Relations Among South Asia’s Nations Remain Complex

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Sydney, N.S.] Cape Breton Post

In 1947, the end of British rule on the Indian subcontinent saw the emergence of what would eventually become three new states – Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. And the triangular relationship among them – along with China – have dominated politics in this large and populous region ever since.

Together, the four countries account for about 3.3 billion of the world’s eight billion people. Of the four, only India can be considered, by most measures, a democracy. China is a Communist command economy, and the two Muslim states are nations whose political transfers of power are usually violent and typically involve their armed forces.

The most recent turbulence involved the smallest and poorest country, but it has had ramifications for all of them. Bangladesh, which gained independence from Pakistan after a bloody uprising, in 1971, has been governed – when not controlled by the military – by two parties, the more secular and pro-Indian Awami League, which helped the country attain sovereignty, and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), more Islamic in its politics and therefore less hostile to Pakistan.

Both were run by women, Sheikh Hasina for the Awami League, Begum Khaleda Zia for the BNP.  The ruling Awami League has become largely inactive since leader Sheikh Hasina lost power and fled to India last August after student-led protests. Khaleda Zia is still head of the BNP but is not currently in office. She plans to run for the leadership of the country in the next election.

India was the biggest benefactor of Hasina’s government and her ouster sent cross-border relations into a tailspin. That has prompted the Bangladeshi  caretaker government of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus to seek greater ties with Beijing, New Delhi’s chief rival for power and influence in the Asian subcontinent.

During his recent March visit, which saw Yunus meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, Dhaka and Beijing discussed trade, culture, water management, and the modernisation of Mongla Port, Bangladesh’s second busiest seaport. Yunus called Bangladesh the “guardian of ocean access” and called on China to view his country, along with Bhutan, Nepal, and, controversially, India’s isolated seven northeastern states, as an “extension of the Chinese economy, presenting them as a market and a production base.

Yunus also met with several Chinese firms to explore investment opportunities. China is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, and “Bangladesh aspires to become a manufacturing hub and is keen to partner with China in this endeavor,” Yunus’s media secretary Shafiqul Alam declared. China also hopes to continue promoting its Belt and Road cooperation with Bangladesh. China’s ambassador in Dhaka, Yao Wen, stated that Beijing “firmly supports Bangladesh in upholding its national independence, sovereignty, and dignity.”

India also worries about the fact that Dhaka and Islamabad appear to be on the path to rapprochement. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Yunus agreed to deepen bilateral cooperation in all areas of mutual interest after the two leaders met on the sidelines of a conference in Cairo last December. The strengthening maritime and military ties between them are reshaping the security dynamics of South Asia, with implications for New Delhi's strategic interests and regional stability.

The establishment of direct sea links, strained since the 1971 independence war, has marked a historic thawing of relations. Bangladesh’s interim government also removed previous restrictions that mandated physical inspections of cargo from Pakistan.

India must navigate a complex geopolitical environment marked by instability and security threats in its seven northeastern states. While New Delhi closely monitors these developments, it is also ramping up security along its border with Bangladesh.

“There is no doubt that relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan have improved overall,” indicated Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, founder and president of the Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies, an independent research forum in Goa, India.

“The important questions to consider are whether these strengthening ties are simply a reaction to India’s tactical pressure, or if they are part of a larger design to destabilize India. If we assume the latter is true, can the present regime in Dhaka afford to pursue such a policy? The answer is no,” added D’Souza.

Ajay Bisaria, a former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, explained that India's longstanding relation with neighbours like Bangladesh focuses on fostering prosperity in exchange for addressing India’s security concerns. New Delhi has long been concerned about human trafficking, infiltration and militant insurgencies along the frontier, particularly as Bangladesh borders the northeastern Indian states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, which are prone to violent outbreaks.

The new alliance between Pakistan and Bangladesh poses a significant threat to India’s strategic interests, particularly to the Siliguri corridor, often referred to as the “chicken neck.” The geopolitically sensitive passage connects those northeastern Indian states to the rest of India through a narrow strip of Indian territory measuring a mere 20-22 kilometres at its narrowest section.

India fears China might aim to establish its presence near the corridor under the guise of development work with Bangladesh. India has ramped up security along its border with Bangladesh, deploying technological solutions and conducting high-level Border Security Force inspections to curb infiltration and smuggling.

New Delhi’s current options regarding Bangladesh are limited. It will not satisfy the demands of the Yunus government to extradite Hasina, but it cannot strengthen ties as long as it hosts Hasina on its soil.