Two Wars Test Turkish-Russian Relations

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

Drawing on Turkey’s geo-strategic position, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has refrained from taking definitive sides in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, earning himself the role of a mediator and expanding his room to make other gains. 

Having fostered military cooperation with Kyiv and rejected Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Erdogan has maintained this policy after Russia invaded Ukraine, which did anger Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Even so, by the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Erdogan and Putin had gained ample experience of dealing with each other, with Putin flexible enough to work with a tough and pragmatic counterpart. Turkey has delivered weapons and ammunition, especially drones, to Ukraine while trying to increase trade with Russia. For Erdogan, this “balanced” position is necessary due to Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. 

This has enabled him to speak to both Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Turkey brought the two warring parties together twice in March 2022, though without results. Four months later, however, Turkey and the United Nations brokered a deal that cleared the way for Ukrainian grain exports that were being blocked by Russia. Erdogan declared that it would benefit “the whole of humanity.”

After President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine paid a visit to Istanbul July 7, the Turkish leader said he would work to help extend the Black Sea grain deal for longer intervals. Erdogan also contended that “Ukraine deserves NATO membership with no doubt.”

But Erdogan believes the Kremlin wants a prompt end to Russia’s faltering campaign in Ukraine. After his Sept. 4 visit to Russia to meet Putin, Erdogan asserted that “Putin is on the side of ending this war as soon as possible. That’s what he said. And I believe his remarks.”

Erdogan has also refused to join the Western sanctions against Russia, offering Moscow an economic lifeline. Russian businesses have come to use Turkey as a transit hub to ship European goods, mostly technological products, to Russia. Turkey’s skies have remained open to Russian planes, while the Turk Stream pipeline has emerged as the only conduit that still carries significant amounts of Russian gas to Europe.

Of course, Erdogan has sought Russian favours in return. The Russian company building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant injected additional funds into the project to make it operational and pledged to put dollars into Turkish sovereign bonds or bank deposits. In another move, Moscow agreed to accept 25 per cent of Turkish gas payments in rubles.

Economic data offers proof of the friendship. The trade turnover between Russia and Turkey increased more than 80 per cent in 2022 to $62 billion, with Russia becoming Turkey’s biggest source of imports. At their September meeting, Putin and Erdogan committed themselves to increasing bilateral trade to $100 billion.

“From every direction, Erdogan gets maximal profit: markets, technologies and economic modernisation from the West, cheap raw materials, fuel and a natural gas hub from Russia,” Kyiv-based political analyst Aleksey Kushch remarked.

Elsewhere, foreign policy has often been a sticking point between Ankara and Moscow. But now, with the flare-up in the Israel-Gaza conflict, they find themselves in the same camp. A report of a telephone call between Erdogan and Putin on Oct. 24 regarding the war stated that they have “practically overlapping positions, focused on implementing the well-known two-state solution, which provides for the creation of an independent Palestine coexisting with Israel in peace and security.”

Russia’s support for Hamas is a relatively recent phenomenon, and a direct consequence of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It has led to a cooling of ties with Israel and warming relations with Iran, a major Hamas sponsor.

Before the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, the sight of Hamas delegations in Moscow could have been interpreted as Russia seeking to mediate between Palestinian factions. Now, however, such contacts are perceived very differently by Israel.

Erdogan, on the other hand, has long supported Hamas, allowing Hamas fighters to reside in Turkey and giving them Turkish passports. The Turkish president himself emerged from Islamist circles, and backing Hamas is ideologically important for him.

In the first days of the current war, Erdogan tried to go back and forth between Israel and Hamas but he has since abandoned that tactic and decided to give his full support to the Palestinians.

Different roads have brought Moscow and Ankara to the same decision to sacrifice relations with Israel, which means neither can be a mediator in the conflict. At the same time, neither country’s interactions with Hamas have been particularly effective.

Despite liaising with the group’s political leadership, neither Russia nor Turkey achieved the freeing of any hostages held by Hamas. Nevertheless, their approach allows Russia and Turkey to level criticisms at the West, which is important for their domestic audiences.

By accusing the United States of fueling chaos in the Middle East, Putin is shoring up his narrative that the West is the source of all misfortune in Russia and the wider world. In the same way, Erdogan’s criticism of the West for ostensibly attempting to start a war between Christianity and Islam appeals to strong feelings in Turkey.

Agreement over the Israel-Hamas conflict means diplomatic cooperation between Russia and Turkey will grow. But any warming of ties will be situational, and no guarantee against future disputes.