Syria Remains a Middle Eastern Muddle

 

By Henry Srebrnik, Saint John Telegraph-Journal

The collapse of the Ba’athist Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 involved more than regime change. It intensified the fight over the country’s future by its two main neighbours, Israel and Turkey, while also confirming Russia’s diminished role as the former ally of its defeated rulers.

For Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it paved the way for an enhanced role in the entire region. A week after President Bashar al-Assad’s demise, Erdogan declared that “Turkey is bigger than Turkey,” that “as a nation, we cannot limit our vision to 782,000 square kilometers.” Turkey “cannot escape its destiny,” he continued. “Those who say, ‘What does Turkey have to do in Libya or Somalia?’ ” -- countries where Ankara has been active -- “do not comprehend this.”

Over the past decade, the country has signed defence and security partnerships with ten other states, from the Balkans, Caucasus and north Africa to the Middle East itself. Turkey even wants to normalize relations with an old foe, Armenia. The Ottoman Empire, once derided by modern Turkey’s political elite as a relic of decline, has been rehabilitated as a model of order and pluralism.

Turkey’s main ambitions remain in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Sunni group that toppled the old dictatorship, has long enjoyed Turkish support. Since its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, took control in Damascus, Turkey has assisted the new regime with security training and equipment, border management, humanitarian aid, agricultural equipment, and urgent repair work on Syria’s energy grid.

Turkish firms are starting to bid for construction, energy, and road projects inside Syria. Ankara also successfully lobbied Saudi Arabia, the United States, and various European capitals to lift Assad-era sanctions. All this is part of Erdogan’s concept of a Turkish-led regional order.

The main nation standing in his way is Israel, which over the past year has emerged as a regional hegemon after its war with Iran and military campaigns inside Lebanon, Qatar, and Syria, as well as in Gaza. But Turkey’s increasing standing in Washington and other Western capitals, together with its harsh rhetoric toward the Jewish state, contributes to Israel’s unease.

Israel is determined to prevent any outside power from consolidating control over Syria and helping the new government build a military and political apparatus capable of threatening Israel’s northern border. Israel has sought military control over a 260-square-kilometre buffer zone inside Syria. (The Gulf monarchies, too, remain wary of Turkish ambitions, and they can also complicate Ankara’s project by withholding financial support to Syria.)

Although Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria began with the military operations launched there in 2016, it was only after Assad’s removal that Ankara’s aspirations regarding other parts of Syria became realistic. If it were solely up to Turkey, military bases would already have been established in Syria, but both the conduct of Syrian President al-Sharaa, who is seeking to diversify his external sources of support, as well as actions by Israel, have thus far blocked Turkey’s intentions. For instance, Turkey had scoped out at least three airbases in Syria where it could deploy forces as part of a planned joint defence pact before Israel hit those sites with airstrikes last April.

Both Turkey and Israel fear an aerial confrontation with each other. The willingness of both sides to operate through a “hotline,” established following talks between Turkish and Israeli officials in Baku, Azerbaijan, is a clear sign that both parties still recoil from direct confrontation.

Nonetheless, Israel views al-Sharaa with profound suspicion because he had led an armed group formally linked, until a decade ago, to al-Qaeda. He continues even now to have extremist fighters in his ranks.

Israeli forces immediately seized 400 square kilometres of territory, including additional positions atop Mount Hermon, a strategic peak straddling the Syria-Lebanon border. The Israeli Air Force launched hundreds of airstrikes on Syrian military installations to deny the new Syrian leader access to weapons.

Israel has also been seeking to shape developments in Syria by supporting allied Druze militiamen as part of an effort to weaken the country’s national cohesion. In this it complicates Washington’s position (not to mention Turkey’s).

The covert Israeli activities are part of a long-running effort to prop up the Druze, a religious minority often at odds with mainstream Muslim Arabs, effectively undermining al-Sharaa’s ability to centralize power. Israeli officials believe Washington is naive when it accepts al-Shaara’s insistence he has given up his extremist views. This has been a source of tension between Israel and the Trump administration, which has made support for the new regime in Damascus a key plank of U.S. regional policy.

Some Israeli and American analysts argue that Israel’s aggressive use of military force in Syria and its clandestine efforts to promote Druze separatism were counterproductive and undercut relations at a time when al-Sharaa appeared eager to reach a diplomatic détente.

Meanwhile, Turkey has been working in recent weeks to deploy radar systems inside Syrian territory. The move is expected to significantly limit Israel’s freedom of movement in Syrian airspace.

Bringing Syria into a pro-Western orbit can also help diminish Russia’s presence. It still maintains a naval facility in Tartus and an air base at Khmeimim. Vladimir Putin hopes to maintain a foothold in the country, but that may not last. Today, the Assads are fugitives living in Moscow.