The Politics of Religion in Uzbekistan

By Henry Srebrnik, [Summerside, PEI] Journal Pioneer

In the post-Soviet states of Central Asia, many of the new regimes try to contain radical forms of Islam with their own, more moderate and “official” versions, with varying success.

This has been the case in Uzbekistan, the largest of these countries, and the centre of Muslim civilization in the region.

Uzbekistan accounts for approximately 60 per cent of Central Asia’s population. Moreover, it represents the core of the Islamic landscape that characterized Central Asia for millennia, converted to Islam in the century after Muhammad.

With its 33.2 million people, it is the successor to Muslim states such as the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand, conquered by tsarist Russia in the 19^th century.

Islam Karimov, the former president of Uzbekistan, died in September 2016, a day after the 25th anniversary of his country’s independence. His successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, is from the city of Samarkand, as was Karimov.

In his opposition to radical Islam, Karimov was particularly clear: “Uzbekistan has always been against all forms of radicalism,” he said in August 2002. “We are against religious fundamentalism, we are against Communist fundamentalism and, if you like, we are against democratic fundamentalism.”

So, as geographer Reuel R. Hanks at Oklahoma State University has noted, Karimov’s strategy involved jointly mythologizing the Islamic heritage while simultaneously condemning its unsanctioned expression.

Most Central Asian Muslims were followers of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. Moderate in tone and theology, it was an acceptable alternative to more radical, politicized and “imported” pan-Islamic movements, such as Wahhabism, Salafism, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

In the early 1990s, after living for more than 70 years under Marxist-Leninist atheism, most Uzbeks were ignorant of the basic rituals and beliefs of Islam.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many people attempted to reconnect to their cultural and spiritual heritage. Karimov himself linked Islamic tradition to the new national myth.

He issued numerous proclamations and statements promoting its “proper” expression in the context of Uzbek society.

The Uzbek government maintained monopolistic control over the qualities of the officially sanctioned Islamic myth. A Muslim Spiritual Board monitored the activities of Islamic officials and the content of their pronouncements and sermons.

In the first two years of independence, the number of mosques in Uzbekistan tripled, from approximately 300 to over 1000, and many of these were constructed with funding originating outside Uzbekistan. This also provided entry by more radical forms of the faith.

Karimov understood that those visions of Islam represented a serious threat to his monopoly on power. He began to cultivate the myth of a threat from Islamic radicalism and began a crackdown on “unofficial” Muslim organizations.

Adolat, an Islamic association that had emerged in the city of Namangan, was banned and its leadership arrested, but some key figures slipped away to neighbouring Tajikistan. 

In 1998, they formed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Its stated goals were the establishment of a radical Islamic state.

During the civil war, Uzbekistan had backed moderate forces, supporting the People’s Front against the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan.

By early 2001, the IMU, allied with the Taliban, had bases in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

In response, Uzbekistan passed a 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, considered one of the most restrictive statutes in the world governing religious behaviour.

In May 2005, Uzbek security forces fired on a large crowd of demonstrators in of Andijan, killing perhaps as many as 1,500 people. The government accused them of being in league with Islamic extremists, primarily Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

However, since President Mirziyoyev took power, Uzbekistan has seen significant reforms.

Recognising the abuses of the previous administration, he began to address the country’s egregious human rights record.

Since he came to power, dozens of high-profile political prisoners have been released, some restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly have been eased, and a more open media environment is now in place.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, in its 2019 Annual Report, has noted that religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan have improved, though concerns remain.

Hundreds of religious Uzbeks remain imprisoned on vague charges of extremism, and law enforcement officials continue to systematically detain people suspected of belonging to unregistered religious groups.