Always an enigma, the Communist
state known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
occupying the northern half of the Korean peninsula, has been
a thorn in the side of American and South Korean policymakers
for half a century.
The latest American president to
tackle the problems posed by this rogue state has been Donald
Trump, himself an unpredictable man.
Professor Charles Armstrong, a
professor of Korean Studies in the Department of History at
Columbia University in New York, recently spoke on the subject
of “North Korea and the Prospects for Peace” at the
University of Prince Edward Island.
This was particularly timely, given the two
summits Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have held in
Singapore and Vietnam since last June.
Armstrong, who was born in South
Korea, specializes in modern Korean, East Asian, and
international history. His latest books are Tyranny of the
Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992; and The Koreas.
He is completing A History of
Modern East Asia, and his next book project deals with
American cultural policy in Asia during the early days of the
Cold War.
Armstrong identified six cycles
of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula since the
establishment of the two Korean states. Each lasted about five
years.
Though the hostilities in the
Korean War ended with the July 27, 1953 armistice, there has
been “an unceasing threat of war” ever since. In fact the past
18 months have been “a particularly tumultuous time.”
Can the two Koreas ever move in
the direction of a genuine “peace regime,” one that would move
the peninsula away from confrontation and conflict toward “a
condition of stable cooperation and long-term peace?”
Beginning in the late 1960s,
there has been dialogue between the two countries. Indeed, on
July 4, 1972 they signed a statement calling for eventual
reunification. But these talks had ended by 1974.
The two Korean states have since
then had sporadic meetings over the years. In April 2018 Kim
met with South Korean president Moon Jae-in at the truce village of Panmunjon on
the border between the two countries.
Their joint “Panmunjom Declaration” announced
their “common goal” of denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula, which was the clearest such commitment ever agreed
to by the two states.
Armstrong
believes that if the Koreans could chart their own destiny,
they might reunify. But Korea doesn’t exist in a vacuum.
“They are happy with the status quo,” given their experience with Vietnam, which was also split in two until 1975.
While North Vietnam looked to China for protection, since unification Vietnam has become closer to its former enemy, the U.S., than to China.
Japan and the United States also prefer the present division. A unified Korean nation would become a much stronger state, something Tokyo, in particular, does not want.
“The great powers should step
back and allow the Koreans to work things out themselves,” he
suggested.
At the summit, Kim had offered a partial shutdown of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, where a large part of North Korea’s fissile material is produced, in return for lifting almost all the meaningful economic sanctions on his country.
Trump rejected that deal on the grounds that it would allow Pyongyang to continue producing weapons of mass destruction, effectively financed by the lifting of sanctions.
Trump tried, but failed, to persuade Kim to “go big” and surrender his entire arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in return for “a bright future” economically.
Yet a few weeks later, Trump announced that he was reversing his administration’s decision to slap new sanctions on North Korea, ordering them withdrawn.
“Trump shouldn’t be criticized by the Democrats,” remarked Armstrong. “He may be onto something in his policy towards North Korea.
“North Korean denuclearization in return for the lifting of economic sanctions would be the trade-off for continuing progress. I was always disappointed Barack Obama didn’t do more to engage with North Korea,” he concluded.
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