By Henry Srebrnik, Jewish Post, Winnipeg
The United Arab Emirates, the world’s third-largest oil producer, quit the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the end of April. And that’s a very big deal.
Apart from its effect on the cartel’s ability to control oil prices, the move reflects a widening confrontation with Saudi Arabia and a fundamental realignment of alliances as a result of the current Middle East war over Iran, as well as the ongoing civil war in Yemen.
The Saudi-Emirati fracture is not new, but it crossed a qualitative threshold in late 2025. On December 29, Saudi Arabian air strikes targeted an Emirati weapons convoy at the port of Mukalla in Yemen, an act without precedent between two nominal allies. Riyadh then publicly demanded the withdrawal of all UAE forces from Yemeni territory and in early 2026, that call was answered with the dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Abu Dhabi’s principal proxy in the country.
The Saudi foreign ministry accused the UAE of pressuring the STC to conduct military operations along the kingdom’s southern borders, describing the move as a direct threat to Saudi national security and a “red line” for Riyadh that it would not hesitate to confront.
These developments also point to a significant Emirati miscalculation. By backing the STC’s advance into eastern Yemen along the coast, Abu Dhabi has sought to build leverage over Saudi Arabia and Oman while consolidating its influence across the Arabian Sea and the Horn of Africa.
The Emiratis, however, underestimated both Riyadh’s willingness to assert itself directly in its immediate neighborhood and its enduring leverage over Yemen’s political and military actors. The episode emphasizes a central reality of the conflict: While the UAE has built deep influence through local partners, Saudi Arabia remains the decisive external actor in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve the territorial integrity of Arab states and to position itself as a regional stabilising power. The UAE, on the other hand, has built, since 2015, a doctrine founded on force projection through non-state actors in Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen.
The UAE has backed the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the Sudanese civil war that began in April 2023, while Riyadh supports the latter. In Somalia, breaking ranks with other Arab nations, the UAE became the first Arab and Muslim country to recognise the breakaway region of Somaliland.
“The Saudis want obedience, or at least alignment with their regional policies,” according to Jonny Gannon, a former senior CIA officer with decades of experience in the Middle East. “The Emiratis don’t want to be obedient. They want optionality.”
Most important, in 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf country and only the third Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords facilitated by the first Trump administration. That paved the way for other Arab countries, such as Bahrain and Morocco, to normalize ties with Israel.
The Saudis have attacked the UAE as “Israel’s Trojan Horse” and denounced the Abraham Accords, as “a political military alliance dressed in the garb of religion.” Emirati officials believe the Saudis are waging a deliberate incitement campaign centered on the UAE’s relationship with Israel. After Saudi Arabia bombed the UAE’s partner forces in Yemen last December, Saudi posts criticizing Israel spiked dramatically, with 77 per cent of the comments attacking the UAE as “Israel’s proxy executing Zionist plans to divide Arab states.”
The accords helped deepen economic, cultural, trade, investment, and intelligence cooperation between the UAE and Israel, which extended to defence as well. This is perhaps why Iran made the UAE its biggest target in the current war. Iran has launched roughly 550 ballistic and cruise missiles and over 2,200 drones specifically at the Emirates. For years, the UAE had pursued a strategy of “omni-alignment,” attempting to maintain deep security ties with Washington and economic ties with Beijing, while fostering a détente with Tehran to protect its status as a safe haven for global capital.
The Iranian bombardment violently disproved this thesis. It proved that economic integration and diplomatic hedging do not grant immunity when regional hostilities boil over. In a historic move, Israel deployed an active Iron Dome battery, accompanied by dozens of Israel Defence Forces operators, directly to the UAE to help defend Emirati airspace against Iran. This marked the very first time Israel deployed its premier air-defence system and its own troops to protect a foreign Arab nation. The UAE realized that when its survival was on the line, the Arab League issued statements, but Israel sent interceptors.
This traumatic realization served as the catalyst for Abu Dhabi to aggressively assert its own sovereignty, deciding that if it must endure the costs of a regional war, it will no longer subvert its economic or political interests to regional consortiums that offer no tangible protection.
So Abu Dhabi has made a choice that goes well beyond energy policy. It is purchasing American strategic goodwill, at the precise moment when its regional alliance framework is collapsing and when it needs a substitute security guarantee. With Iran having conducted direct attacks on Emirati territory and shipping, and with Saudi Arabia having shifted into open confrontation mode, Abu Dhabi’s strategic calculus has fundamentally changed. Washington is no longer a preferred partner. It has become a necessity.
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