide by members of these targeted groups. For instance, as Tigrayan forces took the military offensive in Amhara and Afar regions last August, reports of violence against civilians mounted.

Because Ethiopia was never, save for a brief period in 1935-1941, conquered by a European power, fascist Italy, its own expansion and occupation of disparate peoples has often gone unnoticed. The 19^th century emperor Menelik II not only defeated an Italian army at the Battle of Adwa in 1896 but expanded his realm to the south and east, into Oromo and other kingdoms or republics.

So the nineteenth century Ethiopian empire can be interpreted not only as a case of African resistance to European colonialism, but African participation in the colonial scramble for Africa as a junior partner.

All except one of the country’s emperors from 1270 to 1974 were Amhara; this dominance created competitive quarrels between the Amhara and their northern neighbours, the Tigray, and other Ethiopian ethnic groups, such as the Oromo.

For Oromo nationalists, a monument of Emperor Menelik II glorifies the man who suppressed their people with atrocious violence. For those seeking to resurrect a glorious greater Ethiopia, Menelik II is their hero.

The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 that overthrew Haile Selassie resulted in the establishment of a military regime, the Derg, that oversaw numerous atrocities during its seventeen years in power. They were part of the “Red Terror” that violently repressed all opposition. The 1985 Live Aid concert was organized to raise money for famine relief.

Civil wars raged in the country throughout the post-revolutionary years, with ultimately successful insurgencies fought by rebels that would dominate Ethiopia for decades.

The Derg was also forced into costly conflicts elsewhere. This included the insurgency fought by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and an armed confrontation in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region.

Given this history, each of the current warring parties has cast the conflict in existential terms, with the federal government and Amhara region arguing that their security requires the subjugation of the TPLF.

The Tigrayan resistance has countered that they will settle for nothing less than ironclad guarantees that there can be no future assaults on their region -- something ultimately provided only by their own army. While the fighting has somewhat subsided, the viability of the Ethiopian state itself is increasingly coming into question.