Iraq is Now an Iranian Satrapy

By Henry Srebrnik, Saint John Telegraph-Journal

George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime to bring “democracy” to that country not only failed, but threw it into the hands of Iran. It is now basically a puppet state run by Tehran’s allies.

Since then, Iraq has undergone a long period of instability, with armed groups like the self-proclaimed Islamic State taking advantage of the power vacuum left by the disbandment of the military and the ban on the Baath party. In 2014, the Islamic State advanced into Iraq from Syria and took over parts of Anbar province. Regional forces, including as many as thirty thousand Iranian troops, along with the Iraqi army, local tribes, and the Kurdish Peshmerga engaged in operations to retake territory from the Islamic State, finally emerging victorious in 2017.

But in a situation that captures the tragedy of Iraq’s modern political life, ballot boxes still don’t reflect the will of the people. They have instead become a legal facade for an Iran-backed project designed to perpetuate Iraq’s fragmentation by channeling political, economic, and security resources toward Iran-aligned militias and political actors, consolidating their power at the expense of the Iraqi state.

As the leading force of the Shia Muslim world, Tehran has long sought influence in majority-Shia Iraq, home to both Shia Islam’s most sacred sites and the seminaries that honed the Islamic Republic’s religious leaders.

A coalition of parties led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr won a surprise victory in Iraq’s May 2018 parliamentary election. His Shiite bloc has historically remained at odds with Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Following the 2021 election, however, his coalition disintegrated, and pro-Iranian militias gained power. The premiership was handed to Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, a long-time ally of Iran.

On Nov. 11, 2025, Iraq held its sixth parliamentary elections since the 2003 regime change. They unfolded against a backdrop of persistent sectarian divisions, economic challenges, and competing regional influences.

With around 7,744 candidates and 75 lists on the ballot, most parties ran with ideologically incoherent electoral lists centered on prominent-- though not necessarily popular-- figures and assorted hanger-on candidates. These lists were not designed to articulate a shared program but to gather as many votes as possible from disparate constituencies.

The elections produced a fragmented parliament reflecting Iraq’s ethno-sectarian composition. Prime Minister al-Sudani and his newly established party, Reconstruction and Development, secured the largest bloc with 46 seats out of 329. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law party obtained 28 seats, while former Speaker of Parliament Muhammad al-Halbusi’s Progress party won 27 seats. The League of the Righteous militia, headed by Qais al-Khazali, also secured 27 seats, underscoring the continued political influence of armed groups. Al-Sudani won in eight of ten Shia-majority provinces, including a decisive victory in Baghdad.

The so-called Shia House, despite its collective 197-seat majority, is deeply fragmented into competing factions. Four major groupings can be identified within the bloc: first, the explicitly pro-Iranian militia parties, controlling 51 seats and representing groups with direct organizational and ideological ties to Tehran; second, al-Sudani and aligned minor parties, commanding approximately 70 seats and representing a more nationalist, development-oriented orientation; third, al-Maliki’s faction with 28 seats, occupying a position closer to the Iranian pole than al-Sudani but less subordinate than the militia parties; and fourth, the so-called “Tishreenis,” which refers to the month of October 2019, in which popular protests against the government erupted. This last grouping has now been eliminated from parliamentary representation.

The government is now in the hands of the Shia Coordination Framework, a coalition of Shia parties; it is the political umbrella that brings together the parliamentary arms of Iran-aligned militia, and underscores the breadth of their influence inside parliament. Ali Al-Zaidi was named prime minister April 27 by the Coordination Framework, after former two-time Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had emerged as the coalition’s initial candidate.

These Shia warlords hold formal roles in parliament, but they also control militia forces and security institutions, enabling them to translate their battlefield power into political leverage. This reflects how deeply armed groups have embedded themselves at the core of the legislative process. With dozens of militia affiliates entering parliament, the prospects for a civilian state diminish.

Over the course of the Israel-Hamas War, Iran-backed militia groups have targeted American troops in the region over 165 times. The remaining 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq have been subject to consistent attacks on their bases. This has become more pronounced since Washington’s attacks on Iran began in late February.

Unfortunately for the U.S., these Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), as they are known, are larger and better financed than Iraq’s actual army. Iran’s regime has provided them with advanced weaponry, and they have mounted sophisticated attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure inside America’s closest allies in the war, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran’s Iraqi allies are valuable, not just with military assistance, but also by providing billions of dollars in cash to Iran from Iraq’s oil revenues.

The United States identified seven leaders of the PMF on April 17 as terrorists, asserting that they operate with near impunity, attacking U.S. personnel and innocent civilians across Iraq. Washington also demanded that its nominal ally, Iraq, sever ties with Tehran. This of course won’t happen.