Professor Henry Srebrnik

Professor Henry Srebrnik

Tuesday, October 31, 2023

Where Does Russia Stand on the Israel-Hamas War?

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

When Hamas launched its attack against Israel on Oct. 7, some observers were quick to suspect the Moscow-Tehran axis at work. Officials and experts were concerned that Russia could exploit the chaos surrounding the attack, and push the Kremlin even closer to Iran, which is allied with the Palestinian group. 

Russia, they argued, was deliberately and directly fueling conflict in the region to broaden its battlefield with the West. Others drew direct comparisons between Hamas’ vicious onslaught and Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky suggested that one was “a terrorist organization that attacked Israel” and the other “a terrorist state that attacked Ukraine.” (Many Palestinians took issue with this with this characterization.)

But it was Russian President Vladimir Putin to whom Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu officially spoke over the phone after the attack, while at the same time refusing an offer from Zelensky for a state visit to Israel in its time of need. Putin has over the years visited Israel and cast himself as a loyal ally of the Israeli state, promoting cultural ties and visa-free travel between the two countries.

On Oct. 13, Putin said that Russia could help mediate because it has “good” and “traditional” relations with both sides. For years, he has sought to cultivate strong ties with Israel while also backing the Palestinian cause. The ties were not shattered even by Russia’s war in Ukraine. A pillar of Moscow’s approach to the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis is to retain positive relations with all involved parties.

Moscow has long maintained close relations with Hamas, the Islamist group that controls Gaza and enjoys Iranian backing. Hamas has both political and military wings, and some Western states, such as Australia and New Zealand, have only declared the military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, to be a terrorist organization. Others, such as Canada and the United States, have not made this distinction.

The Kremlin, for its part, has never declared either wing of Hamas to be a terrorist group. Rather, eager to carve out a niche in the Middle East peace process, Russian diplomats have tried to unify different Palestinian factions, including Hamas, into a single political organization, to restart the peace process and promote a two-state solution.

Hamas delegations have frequented Moscow, meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, who holds the Middle Eastern file at the foreign ministry. Last March, Hamas sent a high-level delegation to Russia. Moscow has consulted with Palestinian factions in Doha, Qatar, and Ramallah, in the West Bank.

Those talks showed that Hamas is far from a Russian puppet: In one round of negotiations, held in Moscow in February 2019, the group’s leadership refused to back a final statement brokered by the Russian hosts.

Over the years, some Russian-made weapons have made their way into Gaza, likely via Iran. But there is no evidence that Russia supported Hamas in planning or executing its surprise attack on Israel.

Meanwhile, Kremlin officials have blamed the United States for Hamas’ attack, while not condemning the incursion in explicit terms. Three days after the assault, Putin, while meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in Moscow, raised concerns about the “catastrophic increase” in both Israeli and Palestinian deaths.

The Russian president reiterated his government’s position that the formation of a Palestinian state is “necessary,” while also blasting American policies, unsurprisingly placing most of the blame for the bloodshed on Washington’s doorstep.

 “I think that many people will agree with me that this is a vivid example of the failure of United States policy in the Middle East,” remarked Putin. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also declared that it was a part of Washington's “manic obsession to incite conflicts.”

On Oct. 13, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, called for a “humanitarian ceasefire” and presented his country’s draft resolution to the UN Security Council, which “strongly condemns all violence and hostilities directed against civilians and all acts of terrorism.” It was rejected.

Russian officials have also been busy speaking with their Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, and Turkish counterparts about various dimensions of the crisis, such as the risks of spillover, efforts to negotiate a ceasefire, and the plight of Palestinian refugees. Such outreach to regional players has enabled Moscow to deepen its relationships in the Middle East.

Since launching its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has dramatically deepened its cooperation with Iran. In return for Iranian combat drones and other military gear, Russia has stepped up its defence support for Tehran, including with assistance for its missile and space-launched vehicle programs. There has been a flurry of Iranian-Russian military engagement, including Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s recent tour of an arms exhibition in Tehran.

Once an eager mediator in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, Russia has also lost enthusiasm for seeing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action restored. After its invasion of Ukraine, Russia ceased to push for meaningful and timely progress in the nuclear talks, creating a de facto shield for Iran’s near-nuclear status. Russia is enabling rather than constraining Tehran in the region.

Moscow hopes to deflect Western attention and resources away from Ukraine by cultivating new global pressure points and distractions, and the Hamas-Israel conflict has made this easier.

 

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