By Henry Srebrnik, Saint John Telegraph-Journal
Since Iran’s defeat in the 12-day war against Israel and the United States last June, the country has been dealing with political crises, rising domestic dissent, deepening economic turmoil, and environmental crises ranging from drought to air pollution. Iranian women also have been defying discriminatory public dress codes.
Iran’s economy has bottomed out. The rial, Iran’s currency, hit a record low of 1.43 million against a single U.S. dollar in December. Inflation reached 42.2 per cent, and costs rose a staggering 50 per cent for health and medical goods and 72 per cent for foodstuffs, hitting families and small-business owners particularly hard.
This is why even routine fiscal measures have now triggered backlash. Reports that the government planned to raise taxes starting March 21 immediately fueled public anger, and demonstrations began Dec. 28, not simply because taxes are unpopular, but because the increase is widely understood to finance expanding allocations to military, security, and religious institutions. In a context of currency collapse and eroding purchasing power, the public no longer trusts the state to manage revenue competently or distribute it equitably.
Iran’s theocratic regime has managed to cling to power and overcome several anti-government movements in recent decades. Instead of tackling the underlying political, economic and social problems, the government has used its security apparatus to suppress dissent.
In the summer of 1999, the Iranian government shuttered the reform-oriented newspaper Salam, prompting students to hold peaceful protests in the capital, Tehran. In response, security forces stormed a student dormitory, killing at least one student. The operation sparked nationwide protests that lasted several days. Pro-regime Basij militias then launched a violent crackdown against the demonstrators. Some students disappeared without a trace, and between 1,200 and 1,400 people were arrested.
A decade later, in 2009, Iran once again faced mass protests during the “Green Revolution.” The unrest was sparked by a controversial presidential election. Regime critics disputed the victory of the then-president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and claimed widespread electoral fraud. Millions of Iranians took to the streets in protest. But the regime rejected a repeat election, tightened censorship, and cracked down on the demonstrators.
In November 2019, sudden protests erupted across Iran following an abrupt jump in fuel prices. The rallies began peacefully with economic demands serving as the focal point. However, anti-regime voices grew stronger, and there were increasing calls to overthrow Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Authorities responded by shutting off the internet and with another violent crackdown, with security forces firing live ammunition at demonstrators. Dozens of young protesters were sentenced to death in summary trials.
Jina Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman, died in police custody in September 2022, accused of improperly wearing a hijab. The “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement demanded more rights for women. The government responded by launching another wave of repression, firing live ammunition at demonstrators. Thousands of people were arrested, and many were killed.
Can this time be different? Iran is in the grip of a severe and structural water crisis -- an ecological reckoning born of decades of mismanagement and over-extraction. A country of more than 90 million people is confronting its worst drought in over half a century, with collapsing aquifers, dried rivers, and water rationing spreading across cities and provinces. Protests linked to water scarcity have already flared in Khuzestan and Isfahan. Water shortages do not discriminate, and those dying of thirst have nothing to lose.
The latest political protests, including merchants, students, farmers, and even some police officers, have spread to more than 100 cities in all of Iran’s 31 provinces. Reports speak of many thousands already dead. Protesters have grown more emboldened, with crowds openly chanting “Long Live the Shah,” a slogan that signals an outright rejection of the regime.
The chants reflect renewed support for the exiled Pahlavi dynasty, led by Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, and mark a shift from economic grievances to explicit calls for regime change. The aim is nothing less than the destruction of the Islamic Republic.
It signifies a broader rejection of the clerical leadership’s emphasis on pan-Islamic causes and foreign proxy conflicts, and a growing desire to reclaim an Iranian national identity rooted in the country’s Persian history.
But Iran is not a monolithic Persian entity. The return of the Shah’s rule would not necessarily make non-Persians, such as the Baloch and the Azerbaijani Turks, happy.
As clerical authority erodes, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has steadily accumulated power, filling the vacuum left by pious exhaustion. They have long ceased to be merely a parallel military. The IRGC is a self-financing power structure that fuses battlefield experience, economic capture, and regional penetration into a single system of rule.
The regime had been planning a 24 per cent budget increase for the IRGC. However, in response, protesters have torn down posters and statues of the late IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani, killed in January 2020 in Iraq by a U.S. air strike. They may not necessarily inherit the state.
Conditions in Iran have deteriorated to the point that Ayatollah Khamenei reportedly has prepared contingency plans to flee to Moscow should the protests intensify or the security forces falter. Economic collapse, international sanctions, and devastating military defeats have left the theocracy weaker than at any point since its founding in 1979.
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