By Henry Srebrnik, [Winnipeg] Jewish Post
In the twentieth century, many middle-class Egyptians adopted a cosmopolitan cultural style. They wanted to move the country toward a more liberal and secular state.
But they always came up against, and were unable to surmount, the strength of a very strong Islamic religious culture. In despair, some, despite their own preferences, ended up preferring autocracy to what they considered a backward and dangerous ideology.
In 1952, a revolution brought the Free Officers movement, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, to power. It seemed to have brought a secular quasi-socialist regime to power.
But the undercurrents of politicized religion, though banned by Nasser, did not disappear. The Muslim Brotherhood, which had been founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna and preached a fundamentalist Islamism guarded exclusively by the sharia, was outlawed. Its most prominent theoretician, Sayyid Ibrahim Qutb, was executed in 1966.
But secular movements fell from favour following Egypt’s defeat by Israel in 1967, and the country was transformed into an autocracy following Nasser’s death three years later. From 1981 until 2011, Egypt was ruled with an iron hand by Hosni Mubarak, until popular unrest forced him to step down during the Arab Spring.
Would this herald a new, democratic chapter in Egypt? Would free elections bring about a rebirth of secular politics? The answer was no.
Mubarak’s ouster cleared the way for the Muslim Brotherhood to participate openly in Egyptian politics, and to that end the group formed the Freedom and Justice Party. In April 2012 the party selected Mohamed Morsi to be its candidate in Egypt’s presidential election. Morsi defeated Ahmed Shafiq, a former prime minister under Mubarak, that June.
Morsi soon issued an edict declaring that his authority as president would not be subject to judicial oversight until a permanent constitution came into effect. Although he defended the edict as a necessary measure to protect Egypt’s transition to democracy, mass demonstrations were held against what many saw as a seizure of dictatorial powers.
Worsening economic conditions, deteriorating public services, and a string of sectarian incidents, including attacks on the country’s Coptic Christian minority, strengthened opposition to Morsi’s rule. Clashes between Morsi’s supporters and critics in late June 2013 culminated in massive anti-Morsi protests around the country.
On July 3 the military under the head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, removed Morsi from power. A figurehead president, Adly Mansour, was installed, but it was clear that Sisi, who retained the title of defence minister, wielded power.
Sisi claimed that the military had carried out the will of the Egyptian people, as expressed in the anti-Morsi protests, and that the Islamist-dominated administration led by Morsi had put the Muslim Brotherhood’s interests before those of the country.
A month later the Egyptian police and armed forces committed what Human Rights Watch deemed “one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history.”
Eleven years on, the murder of over 1,000 supporters of the deposed president, known as the Rabaa Massacre, has gone largely unpunished. The Muslim Brotherhood was formally outlawed that September and Morsi was jailed. Prison conditions were harsh, and he was denied adequate medical attention. He died in 2019.
Sisi officially left the military to run for president and was elected in a clearly fraudulent manner in May 2014. He has been re-elected twice since, in March 2018 and again in December 2023, when he was reported to have won with 89.6 per cent of the vote after several opposition figures were prevented from participating. Under his reign, Egypt has degenerated into a police state even more repressive than the 30-year dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak.
Caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place, Egypt’s pro-democracy and civil society movements jettisoned their long-standing commitments to human rights and the rule of law and enthusiastically supported the return of military rule.
One of those civil society leaders, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, was among Egypt’s most influential intellectual figures. He had spent his career insisting that democracy is the solution both to political authoritarianism and to the allures of religious fundamentalism in the Arab world.
Pushing back against the prevailing view that Islamist groups must be marginalized, he argued that they should be included in the democratic process. He even went so far as to advocate, in an article titled “Toward Muslim Democracies,” that “it will be better for us as democrats, for the Islamists, and for Egypt to enlist Islamists under the flag of democracy.”
He encouraged Egyptians to support this vision and put aside common fears about Islamist movements and had been arrested for his views under Mubarak. Yet even he abruptly became an apologist for authoritarian rule.
The “problem” was that the bulk of the Egyptian masses were unwilling to part with their religious traditions or wholly consign them to the realm of the private. Put another way, if most Egyptians were given the choice between being liberal or being Muslim, they would overwhelmingly select the latter.
Faced with that reality, these intellectuals forged authoritarian alliances to forcibly impose their worldview on an otherwise unwilling populace. When Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were in actual control of the state rather than at its fringes, the liberal secularists chose authoritarian rule. This is the same tragedy found in most of the Arab world.
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