India Resists Pressure to Oppose Russia

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

 After Russia invaded Ukraine, western countries formed what looked like an overwhelming global coalition: 141 countries supported a United Nations measure demanding that Russia unconditionally withdraw.

But the West never won over as much of the world as it initially seemed. Another 47 countries abstained or missed the vote, including India and China. A large majority of the world’s population lives in nations that are not aligned with the West’s Ukraine policy. Many of those “neutral” nations have since provided crucial economic or diplomatic support for Russia.

On Feb. 23, the UN General Assembly endorsed another resolution demanding that Russia withdraw from Ukraine’s territory but again China, South Africa, India and many countries in the global south continued to abstain, underlining their alienation from what they regard as the West’s war.

India has faced pressure from the West to distance itself from Moscow. Last March, Jen Psaki, then the White House press secretary, urged India to reflect on “where you want to stand when history books are written at this moment in time.” Some world leaders and diplomats expressed impatience with India for effectively abetting a Russian agenda.

New Delhi has thus far resisted that pressure, citing its long-time ties with Russia and its economic and oil needs. India’s imports from Russia have risen 430 per cent since the war began.

When Russia first invaded Ukraine, Washington warned India against buying more Russian oil, saying that New Delhi could face “consequences.” Now the U.S. is softening its stance, emphasizing that India doesn’t need to choose sides.

The changing tone reflects the middle path that India is carving out for itself in this crisis, as the nation tries to maximize its geopolitical leverage without limiting its economic opportunities.

A “world order which is still very, very deeply Western,” Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, told the New York Times last December, is being hurried out of existence by the impact of the war in Ukraine. It is being replaced by a world of “multi-alignment” where countries will choose their own “particular policies and preferences and interests.

“I would still like to see a more rules-based world,” Jaishankar said. “But when people start pressing you in the name of a rules-based order to give up, to compromise on what are very deep interests, at that stage I’m afraid it’s important to contest that and, if necessary, to call it out.”

“Paradoxically, the war in Ukraine has diminished trust in Western powers and concentrated people’s minds on how to hedge bets,” said Pratap Bhanu Mehta, a prominent Indian political theorist and former president of the Centre for Policy Research, a New Delhi-based think tank.

As tensions increase along India’s border with China, India doesn’t feel it can risk its relationship with Russia, a key source for weapons. Russia has been India’s largest weapons supplier since the days of the Soviet Union. Moscow supported the country with weapons over decades of nonalignment, while the United States supported India’s archenemy, Pakistan.

“For many years, the United States did not stand by us, but Moscow has,” remarked Amitabh Kant, until last year the chief executive officer of the NITI Aayog (National Institute for Transforming India Policy Commission), the main public policy think tank of the government of India.

New Delhi has enough rivals, Kant said: “Try, on top of China and Pakistan, putting Russia against you!” In December, there was another skirmish at the 2,100-mile Chinese-Indian border in the Tawang sector of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

India and Russia celebrated the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation they signed on Jan. 28, 1993. Denis Alipov, the Russian ambassador to India, speaking at the event, emphasized the “trusted” relationship forged by Moscow and New Delhi because of similar approaches to global issues.

“The treaty reflects India’s and Russia’s understanding of bilateral relations. It still plays a big role in our time. In particular, it is clear that neither India nor Russia will do anything that might harm the partner’s strategic interests. And this is very important in today’s turbulent and volatile world,” according to Nandan Unnikrishnan of the Centre for International Relations in the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

Tensions over Russia’s war on Ukraine flared Feb. 24 at meetings of financial chiefs of the Group of 20 leading economies in the Indian technology hub of Bengaluru, despite host India’s reluctance to be caught between allies of Ukraine and Russia. “India is not keen to discuss or back any additional sanctions on Russia during the G20,” an Indian official told Reuters. “The existing sanctions on Russia have had a negative impact on the world.”

Washington knows it will have a hard time making a dent in this relationship. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a recent interview with the Atlantic magazine that he hoped that countries like India might consider a trajectory away from alignment with Moscow, but that the process would not happen quicky.

“There are countries that have long-standing, decades-long relationships with Russia, with the Soviet Union before, that are challenging to break off in one fell swoop,” he stated. “It’s not flipping a light switch. It’s moving an aircraft carrier.” Blinken remains optimistic -- but turning an aircraft carrier around is no easy task.

 

Russian Power Waning: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan have maintained cautious neutrality

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Charlottetown, PEI] Guardian

Kazakhstan has a large Russian minority in its northern region, but Henry Srebrnik writes that the former Soviet country is looking to China for help securing its own territory.

The Kazakh government has spent the last year actively reaching out to the West, keen to put a line between itself and the Kremlin.

None of the five post-soviet Central Asian republics have backed Russia’s war in Ukraine, though they’ve carefully avoided condemning their powerful neighbour. Each has security worries of its own.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which all gained independence i n 1991, have close ties with Moscow but are also on good terms with Ukraine -- like them, a former Soviet republic.

At the United Nations, these states have all maintained cautious neutrality: On Feb. 23, four of them abstained on a General Assembly resolution calling for a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine that would involve Russia’s withdrawal of troops. Turkmenistan did not vote at all. No Central Asian state has endorsed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 either.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Leaders in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have refrained from all comment for fear of alienating Russia, which guarantees their security against neighbouring Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan’s position has been less consistent: initially it appeared to back the Russian invasion, which President Sadyr Japarov called “a necessary measure to protect the civilian population of the territories of Donbas, where a large number of Russian citizens live.” But he later acknowledged Ukraine’s right as a sovereign state to determine its own foreign policy direction. Kyrgyzstan has even sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

Kazakhstan has a large Russian minority in its northern region, territory which many Russian nationalists view as belonging to Russia. Not surprisingly, it restated its attachment “to the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and peaceful coexistence” after the referenda that led to Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

OLD EMPIRE

Before President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in February, Russia played a major role in the affairs of Central Asia. His view of Central Asia as part of Russia’s sphere of influence was not unjustified.

During his first 21 years in power, Russian relations remained relatively unchanged with all five of the former Soviet Central Asian states. But with the Kremlin distracted by its flagging war, Russia’s domination over its old Soviet empire shows signs of unraveling.

The Kazakh government has spent the last year actively reaching out to the West, keen to put a line between itself and the Kremlin. President Kassym-jomart Tokayev also openly welcomed Russians fleeing Putin’s September 2022 conscription, while his government also pressured broadcasters to limit the distribution of Russian state media channels.

Kazakhstan is also looking to China for help in securing its own territory. On a visit to Kazakhstan in September, President Xi Jinping pledged to “resolutely support Kazakhstan in the defence of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

FULL-SCALE CONFLICT

Also that month, along the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, long-running quarrels between farmers over land, water and smuggled contraband escalated into a full-scale conflict involving tanks, helicopters and rockets, as the armies of the two countries fought each other to a standstill.

The conflict, according to Kyrgyz officials, killed scores of civilians and drove more than 140,000 people from their homes. It also left many local residents and officials in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, asking why Moscow, which has bases in both countries and has long been seen as a guardian of stability, had done little to mitigate the conflict.

The border war has unsettled longstanding assumptions about Russian power. Its major base in Tajikistan reportedly saw troops drained for the fight in Ukraine. President Japarov complained that when the border fighting erupted with Tajikistan, Moscow “did nothing at all,” adding that the Russians are “taking care of so many problems of their own.”

In response, China is asserting itself. As Tajik forces were advancing, China issued a pledge of support to Kyrgyzstan. Clearly, Beijing was intruding into Russia’s sphere of influence.

LOST AURA

The United States also sees an opening, pressing Kyrgyzstan to sign a new bilateral cooperation agreement. It would replace one scrapped in 2014 after Russian pressure forced the closing of an American air base outside Bishkek that had been set up to fuel warplanes flying over Afghanistan.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meeting his counterparts from all five former Soviet republics. He told them Washington backed their “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.”

The Tajik-kyrgyz border conflict erupted just as Putin himself had been in Uzbekistan for a summit meeting of a Chinese-sponsored regional grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was attended by President Xi as well as leaders of India, Turkey, Azerbaijan and four Central Asian countries.

China delivered another affront during the summit meeting by signing an agreement with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan that fixed the route of a proposed new railway line to get Chinese exports to Europe by land without going through Russia.

Even Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, probably Moscow’s closest ally in the region, complained to Putin about his lack of respect for the countries of Central Asia. “Putin is no longer the great invincible leader that everyone wants to meet,” contends Emil Dzhuraev, a researcher in Bishkek with Crossroads Central Asia, a research group. “He has lost his aura.”

A new era for Central Asia has begun, and the absence of a regional hegemon means that it is much more likely to be turbulent and possibly deadly.

 

Russian power Diminishes in Central Asia

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Sydney, N.S.] Cape Breton Post

None of the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics have backed Russia’s war in Ukraine, though they’ve carefully avoided condemning their powerful neighbour. Each has security worries of its own.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which all gained independence in 1991, have close ties with Moscow but are also on good terms with Ukraine — like them, a former Soviet republic.

At the United Nations, these states have all maintained cautious neutrality: On Feb. 23, four of them abstained on a General Assembly resolution calling for a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine that would involve Russia’s withdrawal of troops. Turkmenistan did not vote at all. No Central Asian state has endorsed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 either.

PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE

Leaders in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have refrained from all comment for fear of alienating Russia, which guarantees their security against neighbouring Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan’s position has been less consistent: initially it appeared to back the Russian invasion, which President Sadyr Japarov called “a necessary measure to protect the civilian population of the territories of Donbas, where a large number of Russian citizens live.” But he later acknowledged Ukraine’s right as a sovereign state to determine its own foreign policy direction. Kyrgyzstan has even sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

Kazakhstan has a large Russian minority in its northern region, territory which many Russian nationalists view as belonging to Russia. Not surprisingly, it restated its attachment “to the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and peaceful coexistence” after the referenda that led to Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

OLD EMPIRE

Before President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in February, Russia played a major role in the affairs of Central Asia. His view of Central Asia as part of Russia’s sphere of influence was not unjustified.

During his first 21 years in power, Russian relations remained relatively unchanged with all five of the former Soviet Central Asian states. But with the Kremlin distracted by its flagging war, Russia’s domination over its old Soviet empire shows signs of unravelling.

The Kazakh government has spent the last year actively reaching out to the West, keen to put a line between itself and the Kremlin. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also openly welcomed Russians fleeing Putin’s September 2022 conscription, while his government also pressured broadcasters to limit the distribution of Russian state media channels.

Kazakhstan is also looking to China for help in securing its own territory. On a visit to Kazakhstan in September, President Xi Jinping pledged to “resolutely support Kazakhstan in the defence of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

FULL-SCALE CONFLICT

Also that month, along the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, long-running quarrels between farmers over land, water and smuggled contraband escalated into a full-scale conflict involving tanks, helicopters and rockets, as the armies of the two countries fought each other to a standstill.

The conflict, according to Kyrgyz officials, killed scores of civilians and drove more than 140,000 people from their homes. It also left many local residents and officials in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, asking why Moscow, which has bases in both countries and has long been seen as a guardian of stability, had done little to mitigate the conflict.

The border war has unsettled longstanding assumptions about Russian power. Its major base in Tajikistan reportedly saw troops drained for the fight in Ukraine. President Japarov complained that when the border fighting erupted with Tajikistan, Moscow “did nothing at all,” adding that the Russians are “taking care of so many problems of their own.”

In response, China is asserting itself. As Tajik forces were advancing, China issued a pledge of support to Kyrgyzstan. Clearly, Beijing was intruding into Russia’s sphere of influence.

NEW ERA

The United States also sees an opening, pressing Kyrgyzstan to sign a new bilateral co-operation agreement. It would replace one scrapped in 2014 after Russian pressure forced the closing of an American air base outside Bishkek that had been set up to fuel warplanes flying over Afghanistan.

The border conflict erupted just as Putin was in neighboring Uzbekistan for a summit meeting of a Chinesesponsored regional grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was attended by President Xi as well as leaders of India, Turkey, Azerbaijan and four Central Asian countries.

China delivered another affront during the summit meeting by signing an agreement with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan that fixed the route of a proposed new railway line to get Chinese exports to Europe by land without going through Russia.

Even Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, probably Moscow’s closest ally in the region, complained to Putin about his lack of respect for the countries of Central Asia.

A new era for Central Asia has begun, and the absence of a regional hegemon means that it is much more likely to be turbulent and possibly deadly.

 

Moldova – A Model Democracy?

 By Henry Srebrnik, [Saint John, N.B.] Telegraph-Journal

I sensed something was strange when I recently read that Moldova was a shining example of democracy in Europe.

A report on the “Global State of Democracy” published by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) last November stated that, while corruption remains a key challenge, Moldova is now among the top 25 per cent of countries globally in areas such as social rights and equality or media integrity.

The findings from IDEA, an intergovernmental organization headquartered in Stockholm, were based on an analysis of 173 countries. Kevin Casas-Zamora, its secretary-general, highlighted Moldova specifically as a “bright spot” when it comes to democratic progress.

But this is nonsense on stilts. True, the victory of Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) last July 21was interpreted as reflecting a widespread popular consensus against entrenched oligarchic networks. This followed upon Moldova’s pro-Kremlin president Igor Dodon losing his re-election bid to the pro-Western Sandu in 2020.

However, Transparency International, in a more realistic March 2022 “Overview of Corruption in Moldova,” suggested that “much remains to be done to overcome the legacy of state capture still visible in many organs of state.”

This little country of 2.6 million people, which gained independence when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, is wedged between Ukraine and Romania. Until 1940, most of what is Moldova today had been part of Romania.

On its eastern flank, though, one finds the pro-Russian breakaway de facto state of Transnistria, bordering Ukraine. It seceded from Moldova in 1992, supported by troops from Moscow. Roughly 60 per cent of its population is Russian speaking, and Russia has troops stationed there. Russian President Vladimir Putin on Feb. 21 revoked a 2012 decree that in part recognized Moldova’s sovereignty in resolving the future of the Transnistria region.

So Moldova is, in effect, on the front lines should the Ukraine war spill over that country’s borders. The European Union last May 4 pledged to increase military support to Moldova, worried about “provocations” by pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria.

“This year we plan to significantly increase our support to Moldova by providing its armed forces with additional military equipment,” European Council President Charles Michel told Moldovan President Sandu in Chisinau, the capital.

The war is certainly coming closer. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, on Feb. 10 reported that two Russian missiles launched from the Black Sea had entered Moldovan airspace before hitting Ukraine.

That same day, the pro-Western PAS government collapsed with the resignation of Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita. Along with President Sandu, she had been pushing for accession into the EU -- the country was given candidate status last year. The government had been planning a series of reforms in line with EU accession to speed up the process.

She blamed “oligarchs financing protests and fanning discontent” against a backdrop of rising prices and falling purchasing power. “But what has been happening on the streets of Chisinau in recent weeks is a provocation that is being organized with the support of foreign services,” she stated.

“I took over the government with an anti-corruption, pro-development and pro-European mandate at a time when corruption schemes had captured all the institutions and the oligarchs felt untouchable,” Gavrilita said in her resignation statement. “We were immediately faced with energy blackmail, and those who did this hoped that we would give in.”

Last Oct. 26, the U.S. Treasury Department had imposed sanctions on nine individuals and 12 entities in Moldova, “for capturing and corrupting Moldova’s political and economic institutions” and “acting as instruments of Russia’s global influence campaign.”

Those sanctioned included Ilan Shor, chairman of the Sor Party, a populist political organization. Shor was previously arrested on money laundering and embezzlement charges related to the 2014 theft of one billion dollars from Moldovan banks.

He is accused of being a leading figure in the Kremlin’s efforts to subvert this former Soviet republic. Last autumn, anti-government demonstrations organized by him lasted for weeks, blaming it for a 400 per cent rise in gas prices and the resultant inflation, which now stands at 30 per cent.

Shor has denied ever receiving support from Moscow. “We are an absolutely independent party which defends only the position of Moldovan citizens,” he insisted. He blamed the Moldovan government’s pro-Western tilt for bringing the country close to what he called “economic collapse.”

President Sandu on Feb. 13 declared that Russia was seeking to violently oust her country’s leadership by people posing as anti-government protesters. Last year Moscow cut its supply of gas to Moldova by half and energy bills now consume more than 70 per cent of household income.

Moldovans have endured blackouts throughout the winter. The United States is providing $30 million in direct budgetary support, and President Joe Biden asked Sandu to attend a NATO meeting on Feb. 21. “I am proud to stand with you and the freedom-loving Moldovan people,” he told her.

Moldova’s parliament has now approved the formation of a new government led by Dorin Recean, who promised to continue the policy of planned integration into the EU. “Russia is an aggressor state,” Rosian Vasiloi, head of Moldova’s border police, remarked.

But on Feb. 19 thousands of protesters travelled to Chisinau by bus, with their costs reportedly covered by the Sor party. The country remains politically on edge.