What Explains the Rise in Populism Globally?

Henry Srebrnik, [Fredericton, NB] Daily Gleaner

David Goodhart, in his 2017 book The Road to Somewhere: The New Tribes Shaping British Politics, argues that there is now a new political fault line in politics today.

This fault line separates those who come from “somewhere” – people rooted in a specific place or community, socially conservative, often less educated – as opposed to those who could come from “anywhere.” These people are urban, socially liberal and university educated.

Ian Bremmer’s 2018 book Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism, makes the same distinctions. A large segment of society, he writes, isn’t partaking in any economic growth and when workers see threats to their livelihoods, they demand barriers against cheap labour and unfamiliar faces.

But liberal elites in western counties have managed to create the impression that the conflict over immigration is between defenders of human rights on the one hand, and xenophobic nationalists on the other. Unfortunately, it isn't that simple; immigration can have negative economic effects on workers, yet the trade-offs inherent in any public policy are rarely openly debated when it comes to this subject.

In fact, there is an absence of thoughtful, rational debate on national identity. This is in part because of social pressures like political correctness, which make it taboo to express opinions that don't jibe with that mainstream view. But it's also because of a bias in important institutions, which reinforce what Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau once referenced as the ideal of a “post-nationa” society.

Many different institutions create this bias, including a normative liberal press, NGOs funded by liberal foundations, and scholars from institutions dominated by identity politics and connected to an international academic community, who lend their authority to a politically correct narrative. Finally, we have a judiciary which can strike down government actions through judicial review, even when these actions are supported by legislative majorities.

Too often, liberal institutions discount the value of rootedness and tend to run roughshod over local attachments. The open immigration policies of most First World countries have undercut national identities. So have international trade agreements that favour the mobility of labour and capital, and reduce the control of states over their own economic policies.

From the point of view of the “anywheres,” institutions like these serve a moral purpose: to advance the goals of a common humanity without regard to specific local or national communities.

Yet whatever their advantages, the power of these bodies sows discontent among those rooted in a particular place and with a particular group. They feel disconnected from the political processes that govern them. This creates resentment.

We shouldn't be surprised that the result is a turn toward populist politics – where candidates claim to represent the views and interests of the average person, instead of grand ideals coming out of courtrooms, universities and international trade conferences.

Whether today's greater voice for populists is a good thing or not is certainly debatable. Many people argue convincingly that populists don't govern well.

My point is that there is more to the story than saying one side of today's politics is "woke" while the other remains ignorant. It's more complicated.

The central conflict of our times is not between left and right but between people from “Somewhere” and people from “Anywhere.” As I citizen of three countries, and with four university degrees, there's no doubt that I qualify as an “anywhere.” But I can appreciate how the “somewheres” feel.