Scottish Nationalism Since Brexit

Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

While the United Kingdom as a whole voted to leave the European Union last June, one of its component nations, Scotland, voted no.

Overall, 52 per cent of voters in the country voted to leave the EU, with 48 per cent voting to remain, but in Scotland, 62 per cent voted to remain, with 38 per cent voting to get out.

Scottish nationalism has been on the upswing over the past two decades.  It had achieved a major victory with the devolution referendum of 1997. An overwhelming “yes” vote gave Scotland the power to form its own parliament.

By 2016 the Scottish National Party had won its third successive victory in elections to the Holyrood assembly in Edinburgh, with 63 of the 129 seats.

Today the SNP serves as the government of Scotland. It also controls 54 of the 59 Scottish seats in the Westminster House of Commons.

Its leader, Nicola Sturgeon, a lawyer, has been serving as first minister since 2014. After the Brexit vote, she said she planned to begin discussions with the 28-member bloc to “protect Scotland’s relationship with the EU and our place in the single market.”

She also announced a twin-track approach, preparing for a fresh independence referendum within two years, while at the same time as investigating whether Scotland could be granted some form of associative status by the EU while remaining part of the UK.

On March 13 Sturgeon announced that she wanted a vote to be held between the autumn of 2018 and the spring of the following year. That would coincide with the expected conclusion of the UK’s Brexit negotiations.

In the referendum held in September 2014, Scotland rejected independence by 55 per cent to 45 per cent, leading to the resignation of Sturgeon’s predecessor, Alex Salmond.

Why would Scotland seek independence yet wish to be part of an even larger entity? Under the Act of Union, the 1707 act joining Scotland’s and England’s parliaments, Scotland exists in an “incorporating” union with England and Wales, not in a federal or confederal one.

In an incorporating union of unequal size it’s likely that the larger partner will dominate the smaller.  As one nationalist put it, “London doesn’t care what Scotland thinks.” In the EU, by contrast, each member is an equal partner and has an equal voice.

Although the differences are sometimes exaggerated, political scientists have theorized a dichotomy between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. The SNP is considered an advocate of the first version.

While ethnic nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, faith, and ethnic ancestry, civic ones value freedom, tolerance, equality, and individual rights. They are open to all within its borders who identify with it and are part of its economic and political fabric.

We should remember that majority antipathy to minorities is not intrinsic to nationalism but depends on which form nationalism takes.

Since Scotland was an independent kingdom for centuries, and has always had clearly defined borders – only one on land – the SNP has not had to deal with questions as to who belongs to the Scottish nation.

The simple answer is: everyone north of the English border, no one outside of the country.

The Solway-Tweed line between England and Scotland was legally established in 1237 and with minor adjustments since, it remains the border today. It is one of the oldest extant boundaries in the world.

Membership in the Scottish nation is to be defined not by blood but by voluntary attachment to Scotland and participation in its civic life. The SNP has rejected an exclusionary jingoistic “Braveheart” nationalism.

All residents of Scotland had the right to vote in the 2014 referendum on independence, while those Scots who live outside Scotland, even if within the UK, could not.

The party has been rewarded with support from ethnic minorities; indeed, Scots of Asian descent actually support independence at a higher rate than the rest of the population.

As well, it has been remarkably effective at bridging the historic rifts within Scotland. The sectarian rivalry between ethnic Scots Protestants and Irish Catholics had been deeper than anywhere else in Britain, as bitterly reflected in the Rangers and Celtic soccer teams in Glasgow. Similar divides in Northern Ireland, on the other hand, remain unresolved.

The SNP’s success was due predominantly to appeals to the material self-interest of Scots, partly driven by the discovery of major oil fields in Scottish waters, rather than to the revival of historic sentiments of distinct identity.

As a consequence, Scottish nationalism is more a matter of economics and politics than culture.