By Henry Srebrnik, Jewish Post, Winnipeg
Today’s “two-state solution” for the pre-1948 Palestine Mandate governed by the United Kingdom is an offshoot of the older idea of partition: the division of the land into Jewish and Arab countries. Transjordan, as it was then called, had been cut from the original Mandate in 1921 and became, first, a separate British mandate under an emir, and in 1946, as Britain was on the verge of leaving Palestine, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It was always a fragile creation, yet it has lasted to this day, often defying predictions of its imminent demise by friends and foes alike.
Some analysts are currently floating another old idea. Given the basic instability and unsustainability of any Palestinian state in the West Bank (with or without Gaza), a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation comprising the Hashemite Kingdom and the West Bank might, in their eyes, be a better idea.
They view a Jordanian security presence in the West Bank as reliable, more so, certainly, than a Palestinian one. The late King Hussein proposed such a confederation in 1972: a united kingdom consisting of two districts, with full West Bank autonomy except for Jordan’s control of military and security matters and foreign affairs. In 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter raised it with Prime Minister Menachem Begin; at various times, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger espoused the idea.
Indeed, Hussein and PLO president Yasir Arafat agreed to such a confederation in 1985. The king defended this as a “a matter of shared history, experience, culture, economy, and social structure.” Jordan is Arab and Muslim, and already a majority of Jordanian citizens are themselves Palestinian in origin. He believed that the Palestinians would be better served by linking their destiny with Jordan, “a sovereign state which enjoys credible international standing.”
Yet only three years later Jordan renounced the plan, and following the 1993 Oslo Accords, which created a PLO entity in the West Bank, that idea has faded away. Yet it still has some currency, with Palestinian support at times fairly robust. Many Israelis maintain that it would be desirable if the Palestinians became citizens of existing Arab states, Jordan in particular.
But why would Jordan acquiesce to this today? It is true that Jordan controlled the West Bank between 1948 and 1967. But Palestinian national identity back was not as pronounced as it is today. The current extreme forms of nationalism and Islamism don’t fit a traditional hereditary monarchy. Conservatives in Jordan fear that Jordan’s already large Palestinian population would come to dominate domestic affairs.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinian armed factions seriously endangered the Jordanian regime, culminating in the Black September civil war between 1970–1971, and for that reason Palestinian political influence is still suppressed in today’s Jordan.
Nor might this really benefit Israel. What if in such a confederation a resurgent Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or other terrorist group succeeded at overthrowing the Hashemites? The consequences would be far graver than if the same thing happened in a fully independent, PLO-led Palestinian state on the 1949 armistice lines.
The kingdom is also one of the world’s largest recipients of U.S. economic and military assistance, with one of the best-trained armies in the Middle East and advanced American weaponry. If this arsenal were to fall into the hands of Islamists, Jordan would be far more dangerous than a would-be Palestinian state.
Shortly after the Gaza war started, the kingdom saw massive demonstrations against Israel, spurred by the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood, who support Hamas and leveraged the public outcry over Israel’s military operations, with aid from Iran, which has stepped up its efforts to destabilize the kingdom by reactivating Islamist groups within the country. Protests organized by the group have been dominated by Hamas flags and pro-Hamas slogans.
The group’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front, is the largest opposition group in Jordan’s parliament since its gains in last year’s parliamentary election, the first following a series of reforms introduced by King Abdullah II aimed at promoting greater democratization.
Jordan’s security services on April 15 arrested 16 people suspected of plotting attacks inside the country involving rockets and drones. The hand of Iran was suspected. Jordan accused the Muslim Brotherhood of planning the attacks and introduced a blanket ban against the group April 23.
The relationship between Israel and Jordan has had its ups and downs, though since a 1994 treaty they are formally at peace. The second intifada, 2000-2005, and Israel’s 2008-2009 military operation in Gaza, were challenging periods. In 2017, an Israeli security guard at the Israeli embassy in Amman killed an assailant and an innocent Jordanian national, shuttering the embassy for six months. The Gaza war has, naturally, put increased strain between the two nations, and in the last several years, it’s been mainly a peace upheld by security coordination.
King Abdullah has of late been particularly critical of Israel. The king joined 56 other countries at the September 15 joint meeting of the Arab League and Organization of Islamic States, following Israel’s September 9 attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, in calling for tougher measures against the Jewish state. He also contended that the attack was “proof that the Israeli threat has no limits,” and advocated for a “clear, decisive, and deterrent” response. He urged a “review all our tools of joint action to confront the threat of this extremist Israeli government.”
During his September 23 speech before the UN General Assembly, King Abdullah again centred his remarks on Israel. He criticized Israel for attacking Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, though all three have had Iranian proxies that posed direct threats to Jordan. He accused Israel of complicity in the desecration of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. He even stated that Israel was a threat to the Al Aqsa Mosque. (Jordan maintains administrative control of the Temple Mount because Israel granted that in 1967 following the Six Day War. But in return, no other religion other than Islam is permitted to pray anywhere on the of the Temple Mount.)
On November 1, 2023, Jordan pulled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Amman also encouraged the European Union and the United Nations to sanction and embargo arms transfers to Israel. The Allenby Bridge, also known as the King Hussein Bridge, which crosses the Jordan River, was shut on September 19, after two Israelis were murdered at the crossing by a Jordanian truck driver. It was the second incident of its kind in a year, following the killing of three Israelis in September 2024. The bridge reopened four days later.
Israel and Jordan share a critical and lengthy border, secured by the peace agreement. The boundary is 482 kilometres long and stretches from the Golan Heights through the West Bank and the Dead Sea to its terminus at the Gulf of Aqaba. Jordan also provides Israel with strategic depth and early warning vis-à-vis Iran. In April and October 2024, as well as during the June 15-23 twelve-day war, bilateral defense cooperation was critical to helping to counter Iranian missile and drone attacks against Israel. A weakened Jordan would place Israel in a far more dire situation.
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