Professor Henry Srebrnik

Professor Henry Srebrnik

Thursday, October 15, 2026

Morocco’s Shifting Domestic and International Politics

 

By Henry Srebrnik, Fredericton Daily Gleaner

Last summer, some 60,000 migrants pushed their way into the Spanish town of Ceuta, a coastal enclave on the Moroccan side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Ceuta and its sister enclave Melilla have long been a source of tension between Madrid and Rabat, with Morocco claiming the territories as its own.

The Spanish-Moroccan boundary on the African side of the Mediterranean is the line on the ground with the greatest economic disparity from side to side in the world. It’s the border between the developed world and the Global South. So the relationship between the two countries is as thick and complex as globalization itself. It is also part of a larger geopolitical conflict that involves Algeria, Israel, and the United States, relating to Morocco’s occupation of the old Spanish Sahara.

Morocco’s sudden lapse in border enforcement may be in response to deepening ties between the left-wing government of socialist prime minister Pedro Sanchez in Spain with Algeria, including the reopening of lucrative economic ties, as well as Moroccan resentment over the perceived colonial nature of Spanish rule in Ceuta. (Rather than rebuking Morocco, Sanchez thanked Rabat for defusing the situation.)

Algeria has long supported Sahrawi separatists in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. And it considers itself a paragon of Third World leadership, the legacy of its bloody revolution against France from 1954 to 1962. So it doesn’t like the increasingly close relationship by monarchist Morocco with the Trump administration in Washington and Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, under the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and several Arab states, including Morocco, in 2020. Morocco also signed a security agreement with Israel in 2021, proving vital for the conflict in Western Sahara, and in January, the two nations signed an additional joint military work plan.

The dispute over Western Sahara traces back to Spain’s 1975 withdrawal from what was then called Spanish Sahara, which handed administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania; Mauritania withdrew from its share in 1979 after heavy losses to Sahrawi guerrillas. A 16-year war followed, pitting Moroccan forces against the Polisario Front. Rabat eventually built an extensive sand wall, fortified with landmines and troops, partitioning the territory.  A shaky stalemate is now in place.

To show its appreciation to Trump on the Western Saara issue, Morocco recently announced that it was naming the Dakhla-Tiznit highway, which runs through Western Sahara, after the U.S. president. Meanwhile, the Polisario Front sits across the border in the Algerian town of Tindouf, where thousands of displaced Saharawi people live in refugee camps.

The Ceuta crisis also stems from Morocco’s internal political dynamics. Morocco is a semi-constitutional monarchy led by a king, who governs alongside an elected parliament where Islamist, secular, and nationalist parties compete for political influence. Islamist groups dedicated to challenging the legitimacy of the monarchy itself also operate within the country, because they believe the king does not conform to their interpretation of Islamic law and governance.

This opposition intensified after Morocco normalized relations with Israel and it gained momentum after the Gaza war began three years ago. Also, though Morocco has never formally recognized Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves, successive Moroccan governments refrained from actively pursuing these territorial claims.

Islamists in Morocco consider the territories to be part of historic Muslim land, and reclaiming them to be a religious imperative. “We are still required to work diligently for the return of Ceuta and Melilla to the homeland,” asserted Abdelilah Benkirane, Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), the main Islamist party, earlier this year. In contrast to other Islamist players, the PJD has a longer record as an officially recognised and institutional actor.

According to their narrative, Morocco is not worth anyone’s loyalty until the government is overhauled. Young Moroccans are urged toward a permanent stance of confrontation with the West. The PJD and others claim that Morocco in its current political system has no future, and Islamist rule is the only viable salvation.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to blunt their message, King Mohammed VI asked Fatima Zahra El Mansouri, a lawyer from the centrist Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), to form a new government. The Moroccan king, who took the throne in 1999, has been broadly supportive of women’s rights.

Her selection comes after legislative elections held Sept. 23 were characterized by low turnout, amid widespread frustration over unemployment and poor public services, as well as concern about the exodus of Moroccans in search of better economic opportunities. Unemployment is high, with about one-third of young Moroccans jobless. About one-fifth of the work force is considered underemployed. Schools and hospitals are crumbling, and the space for public expression is shrinking.

Her party won 97 of 395 legislative seats, far from a majority, so she promised to form a coalition government with other moderates promptly. But the Islamist PJD took 54 seats – a big gain of 41.

El Mansouri has been nicknamed the “pasha’s daughter” because she comes from a prominent Marrakesh family and her father was formerly a municipal governor. She referred to her selection as “historic,” and framed it as a win for all women in Morocco. “This isn’t just pride for me but pride for all women,” she declared. “This is a message to all women in the kingdom.” It’s a work in progress.

 

No comments: